

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

MEMBER/OFFICER POST-TRAVEL DISCLOSURE FORM Original Amendment

This form is for disclosing the receipt of travel expenses from a private source for travel taken in connection with a Member or officer's official duties. This form does not eliminate the need to report privately-funded travel on the Member or officer's annual *Financial Disclosure Statement*. In accordance with House Rule 25, clause 5, **you must complete this form and file it with the Clerk of the House by email at gifttravelreports@mail.house.gov, within 15 days after travel is completed.** Please **do not** file this form with the Committee on Ethics.

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

1. Name of Traveler: Veronica Escobar
2. a. Name of Accompanying Relative: _____ **OR** None
b. Relationship to Traveler: Spouse Child Other (specify): _____
3. a. Dates: Departure: Feb. 16, 2024 Return: Feb. 19, 2024
b. Dates at Personal Expense, if any: _____ **OR** None
4. Departure City: Washington, D.C. Destination: Munich and Kruen, Germany Return City: El Paso, TX
5. Sponsor(s), Who Paid for the Trip: German Marshall Fund, Charles F. Kettering Foundation, Robert Bosch Stiftung, and American Friends of MSC
6. Describe Meetings and Events Attended (attach additional pages if necessary): at the Munich Security Conference, Rep. Escobar attended sessions about international security and learned how countries are responding to global issues. At Elamu, she attended discussions on U.S.-Germany bilateral relationships and how to better work together across mutual issues.
7. Attached to this form are **each** of the following, *signify that each item is attached by checking the corresponding box*:
 - a. a completed *Sponsor Post-Travel Disclosure Form*;
 - b. the *Primary Trip Sponsor Form* completed by the trip sponsor **prior** to the trip, **including all** attachments **and** the *Additional Sponsor Form(s)*;
 - c. page 2 of the completed *Traveler Form* submitted by the Member or officer; **and**
 - d. the letter from the Committee on Ethics approving my participation on this trip.
8. a. I represent that I participated in each of the activities reflected in the attached sponsor's agenda. *Signify statement is true by checking the box.*
b. If not, explain: _____

I certify that the information contained in this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge. I have determined that all of the expenses on the attached *Sponsor Post-Travel Disclosure Form* were necessary and that the travel was in connection with my duties as a Member or officer of the U.S. House of Representatives and would not create the appearance that I am using public office for private gain.

Member / Officer Signature: _____

Veronica Escobar

Date: 02/29/2024

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

SPONSOR POST-TRAVEL DISCLOSURE FORM

Original Amendment

This form must be completed by an officer of any organization that served as the primary trip sponsor in providing travel expenses or reimbursement for travel expenses to House Members, officers, or employees under House Rule 25, clause 5. **A completed copy of the form must be provided to each House Member, officer, or employee who participated in the trip within 10 days of their return.** You must answer all questions, and check all boxes, on this form for your submission to comply with House Rules and the Committee's Travel Regulations. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in the denial of future requests to sponsor trips and/or subject the current traveler to disciplinary action or a requirement to repay the trip expenses.

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

- Sponsor(s) who paid or provided in-kind support for the trip: German Marshall Fund of the United States
Charles F. Kettering Foundation, Robert Bosch Stiftung, American Friends of MSC
- Travel Destination(s): Munich, Germany and Kruen, Germany
- Date of Departure: Feb 16, 2024 Date of Return: Feb 19, 2024
- Name(s) of Traveler(s): Congresswoman Veronica Escobar
Note: You may list more than one traveler on a form only if all information is identical for each person listed.
- Actual amount** of expenses paid on behalf of, or reimbursed to, each individual named in Question 4:

	Total Transportation Expenses	Total Lodging Expenses	Total Meal Expenses	Total Other Expenses (dollar amount per item and description)
Traveler	\$6,290.78	\$1,715.68	\$415.61	
Accompanying Family Member				

- All expenses connected to the trip were for actual costs incurred and not a *per diem* or lump sum payment. *Signify statement is true by checking box.*

I certify that the information contained in this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature:  Date: 03/26/2024

Name: Laura Hope Gammell-Ibanez Title: Corporate Secretary & Chief of Staff

Organization: The German Marshall Fund of the United States

I am an officer of the above-named organization. Signify statement is true by checking box.

Address: 1744 R St NW; Washington, DC 20009

Telephone: +1 202 683 2627 Email: LGammell@gmfus.org

Committee staff may contact the above-named individual if additional information is required.

If you have questions regarding your completion of this form, please contact the Committee on Ethics at 202-225-7103.

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

TRAVELER FORM

This form should be completed by House Members, officers, or employees seeking Committee approval of privately-sponsored travel or reimbursement for travel under House Rule 25, clause 5. The completed form should be submitted directly to the Committee by each invited House Member, officer, or employee, together with the completed and signed trip sponsor form(s) and any attachments. A copy of this form, minus this initial page, will be made available for public inspection.

This form and any attachments may be submitted at 1015 Longworth House Office Building or travel.requests@mail.house.gov.

Your completed request must be submitted to the Committee no less than 30 days before your proposed departure date. Absent exceptional circumstances, permission will not be granted for requests received less than 30 days before the trip commences. **You must receive explicit approval from the Committee before you depart on this trip.**

Name of Traveler: Veronica Escobar

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

I certify that the information contained on both pages of this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: _____



Name of Signatory (if other than traveler): _____

Veronica Escobar

For Staff (name of employing Member or Committee): _____

Congresswoman Veronica Escobar

Office Address: _____

2448 Rayburn HOB, 45 Independence Ave, Washington, D.C. 20515

Telephone Number: _____

202-225-4831

Email Address of Contact Person: _____

jessica.andino@mail.house.gov

Check this box if the sponsoring entity is a media outlet, the purpose of the trip is to make a media appearance sponsored by that entity, and these forms are being submitted to the Committee less than 30 days before the trip departure date.

NOTE: You must complete all of the contact information fields above, as Committee staff may need to contact you if additional information is required.

KEEP A COPY OF THIS FORM. Page 2 (but not this page) must be submitted to the Clerk as part of the post-travel disclosure required by House Rule 25. Travel Regulation § 404(d) also requires you to keep a copy of all request forms and supporting paperwork for three subsequent Congresses from the date of travel.

If there are any questions regarding this form, please contact the Committee on Ethics at 202-225-7103 or via email: travel.requests@mail.house.gov.

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

TRAVELER FORM


1. Name of Traveler: Veronica Escobar
2. Sponsor(s) who will be paying or providing in-kind support for the trip: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Robert Bosch Stiftung, The Kettering Foundation, Americans Friends of the Munich Security Cc
3. City and State **OR** Foreign Country of Travel: Munich, Germany & Kruen, Germany
4. a. Date of Departure: February 16, 2024 Date of Return: February 20, 2024
b. Yes No Will you be extending the trip at your personal expense?
If yes, list dates at personal expense: _____
5. a. Yes No Will you be accompanied by a family member at the sponsor's expense? **If yes:**
 - (1) Name of Accompanying Family Member: _____
 - (2) Relationship to Traveler: Spouse Child Other (specify): _____
 - (3) Yes No Accompanying Family Member is at least 18 years of age?
6. a. Yes No Did the trip sponsor answer "Yes" to Question 8(c) on the *Primary Trip Sponsor Form* (i.e., travel is sponsored by an entity that employs a registered federal lobbyist or a foreign agent)?
b. **If yes**, and you are requesting lodging for two nights, explain why the second night is warranted:

7. Yes No *Primary Trip Sponsor Form* is attached, including agenda, invitation, invitee list, and any other attachments and Additional Sponsor Forms.
NOTE: The agenda should show the traveler's individual schedule, including departure and arrival times and identify the specific events in which the traveler will be participating.
8. Explain why participation in the trip is connected to the traveler's individual official or representational duties. **Staff should include their job title and how the activities on the itinerary relate to their duties.**
Congresswoman Veronica Escobar will participate in the Congress-Bundestag Exchange 2024 – Connecting Future Transatlantic Leadership to serve as representative for the US Congress, identify transatlantic policy challenge, and to work on mutually beneficial solutions in both German and US foreign policy.

9. **Yes No Is the traveler aware of any registered federal lobbyists or foreign agents involved in planning, organizing, requesting, or arranging the trip?**
10. For staff travelers, to be completed by your employing Member:

ADVANCED AUTHORIZATION OF EMPLOYEE TRAVEL

I hereby authorize the individual named above, an employee of the U.S. House of Representatives who works under my direct supervision, to accept expenses for the trip described in this request. I have determined that the above-described travel is in connection with my employee's official duties and that acceptance of these expenses will not create the appearance that the employee is using public office for private gain.

Signature of Employing Member:  Date: 1-16-24

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

PRIMARY TRIP SPONSOR FORM

This form should be completed by private entities offering to provide travel or reimbursement for travel to House Members, officers, or employees under House Rule 25, clause 5. A completed copy of the form (and any attachments) should be provided to each invited House Member, officer, or employee, who will then forward it to the Committee together with a *Traveler Form* **at least 30 days before the start date of the trip**. The trip sponsor should *NOT* submit the form directly to the Committee. The Committee's website (ethics.house.gov) provides detailed instructions for filling out the form. The Committee will notify the House invitees directly of its decision and will not notify the trip sponsors.

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Failure to comply with the Committee's Travel Regulations may also lead to the denial of permission to sponsor future trips. Signatures must comply with section 104(bb) of the Travel Regulations.

1. Sponsor who will be paying for the trip:

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

2. I represent that the trip will not be financed, in whole or in part, by a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent. *Signify that the statement is true by checking box.*

3. **Check only one.** I represent that:

- a. The primary trip sponsor has not accepted from any other source, funds intended directly or indirectly to finance any aspect of the trip; **OR**
- b. The trip is arranged without regard to congressional participation and the primary trip sponsor has accepted funds only from entities that will receive a tangible benefit in exchange for those funds; **OR**
- c. The primary trip sponsor has accepted funds, services, or in-kind assistance from other source(s) intended directly or indirectly to finance all or part of this trip and has enclosed disclosure forms from each of those entities.

If "c" is checked, list the names of the additional sponsors: The Robert Bosch Stiftung, The Kettering Foundation,
American Friends of the Munich Security Conference

4. Provide names and titles of **ALL** House Members *and* employees you are inviting. **For each House invitee, provide an explanation of why the individual was invited** (include additional pages if necessary): Please see addendum A

5. Yes No Is travel being offered to an accompanying family member of the House invitee(s)?

6. Date of Departure: February 16, 2024 Date of Return: February 20, 2024

7. a. City of departure: Washington, D.C.

b. Destination(s): Munich, Germany & Kruen, Germany

c. City of return: Washington, D.C. or District of Representative

8. **Check only one.** I represent that

- a. The sponsor of the trip is an institution of higher education within the meaning of section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965; **OR**
- b. The sponsor of the trip does not retain or employ a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent; **OR**
- c. The sponsor employs or retains a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent, but the trip is for attendance at a one-day event *and* lobbyist / foreign agent involvement in planning, organizing, requesting, or arranging the trip was *de minimis* under the Committee's travel regulations.

9. **Check only one of the following.**

- a. I checked 8(a) or (b) above; **OR**
- b. I checked 8(c) above but am not offering any lodging; **OR**
- c. I checked 8(c) above and am offering lodging and meals for one night; **OR**
- d. I checked 8(c) above and am offering lodging and meals for two nights. If you checked this box, explain why the second night of lodging is warranted. _____

10. Attached is a detailed agenda of the activities House invitees will be participating in during the travel (i.e., an hourly description of planned activities for trip invitees). *Indicate agenda is attached by checking box.*

11. **Check only one of the following.**

- a. I represent that a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent will not accompany House Members or employees on any segment of the trip. *Signify the statement is true by clicking the box; OR*
- b. *Not Applicable.* Trip sponsor is a U.S. institution of higher education.

12. For *each* sponsor required to submit a sponsor form, describe the **sponsor's** interest in the subject matter of the trip **and** its role in organizing and/or conducting the trip:

~~The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan policy organization committed to the idea that the United States and Europe are stronger together. To build stronger relationships between US and European policymakers, we have organized exchanges and dialogue formats between Members of Congress and the Bundestag since 2003. These exchanges give US lawmakers an opportunity to network and develop better working relationships with their German colleagues. GMF is responsible for all aspects of the trip, including recruitment of participants and creation of the agenda. Please see addendum B for more information.~~

13. **Answer parts a and b. Answer part c if necessary:**

- a. Mode of travel: Air Rail Bus Car Other (specify: _____)
- b. Class of travel: Coach Business First Charter Other (specify: _____)
- c. If travel will be first class, or by chartered or private aircraft, explain why such travel is warranted:

14. I represent that the expenditures related to local area travel during the trip will be unrelated to personal or recreational activities of the invitee(s). *Signify that the statement is true by checking box.*

15. **Check only one.** I represent that either:

- a. The trip involves an event that is arranged or organized *without regard* to congressional participation and that meals provided to congressional participants are similar to those provided to or purchased by other event attendees; **OR**
- b. The trip involves events that are arranged specifically *with regard* to congressional participation. If "b" is checked:
 - 1) Detail the cost *per day* of meals (approximate cost may be provided): 94 \$ per day in Munich.
Please note that the hotel in Elmau is inclusive and costs include all meals.
 - 2) Provide the reason for selecting the location of the event or trip: Please see Addendum C.

16. Name, nightly cost, and reasons for selecting each hotel or other lodging facility:

Hotel Name: Schloss Elmau City: Kruen Cost Per Night: \$630
Reason(s) for Selecting: Superior conference facilities, inclusive of meals, prior use of location, see Addendum B
Hotel Name: Hilton Munich City City: Munich Cost Per Night: \$220
Reason(s) for Selecting: The Hilton Munich City is one of the hotels partnering with the Munich Security Conference.
Hotel Name: _____ City: _____ Cost Per Night: _____
Reason(s) for Selecting: _____

17. I represent that all expenses connected to the trip will be for actual costs incurred and not a per diem or lump sum payment. *Signify that the statement is true by checking the box.*

18. **Total Expenses for each Participant:**

<input type="checkbox"/> Actual Amounts <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Good Faith Estimates	Total Transportation Expenses per Participant	Total Lodging Expenses per Participant	Total Meal Expenses per Participant
For each Member, Officer, or Employee	\$6500	\$1480	\$242
For each Accompanying Family Member			


	Other Expenses (dollar amount per item)	Identify Specific Nature of "Other" Expenses (e.g., taxi, parking, registration fee, etc.)
For each Member, Officer, or Employee	\$180	ground transportation
For each Accompanying Family Member		

19. **Check only one:**

- a. I certify that I am an officer of the organization listed below; **OR**
- b. *Not Applicable.* Trip sponsor is an individual or a U.S. institution of higher education.

20. **I certify by my signature that**

- a. **I read and understand the Committee's Travel Regulations;**
- b. **I am not a registered federal lobbyist or registered foreign agent; and**
- c. **The information on this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.**

Signature:  Date: 1/10/2024
 Name: Laura Hope Gammell-Ibañez Title: Corporate Secretary & Chief of Staff
 Organization: The German Marshall Fund of the United States
 Address: 1744 R St NW, Washington, D.C. 20009
 Email: LGammell@gmfus.org Telephone: +1 202 683 2627

If there are questions regarding this form, please contact the Committee on Ethics at 202-225-7103 or travel.requests@mail.house.gov.

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

ADDITIONAL TRIP SPONSOR FORM

This form should be completed by an organization that provides funds, services, or in-kind assistance to another entity to underwrite, in whole or in part, a trip or an event, meal, or activity that will occur during a trip, or a necessary expense that will be incurred during a trip, with express or implicit knowledge or understanding that one or more House Members or employees may participate in or attend that trip or event, or otherwise may be beneficiaries of the gift or donation. **Provide a copy of your completed form to the primary sponsor of the trip.**

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Failure to comply with the Committee's Travel Regulations may also lead to the denial of permission to sponsor future trips. Signatures must comply with section 104(bb) of the Travel Regulations.

1. Name of Primary Trip Sponsor for this trip: German Marshall Fund
2. Name of your organization: Charles F. Kettering Foundation
3. Yes No Is your organization designated a § 501(c)(3) charitable organization by the Internal Revenue Service?
4. Yes No Does your organization receive funding from any foreign government or multinational organization?
5. **Check one.** I certify that my organization:
 - a. Has provided a grant, gift, or donation to the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor and conducts an audit or review of its grant, gift, or donation to ensure that the funds are spent in accordance with the terms of its grant, gift, or donation. **OR**
 - b. Has had a direct role in the organizing, planning, or conducting of a trip to
Destination: _____ on Date: _____
that is being organized or arranged by the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor. **OR**
 - c. Has provided in-kind support to the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor (e.g., meeting planning assistance, meeting space and set-up, and paying for expenses related to this trip directly to the service provider).
6. **Check only one:**
 - a. My organization does not employ or retain a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent **OR**
 - b. My organization employs a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent, but their involvement in planning, organizing, or arranging the trip was *de minimis* under the travel regulations.
7. **I certify by my signature that**
 - a. I read and understand the Committee's Travel Regulations;
 - b. I am not a registered federal lobbyist or registered foreign agent;
 - c. I am an officer of this organization and am duly authorized to sign this form; and
 - d. The information on this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature:  Date: 1/10/2024

Name: Maxine S. Thomas Title: Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel

Organization: Charles F. Kettering Foundation

Address: 200 Commons Road Dayton, Ohio

Telephone: 937-439-9808 Email: mthomas@kettering.org

If there are questions regarding this form, please contact the Committee on Ethics at 202-225-7103 or travel.requests@mail.house.gov.

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

ADDITIONAL TRIP SPONSOR FORM

This form should be completed by an organization that provides funds, services, or in-kind assistance to another entity to underwrite, in whole or in part, a trip or an event, meal, or activity that will occur during a trip, or a necessary expense that will be incurred during a trip, with express or implicit knowledge or understanding that one or more House Members or employees may participate in or attend that trip or event, or otherwise may be beneficiaries of the gift or donation. **Provide a copy of your completed form to the primary sponsor of the trip.**

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Failure to comply with the Committee's Travel Regulations may also lead to the denial of permission to sponsor future trips. Signatures must comply with section 104(bb) of the Travel Regulations.

1. Name of Primary Trip Sponsor for this trip: The German Marshall Fund of the United States

2. Name of your organization: Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH

3. Yes No Is your organization designated a § 501(c)(3) charitable organization by the Internal Revenue Service?

4. Yes No Does your organization receive funding from any foreign government or multinational organization?

5. **Check one.** I certify that my organization:

a. Has provided a grant, gift, or donation to the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor and conducts an audit or review of its grant, gift, or donation to ensure that the funds are spent in accordance with the terms of its grant, gift, or donation. **OR**

b. Has had a direct role in the organizing, planning, or conducting of a trip to

Destination: _____ on Date: _____

that is being organized or arranged by the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor. **OR**

c. Has provided in-kind support to the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor (e.g., meeting planning assistance, meeting space and set-up, and paying for expenses related to this trip directly to the service provider).

6. **Check only one:**

a. My organization does not employ or retain a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent **OR**

b. My organization employs a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent, but their involvement in planning, organizing, or arranging the trip was *de minimis* under the travel regulations.

7. **I certify by my signature that**

a. I read and understand the Committee's Travel Regulations;

b. I am not a registered federal lobbyist or registered foreign agent;

c. I am an officer of this organization and am duly authorized to sign this form; and

d. The information on this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: pki, BOSCH, DE, H, E, henry.alt-haaker Digital unterschrieben von pki, BOSCH, DE, H, E, henry alt-haaker
Datum: 2023.12.19 15:14:43 +01'00'

Date: 19.12.2023

Name: Henry Alt-Haaker

Title: Senior Vice President

Organization: Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH

Address: Franzoesische Strasse 32, 10117 Berlin

Telephone: +49 30 220025-322

Email: henry.alt-haaker@bosch-stiftung.de

If there are questions regarding this form, please contact the Committee on Ethics at 202-225-7103 or travel.requests@mail.house.gov.

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

ADDITIONAL TRIP SPONSOR FORM

This form should be completed by an organization that provides funds, services, or in-kind assistance to another entity to underwrite, in whole or in part, a trip or an event, meal, or activity that will occur during a trip, or a necessary expense that will be incurred during a trip, with express or implicit knowledge or understanding that one or more House Members or employees may participate in or attend that trip or event, or otherwise may be beneficiaries of the gift or donation. **Provide a copy of your completed form to the primary sponsor of the trip.**

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Failure to comply with the Committee's Travel Regulations may also lead to the denial of permission to sponsor future trips. Signatures must comply with section 104(bb) of the Travel Regulations.

1. Name of Primary Trip Sponsor for this trip: The German Marshall Fund of the United States
2. Name of your organization: American Friends of the Munich Security Conference
3. Yes No Is your organization designated a § 501(c)(3) charitable organization by the Internal Revenue Service?
4. Yes No Does your organization receive funding from any foreign government or multinational organization?
5. **Check one.** I certify that my organization:
 - a. Has provided a grant, gift, or donation to the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor and conducts an audit or review of its grant, gift, or donation to ensure that the funds are spent in accordance with the terms of its grant, gift, or donation. **OR**
 - b. Has had a direct role in the organizing, planning, or conducting of a trip to
Destination: _____ on Date: _____
that is being organized or arranged by the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor. **OR**
 - c. Has provided in-kind support to the above-named Primary Trip Sponsor (e.g., meeting planning assistance, meeting space and set-up, and paying for expenses related to this trip directly to the service provider).
6. **Check only one:**
 - a. My organization does not employ or retain a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent **OR**
 - b. My organization employs a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent, but their involvement in planning, organizing, or arranging the trip was *de minimis* under the travel regulations.
7. **I certify by my signature that**
 - a. I read and understand the Committee's Travel Regulations;
 - b. I am not a registered federal lobbyist or registered foreign agent;
 - c. I am an officer of this organization and am duly authorized to sign this form; and
 - d. The information on this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: Fred W. Reinke Date: Jan. 8, 2024

Name: Fred W. Reinke Title: President

Organization: American Friends of the Munich Security Conference

Address: 8005 Westover Road, Bethesda, MD 20814

Telephone: 202-262-1783 Email: fwreinke@gmail.com

If there are questions regarding this form, please contact the Committee on Ethics at 202-225-7103 or travel.requests@mail.house.gov.

Michael Guest, Mississippi
Chairman
Susan Wild, Pennsylvania
Ranking Member

David P. Joyce, Ohio
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Michelle Fischbach, Minnesota

Veronica Escobar, Texas
Mark DeSaulnier, California
Deborah K. Ross, North Carolina
Glenn F. Ivey, Maryland



ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

Thomas A. Rust
Staff Director and Chief Counsel

Keelie Broom
Counsel to the Chairman

David Arrojo
Counsel to the Ranking Member

1015 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6328
Telephone: (202) 225-7103
Facsimile: (202) 225-7392

February 14, 2024

The Honorable Veronica Escobar
U.S. House of Representatives
2448 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Colleague:

Pursuant to House Rule 25, clause 5(d)(2), the Committee on Ethics hereby approves your proposed trip to Germany, scheduled for February 16 to 20, 2024, sponsored by German Marshall Fund of the United States, Charles F. Kettering Foundation, Robert Bosch Stiftung, and American Friends of the Munich Security Conference.

You must complete a Member/Officer Post-Travel Disclosure Form and file it, together with a Sponsor Post-Travel Disclosure Form completed by the trip sponsor, with the Clerk of the House within 15 days after your return from travel. As part of that filing, you are also required to attach a copy of this letter and both the Traveler and Primary Trip Sponsor Forms (including attachments) you previously submitted to the Committee in seeking pre-approval for this trip. You must also report all travel expenses totaling more than \$480 from a single source on the "Travel" schedule of your annual Financial Disclosure Statement covering this calendar year. Finally, Travel Regulation § 404(d) also requires you to keep a copy of all request forms and supporting information provided to the Committee for three subsequent Congresses from the date of travel.

Because the trip may involve meetings with foreign government representatives, we note that House Members may accept, under the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (FGDA), gifts "of minimal value [currently \$480] tendered as a souvenir or mark of courtesy" by a foreign government. Any tangible gifts valued in excess of minimal value received from a foreign government must, within 60 days of acceptance, be disclosed on a Form for Disclosing Gifts from Foreign Governments and either turned over to the Clerk of the House, or, with the written approval of the Committee, retained for official use.

¹ Please be aware that the Committee's review of the proposed trip does not extend to either the security situation in the destination country or security related to foreign travel in general. We recommend you contact the Office of House Security (OHS) for a safety and security briefing prior to your departure. OHS may be reached at (202) 226-2044 or ohsstaff@mail.house.gov. House travelers should also register for the U.S. State Department's Smart Traveler Enrollment Program at <https://step.state.gov>.

If you have any further questions, please contact the Committee's Office of Advice and Education at extension 5-7103.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Michael Guest". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "M".

Michael Guest
Chairman

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Susan Wild". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "S".

Susan Wild
Ranking Member

MG/SW:rp

Connecting Future Transatlantic Leadership Congress-Bundestag Exchange

Munich & Schloss Elmau
February 17 – 20, 2024

AGENDA

A dialogue for German and American lawmakers to address transnational issues and examine forward-looking solutions to strengthen democracies on both sides of the Atlantic. GMF would like to thank the Friends of MSC, the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, and the Robert Bosch Foundation for supporting this exchange.

Friday, February 16, 2024

US Members of Congress depart on individual travel itineraries.

17:20 US Members of Congress Peter Aguilar, Jason Crow, Veronica Escobar and Lauren Underwood depart Washington, D.C. on flight UA108

Saturday, February 17, 2024

US Members of Congress and German Members of the Bundestag arrive in Munich on individual travel itineraries and attend the Munich Security Conference (MSC).

Accommodation: Hilton City Munich
Rosenheimer Strasse 15
81667 München

7:20 US Members of Congress Peter Aguilar, Jason Crow, Veronica Escobar and Lauren Underwood arrive in Munich

9:00 – 13:30 MSC Panel Discussions, Roundtables, Conversations and Townhall Meetings

Members of Congress and the Bundestag will attend panel discussions, roundtables, conversations featuring high-level speakers from politics and civil society at the MSC according to their individual programs.

13:30 – 15:00 MSC Lunch Discussions

Members of Congress and the Bundestag will attend lunch discussions at the MSC according to their individual programs.

15:15 – 19:15 MSC Panel Discussions, Roundtables, Conversations and Townhall Meetings

Members of Congress and the Bundestag will attend panel discussions, roundtables, conversations featuring high-level speakers from politics and civil society at the MSC according to their individual programs.

20:00 – 21:30 MSC Dinner Discussions

Members of Congress and the Bundestag will attend dinner discussion sessions at the MSC according to their individual programs.

22:00 – 23:00 MSC Night Cap Sessions

Members of Congress and the Bundestag will attend night cap sessions at the MSC according to their individual programs.

Sunday, February 18, 2024

7:30 – 9:00 MSC Breakfast Roundtables

Members of Congress and the Bundestag will attend breakfast roundtables at the MSC according to their individual programs.

9:30 – 11:30 MSC Panel Discussions, Roundtables, Conversations and Townhall Meetings

Members of Congress and the Bundestag will attend panel discussions, roundtables, conversations featuring high-level speakers from politics and civil society at the MSC according to their individual programs.

11:30 Meet GMF staff at the Bayerischer Hof
Short walk to lunch venue

12:00 – 14:00 Roundtable on Transatlantic Security

Speaker:

Boris Pistorius, German Minister of Defense (tentative)

Location: tbd

14:00 Transfer from MSC to Schloss Elmau will be provided. Please meet GMF staff at designated meeting spot and look for a **"GMF"** sign.

Accommodation: Schloss Elmau
82493 Elmau/Oberbayern
Tel. +49 8823 18 0

16:00 Members of Congress and the Bundestag arrive at Schloss Elmau and check-in

17:30 -18:30 Facilitated Opening Session

Welcome on behalf of Partners – Heather Conley, President, GMF

Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag are invited to share their views on representative democracy and leadership.

18:30 – 21:00 Dinner Discussion: The Necessities and Realities of Zeitenwende

Speaker.

Wolfgang Schmidt, Head of the Federal Chancellery and Federal Minister for Special Tasks

Monday, February 19, 2024

Starting at 7:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

9:00 – 10:30 Session I: Collective Security and Shared Prosperity in the Face of Global Disorder

Speakers:

General (Retired) James Mattis, Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Senior Counselor, The Cohen Group (invited)

Oby Ezekwesili, Senior Economic Adviser, Africa Economic Development Policy Initiative (invited)

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:30 Continuation of Session I: Working Groups

*Members will be split into groups to discuss policies and best practices regarding **defense capabilities, energy transition, and emerging technologies.***

12:30 – 13:45 Lunch Break

13:45 – 15:45 Session II: Demographic Change and Social Cohesion
Speakers:
Laura-Kristine Krause, Germany Director, More in Common

15:45 – 16:15 Coffee Break

16:15 – 18:15 Session III: Delivering Democracy Locally and for the Next Generation

Speakers:

Henry Alt-Haakar, Senior Vice President, Robert Bosch Foundation

Heather Conley, President GMF

Sharon L. Davies, President and CEO, Charles F. Kettering Foundation

Ambassador Rainer Rudolph, Vice Chair MSC

Representatives of partner organizations provide brief inputs on strengthening democracy. Members of Congress and the Bundestag will have solution-oriented discussion, reflecting on the partners' input and the situation in their constituencies.

19:30 – 21:30 Networking Dinner

Members of Congress and of the Bundestag will have the opportunity to reflect on how their experience at the Congress-Bundestag Exchange has informed their views on policy and transatlantic engagement.

Tuesday, February 20, 2024

Starting at 7:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

8:00 – 11:00 Departures

German Members of the Bundestag check-out and depart on individual itineraries

12:00 Rep. Peter Aguilar departs Munich on flight UA8860 to Los Angeles

15:35 Rep. Lauren Underwood departs Munich on flight UA8855 to Chicago

16:05 Rep. Jason Crow and Veronica Escobar depart Munich on flight UA761 to Denver (Rep. Veronica Escobar continues on flight UA6211 to El Paso)

House Ethics Addendum B
Congress-Bundestag Exchange 2024 – Connecting Future Transatlantic Leadership

The Charles F. Kettering Foundation works to inspire and connect individuals and organizations to advance thriving and inclusive democracies around the globe.

Robert Bosch Stiftung is a German foundation that supports projects in the areas of global issues, education and health.

The American Friends of the MSC aim to promote the activities of the Munich Security Conference in the United States of America.

Representatives of the three organizations will support the exchange by moderating and giving input during discussions.

House Ethics Addendum C
**Congress-Bundestag Exchange 2024 – Connecting Future Transatlantic
Leadership**

Munich will host the 60th iteration of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in 2024. It is a premier conference on international affairs. Lawmakers participating in our program will also be included in these debates and will be invited to participate at the MSC. Schloss Elmau was selected for its proximity to Munich and its superior conference facilities. G7 summits were hosted at the venue in 2015 and 2022. GMF has organized programs for lawmakers at Schloss Elmau in 2020, 2017, 2015 and 2013. Thanks to a package price, all meals will be included in the costs.

House Ethics Addendum A
Congress-Bundestag Exchange 2024 – Connecting Future Transatlantic Leadership

US-German relations are not only being reshaped by current security realities and renewed interest in the transatlantic relationship, but also by new leadership and political representatives in both countries. The German Marshall Fund of the United States will bring together the next generation of American and German leaders following the 2024 Munich Security Conference. The two-day gathering would allow for exchange between lawmakers who are often underrepresented in international conversations, including younger and diverse representatives as well as lawmakers from a variety of geographical backgrounds. The following Members of Congress were invited to participate due to their diverse backgrounds and their interest in contributing to transatlantic and international conversations:

Confirmed Members:

- Congressman Pete Aguilar (D-CA)
- Congressman Jason Crow (D-CO)
- Congresswoman Veronica Escobar (D-TX)
- Congresswoman Lauren Underwood (D-IL)

Invited Members:

- Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)
- Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove (D-CA)
- Rep. Mike Garcia (D-CA)
- Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-CA)
- Rep. Dusty Johnson (R-SD)
- Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA)
- Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL)
- Rep. Nick LaLota (R-NY)
- Rep. Mike Lawler (R-NY)
- Rep. Mikie Sherrill (D-NJ)
- Rep. Elisa Slotkin (D-MI)
- Rep. Haley Stevens (D-MI)
- Rep. Julie Letlow (R-LA)
- Rep. Jake Ellzey (R-TX)
- Rep. Austin Scott (R-GA)
- Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX)
- Rep. Maria Salazar (R-FL)
- Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA)
- Rep. Jennifer Kiggans (R-VA)

- Rep. Lori Chavez DeRemer (R-OR)

Members invited but declined:

- Rep. Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL)
- Rep. Maxwell Frost (D-FL)
- Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY)
- Rep. Grace Meng (D-NY)
- Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-MA)
- Rep. Nannette Barragan (D-CA)
- Rep. Ashley Hinson (R-IA)
- Rep. Nathan Moran (R-TX)
- Rep. Anthony D'Esposito (R-NY)
- Rep. Monica de la Cruz (R-TX)
- Rep. Zach Nunn (R-IA)
- Rep. Abigail Spanberger (D-VA)
- Rep. Tom Kean (R-NJ)
- Rep. John James (R-MI)
- Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA)
- Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI)
- Rep. Andy Kim (D-NJ)
- Rep. Reuben Gallego (D-AZ)
- Rep. Andrew Garbarino (R-NY)
- Rep. Laurel Lee (R-FL)
- Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-NY)



Connecting Future Transatlantic Leadership Congress-Bundestag Exchange

Munich & Schloss Elmau
February 17 – 20, 2024

Connecting Future Transatlantic Leadership Congress-Bundestag Exchange

Munich & Schloss Elmau
February 17 – 20, 2024

A dialogue for German and American lawmakers to address transnational issues and examine policies to strengthen democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) would like to thank the American Friends of MSC, the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, and the Robert Bosch Foundation for supporting this exchange.



Supported by:



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Logistics	2
Map	3
List of Participants	4
Agenda	6
Participant Biographies	10
Speaker and Moderator Biographies	16
Background Information	23
Representatives of the Charles C. Kettering Foundation	74
Representatives of the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH	75
Representatives of the German Marshall Fund of the United States	76
Notes	78
Partners	82

GMF Staff Contact Information

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Corinna Blutguth, Program Manager	+49 172 2506 715
Juliette Maresté, Program Assistant	+49 172 2506 383

LOGISTICS

Transportation

Transportation to the Hilton Munich City Hotel and the MSC venue will be provided by MSC. Please check the MSC portal for further information.

Transportation from the airport for Members of Congress will be provided by GMF. Upon arrival, please look for a GMF sign.

Accommodations

Munich, Germany

Hilton Munich City
Rosenheimer Strasse 15
81667 Munich, Germany
Tel +49 8948 040


Elmau, Germany

Schloss Elmau
82493 Elmau, Germany
Tel: +49 8823 180

The dress code at the Munich Security Conference is business attire.

The dress code for programming activities at Schloss Elmau is business casual.

Route from Hilton Munich City to Munich Security Conference



LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

US Congress

The Honorable Gabe Amo (D-RI)

The Honorable Veronica Escobar (D-TX)

The Honorable Jim Himes (D-CT)

The Honorable Lauren Underwood (D-IL)

German Bundestag

The Honorable Isabel Cademartori (SPD)

The Honorable Catarina dos Santos-Wintz (CDU)

The Honorable Marcus Farber (FDP)

The Honorable Gyde Jensen (FDP)

The Honorable Anne König (CDU)

The Honorable Kassem Taher Saleh (Alliance 90/The Greens)

The Honorable Kai Whittaker (CDU)

The Honorable Armand Zorn (SPD)

Charles F. Kettering Foundation

Sharon L. Davies, President and CEO

Maxine S. Thomas, Director of International Programs, Vice President, and General Counsel

John R. Dedrick, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

Maia Comeau, Consultant

Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH

Henry Alt-Haaker, Senior Vice President, Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy

Christina Söhner, Senior Project Manager

Munich Security Conference

Ambassador Rainer Rudolph, Vice Chairman

Dr. Michael Werz, Senior Adviser, North America & Multilateral Affairs

Lisa Simon, Assistant to the CEO

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Heather A. Conley, President

Sudha David-Wilp, Regional Director Germany & Senior Fellow

Bailey Childers, Managing Director, Government Relations

Laura Hope Gammell-Ibañez, Corporate Secretary and Chief of Staff

Corinna Blutguth, Program Manager

Juliette Maresté, Program Assistant

Oliver Gnad, Senior Visiting Fellow and Facilitator

AGENDA

Saturday, February 17, 2024

US Members of Congress and German Members of the Bundestag arrive in Munich on individual travel itineraries and attend the Munich Security Conference (MSC).

Accommodation: Hilton Munich City
Rosenheimer Strasse 15
81667 München
+49 8823 18-0

Kindly remember to share credit card information upon check-in for personal incidental expenses. GMF is covering room costs and all planned meals.

The dress code at MSC is business attire.

9:00 – 22:00 **Munich Security Conference**
Members of Congress and the Bundestag participate in MSC programming.

Sunday, February 18, 2024

Please check-out of Hotel Hilton City Munich before 10:00 am and leave your luggage at the reception. GMF staff will assist you.

The dress code for the first half of the day is business attire.

7:30 – 11:15 **Continuation of Munich Security Conference**
Members of Congress and the Bundestag participate in MSC programming.

11:15 Meet GMF staff at the information desk at Hotel Bayerischer Hof
Short walk to Gelber Salon (Palais Montgelas, 1. Floor)

11:30 – 13:00 **Lunch Discussion: Taking Stock: How to Make Transatlantic Security Count?**

Speaker:

General David H. Petraeus, Partner & Chairman of the Global Institute, KKR

Moderator: Heather A. Conley, President, GMF

Location: Gelber Salon, Hotel Bayerischer Hof

Connecting Future Transatlantic Leadership

Congress-Bundestag Exchange

13:20 Transfer from MSC to Schloss Elmau. Please meet GMF staff at designated MSC pick-up zone at Prannerstrasse (Backside of the Bayerischer Hof, close to the Rosewood Hotel).

Accommodation: Schloss Elmau
82493 Elmau/Oberbayern
Tel. +49 8823 18 0

The dress code for the second half of the day is business casual.

15:30 Members of Congress and the Bundestag arrive at Schloss Elmau and check-in.
GMF is covering room costs and all planned meals. Please keep in mind that you will be responsible for personal incidentals.

17:15 Meet GMF staff in the lobby of the main building for a 3-minute walk to the retreat building or go directly to the Pavillon in the Retreat building.

17:30 – 18:30 Facilitated Opening Session

Welcome on behalf of Partners – Heather Conley, President, GMF

Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag are invited to share their views on representative democracy and leadership.

Facilitator: Oliver Gnad, Visiting Senior Fellow, GMF

Location: Pavillon

18:30 – 21:00 Dinner Discussion: The German-American Partnership Today

Location: Restaurant Summit Pavillon

Monday, February 19, 2024

- 8:00 – 9:15** **Breakfast Discussion: The German-American Partnership Today**
Speaker:
Wolfgang Schmidt, Head of the Federal Chancellery and Federal Minister for Special Tasks
Moderator: Sudha David-Wilp, Regional Director Germany & Senior Fellow, GMF

Location: Pavillon
- 9:15 – 10:30** **Session I: Shared Prosperity and Emerging Technologies in the Face of Global Disorder**
Speakers:
Dr. Oby Ezekwesili, Chair of the Board, Women Political Leaders
Dr. Cathy Mulligan, Founder, Sustainable Society Digital Collective & Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow, Robert Bosch Academy
Moderator: Henry Alt-Haaker, Senior Vice President, Robert Bosch Foundation

Location: Pavillon
- 10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break
- 10:45 – 12:20** **Continuation of Session I: Working Groups**
*Members will be split into groups to discuss best practices and policies regarding **security cooperation, trade and emerging technologies.***
- 12:20 Short walk to the main building
- 12:30 – 13:30 Lunch Break
Location: Kaminstüberl
- 13:40 Meet at Pavillon

13:45 – 15:45 Session II: Demographic Change and Social Cohesion

Speakers:

Sharon L. Davies, President and CEO, Charles F. Kettering Foundation

Laura-Kristine Krause, Germany Director, More in Common

Moderator: Dr. Michael Werz, Senior Advisor, North America & Multilateral Affairs, Munich Security Conference

Location: Pavillon

15:45 – 16:15 Coffee Break

16:15 – 18:15 Session III: Delivering Democracy Locally and for the Next Generation

Speakers:

Henry Alt-Haaker, Senior Vice President, Robert Bosch Foundation

Heather A. Conley, President GMF

Ambassador Rainer Rudolph, Vice Chair MSC

Moderators: Oliver Gnad, Visiting Senior Fellow, GMF; Lisa Simon, Assistant to the CEO, MSC

Representatives of partner organizations provide brief inputs on strengthening democracy. Members of Congress and the Bundestag will then respond and share their views.

Location: Pavillon

19:30 – 21:30 Networking Dinner

Members of Congress and the Bundestag will have the opportunity to reflect on the discussions and share their priorities for transatlantic engagement.

Location: Restaurant Kaminstüberl

Tuesday, February 20, 2024

Starting at 7:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

8:00 – 11:00 Members of Congress and the Bundestag check-out and depart on individual itineraries.

PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

Members of Congress

The Honorable Gabriel Amo (D-RI)



Congressman Gabe Amo represents Rhode Island’s First District in the US House of Representatives. In the 118th Congress, Rep. Amo serves on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. He has spent most of his career in public service in Rhode Island and Washington, D.C. In the Biden White House, he served as Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Director of the White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, where he worked as the principal liaison to mayors and local elected officials. Previously, Rep.

Amo was the Director of Public Engagement and Community Affairs for former Governor Gina Raimondo. Earlier in his career, he served in the Office of Public Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs for President Barack Obama as a liaison to governors and state government officials. Congressman Amo is the son of two parents from West Africa – his mother, a nurse, is originally from Liberia and his father, a liquor store owner, is originally from Ghana.

The Honorable Veronica Escobar (D-TX)



Congresswoman Veronica Escobar represents Texas’ 16th Congressional District. In the 118th Congress, Rep. Escobar serves on the House Judiciary Committee, House Armed Services Committee, and House Ethics Committee. She is also co-chair of the Democratic Policy and Communications Committee. In her time in Congress, she has led legislation to address immigration challenges. Before being elected to Congress in 2018, Rep. Escobar served as County Commissioner and County Judge for El Paso County. She worked with the University Medical Center of El Paso to build primary care clinics and the El Paso Children’s Hospital, to make

El Paso County a leader in expanding access to healthcare. Rep. Escobar graduated from the University of Texas at El Paso and New York University.

The Honorable Jim Himes (D-CT)



Congressman Jim Himes represents Connecticut's 4th District in the United States House of Representatives where he is serving his eighth term. In the 118th Congress, Rep. Himes serves as Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and on the House Financial Services Committee. Born in Lima, Peru to American parents, he spent the early years of his childhood in Peru and Colombia. At the age of ten, Rep. Himes moved with his mother and sisters to the United States, graduated from Hopewell Valley Central High School and then attended college at Harvard University. After completing his undergraduate

work, Rep. Himes earned a Rhodes Scholarship, which enabled him to attend Oxford University where he continued his studies of Latin America. Prior to his service in Congress, he ran the New York City branch of The Enterprise Community Partners, a nonprofit dedicated to addressing the unique challenges of urban poverty. Rep. Himes has also been active in his community, serving as a Commissioner and ultimately chair of the Greenwich Housing Authority. He also was an elected Member of Greenwich's finance board and has also served as Chair of his local Democratic Town Committee.

The Honorable Lauren Underwood (D-IL)



Congresswoman Lauren Underwood represents Illinois' 14th Congressional District. In the 118th Congress, Rep. Underwood serves on the House Committee on Appropriations. She is the co-chair of the House Democratic Policy & Communications Committee and serves on the House Committee on Appropriations. She also co-founded the Black Maternal Health Caucus, which she currently co-chairs. Before being elected to Congress in 2018, Rep. Underwood served as a Senior Advisor at the US Department of Health and Human Services, where she helped implement the Affordable Care Act, broadening

access for those on Medicare, improving health care quality, and reforming private insurance. She is a registered nurse and taught future nurse practitioners at Georgetown University. Rep. Underwood is a graduate of the University of Michigan and Johns Hopkins University.

Members of the Bundestag

The Honorable Isabel Cademartori (SPD)



Isabel Cademartori has been a directly elected Member of the Bundestag for Mannheim since 2021. Cademartori is spokeswoman of the SPD Parliamentary Working Group of Transportation, as well as a full Member of the Transportation Committee. Within the SPD, she holds various positions including co-chair of the Parliamentary Discussion Group on Latin America & the Caribbean and Coordinator of the Parliamentary Group, ConoSur. She is also Deputy Speaker of the Baden-Württemberg SPD Caucus in the Bundestag, Deputy Party Chair of the Mannheim SPD, and is a Member of the Baden-Württemberg SPD Steering Committee. Previously, she was policy advisor to State Rep. Dr. Stefan Fulst-Blei. From 2014-2019 she was also a researcher for Economics Education at the University of Mannheim. Cademartori holds a bachelor's degree in business administration and a master's degree in economics education from the University of Mannheim. She was born in Brandenburg, and has lived in many places including Santiago de Chile, Hannover and Bloemfontein, South Africa.

The Honorable Catarina dos Santos Wintz (CDU)



Catarina dos Santos Wintz has been a Member of the German Bundestag since 2021, representing the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). She is a Member of the Committee on Digital Affairs and the Committee on European Union Affairs, as well as a substitute Member of the Committee on Legal Affairs. Dos Santos Wintz is also involved in several interparliamentary and bilateral groups, such as the German-French Interparliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the German-Portuguese Parliamentary Friendship Group. She is a lawyer specializing in tax law and company law. She holds a first and second state examination in law from the University of Cologne.

The Honorable Marcus Faber (FDP)



Dr. Marcus Faber became a Member of the German Bundestag in October 2017. He is a regular Member of the Defense Committee for the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Since 2017, he is Vice President of the German Israeli Society. He has been the chairman of the German-Taiwan Society since 2022. After graduation he completed military service as an armored engineering soldier in the Elbe-Havel barracks in Havelberg. From 2003 to 2008, he studied Political Science at the University of Potsdam. In 2007, he spent a semester abroad at the University of Western Sydney (Australia). In October 2008, he graduated from the University of Potsdam with a focus on "The Political System of the Federal Republic of Germany". From 2009 to 2013, he worked as a lecturer at the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Potsdam, while he completed his PhD at the University of Potsdam on "Direct Democracy at State Level - A case-related comparative study between Brandenburg, Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt".

The Honorable Gyde Jensen (FDP)



Gyde Jensen is a Member of the German Bundestag and deputy chairwoman of the FDP Parliamentary Group. In this role she heads several policy areas including education, research, women's rights and gender, family, culture, and media policy. She is a Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and deputy chairwoman of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Friendship Group. From 2018 until 2021 she served as chairwoman of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid of the German Bundestag and as the FDP Parliamentary Group's spokesperson on human rights and humanitarian aid. Since Gyde Jensen became a Member of the German Bundestag in 2017, building strong democratic alliances and strengthening multilateral institutions have been issues very close to her heart. Gyde Jensen holds a master's degree in international politics and law from Kiel University. Before she was elected, she worked for the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Germany.

The Honorable Anne König (CDU)



Anne König has been a directly elected Member of the Bundestag since 2021, representing the Christian Democratic Union in the District Borken II. She is a coordinator for her party on the sub-committee of International Climate and Energy Policy. Moreover, she is a Member of the Committee on Climate Action and Energy and the Committee on Housing, Urban Development, Building and Local Government. König has been a member of the CDU and Women's Union since 2000. Since 2001, she has held various positions within the CDU Borken and currently serves on the board of the CDU Münsterland. Additionally, she served in leadership roles for various organizations, including *Frauenschützen Münsterland e.V.* and the soccer club Westfalia Gemen e.V. She studied Math and History to become a primary and secondary school teacher at the University of Duisburg- Essen. She worked as a teacher and principal at various schools before being elected to the Bundestag in 2021.

The Honorable Kassem Taher Saleh (Alliance 90/The Greens)



Kassem Taher Saleh has been a Member of the Bundestag since 2021, representing the District Dresden I for Alliance 90/The Greens. He is a Member of the Committee on Housing, Urban Development, Building, and Local Government, as well as a substitute Member of the Committee on Climate Action and Energy and the Committee on Human Rights. Born in Zakho, Iraq, he spent his youth in Plauen, Saxony, and received a diploma in Civil Engineering at the TU Dresden, including a stint at the Universidad de Cantabria, Santander in Spain. Afterwards, he worked as a construction manager in Dresden and Hamburg before entering the German Bundestag in September 2021. Taher Saleh actively engages in various organizations and councils, including the Industrial Union for Construction, Agriculture, and Environment, the Saxon Refugee Council, and the German Business Initiative for Energy Efficiency (DENEFF).

The Honorable Kai Whittaker (CDU)



Having been active for the Christian Democratic Party since his early youth, Mr. Whittaker represents the local constituency of Rastatt in the German Bundestag since 2013. He has been a Member of the Parliamentary Committee of Labor and Social Affairs since 2013. Within this area of expertise, he covers predominantly the topics of unemployment and pension schemes. Between 2018 and 2021 Kai Whittaker was chairman of the CDU/CSU working group on the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable Development. Since 2021 he is also vice-chair of the German-US-American Parliamentary Friendship Group of the German Bundestag. Born in Baden-Baden in 1985 to a German mother and an English father, Kai Whittaker graduated with a BSc in Economics and Management from the University of Bristol and completed an MSc in European Political Economy from the London School of Economics.

The Honorable Armand Zorn (SPD)



Armand Zorn has been a Member of the German Bundestag for the Social Democrats (SPD) since September 2021 and represents the constituency Frankfurt am Main I. Being a Member in the Committees of Finance and of Digital Affairs, his political work focuses on the financing of the ecological and digital transformation and the governance of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. In addressing these topics, Zorn appreciates the importance of an international and especially transatlantic perspective. Zorn was born in Yaoundé, Cameroon, and immigrated to Germany at the age of 12. His academic journey in political science and history at the Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg and extended to Sciences Po in Paris, the University of Konstanz and John Hopkins University SAIS, where he studied International Economics. Professionally, Zorn gained international experience in Hong Kong, Macao, and France, and as a consultant with PricewaterhouseCoopers.

SPEAKER & MODERATOR BIOGRAPHIES

Heather A. Conley, President, German Marshall Fund of the United States



Heather A. Conley is the sixth president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Ms. Conley arrives at GMF after 12 years at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she most recently served as senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and as director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. From 2001 to 2005, Ms. Conley was deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for US bilateral relations with the countries of Northern and Central

Europe. She co-led the US interagency effort to enlarge NATO and secure Senate ratification of an Amended NATO Treaty, and she created a senior level US dialogue with the eight Nordic and Baltic states, the Enhanced Partnership in Europe (e-PINE). Ms. Conley began her career in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the US Department of State. She frequently appears as a foreign policy analyst and Europe expert on CNN, MSNBC, BBC, NPR, and PBS, among other prominent media outlets. She received her B.A. in international studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and her M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

David H. Petraeus, Partner & Chairman of the Global Institute, KKR



General David H. Petraeus (US Army, Ret.) is a Partner at KKR and chairman of the KKR Global Institute, which he established in May 2013. He is also a Member of the boards of directors of Optiv and OneStream, a Strategic Advisor for Sempra and Advanced Navigation, a personal venture investor, an academic, and the co-author (with British historian Andrew Roberts) of "Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine". Prior to joining KKR, General Petraeus served over 37 years in the U.S. military, culminating his career with six consecutive commands as a general officer, including command of

the Surge in Iraq, command of U.S. Central Command, and command of coalition forces in Afghanistan. Following retirement from the military and after Senate confirmation by a vote of 94-0, he served as Director of the CIA during a period of significant achievements in the global war on terror, the establishment of important Agency digital initiatives, and substantial investments in the Agency's most important asset, its human capital. General Petraeus graduated with distinction from the U.S. Military Academy and is the only person in Army history to be the top graduate of both the demanding U.S. Army Ranger School and the U.S. Army's year-long Command and General Staff College. He also earned a Ph.D. in international relations and academics from Princeton University. General Petraeus taught both subjects at the U.S. Military

Academy in the mid-1980s, he was a Visiting Professor of Public Policy at the Honors College of the City University of New York from 2013 through 2016, and he was for 6 years a Judge Widney Professor at the University of Southern California and a Senior Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center. He is currently a Visiting Fellow and Lecturer at Yale University's Jackson Institute, co-chairman of the Global Advisory Council of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Senior Vice President of the Royal United Services Institute, and a Member of the Trilateral Commission, Council on Foreign Relations, and the Aspen Strategy Group, as well as a Member of the boards of the Atlantic Council, the Institute for the Study of War, and over a dozen veterans service organizations.

Wolfgang Schmidt, Head of the Federal Chancellery and Federal Minister for Special Tasks



Wolfgang Schmidt has been the Head of the Federal Chancellery and Federal Minister for Special Tasks since December 2021. Schmidt has been a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) since 1989. He studied law in Hamburg and Bilbao in Spain from 1991 until 1997 and completed his first state examination in 1997 and the second in 2002. Before moving into politics, Schmidt began his

career as a legal clerk at the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court of Hamburg. He then began working for the SPD from 2002 until 2007, as a personal assistant, then as office manager to the Secretary General and then as office manager of the First Parliamentary Secretary of the SPD Parliamentary Group. Schmidt also previously served as director of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Germany. Prior to his appointment in 2021, he served as State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Finance. Previously, he had served as State Secretary and Plenipotentiary of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Federation, the European Union, and for Foreign Affairs.

Sudha David-Wilp, Regional Director and Senior Fellow, Berlin Office, German Marshall Fund of the United States



Sudha David-Wilp is the regional director of the Berlin office and a senior fellow. She joined GMF's Berlin office in September 2011, where she oversees GMF's outreach to the Bundestag and engages with the media as an expert on relations between Germany and the United States. She has written commentary for *Foreign Affairs*, *Axios*, *der Tagesspiegel*, and CNN and has been featured in interviews on Bloomberg News, the BBC, NPR, ZDF, and ARD. Before moving to Berlin, she was the director of international programs at the US Association of Former Members of Congress in Washington, DC for nearly eight years. At the association,

David-Wilp was responsible for congressional study groups and international programs for current members of Congress and senior congressional staff. She received her bachelor's degree from Johns Hopkins University, with a major in international relations and a minor in writing seminars. She received her master's in international relations from Columbia University.

Oby Ezekwesili, Chair of the Board, Women Political Leaders



Dr. Obiageli "Oby" Katryn Ezekwesili, who was candidate for the office of the President of Nigeria in the 2019 election, is an economic policy expert and senior economic advisor at the Africa Economic Development Policy Initiative (AEDPI) and co-founder of the #BringBackOurGirls movement as well as the #RedCardMovement in Nigeria. Ezekwesili was Vice President of the World Bank's Africa division and is former Nigerian Minister of Education, Minister of Solid Minerals, Head of the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit as well as former

chairperson of the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI). She is also founding director of Transparency International. For her work and her social commitment, Ezekwesili was decorated with the national award of Commander of the Order of the Federal Republic (CFR) of Nigeria. In 2016, the University of Essex Business School awarded her an honorary doctorate degree in business in recognition of her role in promoting economic and social justice in African countries. In 2015, she was recognized by Time Magazine as one of the Time-100 Most Influential People and by New York Times as one of the 25 Women of Impact. In 2018, she was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. She holds an MA in International Law and Diplomacy, and an MA in Public Policy and Administration from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Dr. Ezekwesili is a Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy.

Cathy Mulligan, Founder, Sustainable Society Digital Collective, Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow, Robert Bosch Academy



Dr. Cathy Mulligan is an expert in digital technology and digital economy, known for her work in blockchain, telecommunications, and sustainable development. She has held various prestigious positions and contributed significantly to academic and industry sectors in these fields. She has been a fellow at the World Economic Forum for several years and was a Member of the United Nations Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation in 2019. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge and is a visiting lecturer at Imperial College London. Her work in digital has taken her to the North Pole as technical support for the Beringia 2005 expedition for climate change research, the foothills of the Himalayas for sustainable rural businesses, and Malaysia for climate protection, among many other places and projects across the U.K., EU, and Australia.

Henry Alt-Haaker, Senior Vice President, Robert Bosch Foundation



Henry is responsible for the department "Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy", which includes institutional partnerships with renowned international think tanks, programs with high level policymakers, and the Robert Bosch Academy as an institution of the foundation. The department works across all the foundation's areas of support and aims to strengthen evidence-based decision making. Henry has held various positions at the Robert Bosch Stiftung since 2013. Previously, he managed as chief clerk the office of German Federal Minister of Justice Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, worked as a political officer at the Canadian Embassy in Berlin, in the office of Andrea Fischer in the German Bundestag, and at the international NGO Humanity in Action in Paris. Henry studied German Literature and Philosophy at Humboldt University in Berlin, Université Paris-Sorbonne and Washington University in St. Louis, USA and holds a master's degree in public policy from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.

Sharon L. Davies, President and CEO, Charles F. Kettering Foundation




Sharon L. Davies is the president and CEO of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation. Before joining the Kettering Foundation, Davis worked in the academic and legal sector. From 2017-2021, she was provost and senior vice president for academic affairs at Spelman College, and at the Ohio State University (OSU), she was vice provost for diversity and inclusion and chief diversity officer. She was also a Member of OSU's Moritz College of Law faculty for 22 years, serving as the Gregory H. Williams Chair in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. After graduating from law school, she served for five years as an assistant United States attorney in the US Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York. In 2010, she published a book, titled "Rising Road: A True Tale of Love, Race, and Religion in America," a non-fiction account of a 1921 murder trial in Birmingham, Alabama. Davies has an undergraduate degree from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and a law degree from Columbia University School of Law.

Laura Kristine Krause, Germany Director, More in Common



Laura is the Founding Director of More in Common Germany and has been building the organization since 2018. Previously she headed the Future of Democracy Program at the Berlin-based think tank Das Progressive Zentrum, worked in political consulting and for election campaigns in the US and Europe. Laura holds a master's degree from the Free University of Berlin and was a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Washington in Seattle. Laura has twice been named one of "40 under 40" of German Society and Science and is active for a range of social causes. She serves as a board Member of the Schöpflin Foundation and is a Member of the oversight board of German public broadcaster ZDF.

Michael Werz, Senior Adviser, North America & Multilateral Affairs, Munich Security Conference



Dr. Michael Werz is a Senior Adviser for North America and Multilateral Affairs to the Munich Security Conference and a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress in Washington where his work over the past 15 years has been focused on the nexus of climate change, migration, and security and emerging powers, especially Turkey, Mexico, and Brazil. He is a non-resident fellow at the Center on Contemporary China and the World at Hong Kong University and the Co-director of Nexus25. Previously, he was a Senior

Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States working on transatlantic foreign policy and the European Union. Werz has published numerous articles and several books dealing with a wide range of scholarly and policy issues, including race and ethnicity in the 20th century; Western social and intellectual history; minorities in Europe and the United States; ethnic conflicts, politics in Europe, and anti-Americanism. He is a graduate of Frankfurt University's Institute for Philosophy, a former professor at Hannover University in Germany, and a former and adjunct professor at Georgetown University's Center for German and European Studies.

Ambassador Rainer Rudolph, Vice Chairman, Munich Security Conference



Ambassador Rainer Rudolph is vice-chairman of the Munich Security Conference (MSC). He is a German diplomat and was Deputy Head of Mission at the German Embassy in Vienna until 2023. Earlier, he was posted at the Permanent Representation of Germany to the European Union in Brussels and at the German Embassies in Warsaw and Washington, DC. In Berlin, he worked at the Federal Chancellery twice, including as Head of division responsible for EU external relations, EU enlargement, Relations with EU Member states and the Brexit negotiations.

Rudolph graduated from Tübingen University with a degree in History and German literature. He is an Associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

Oliver Gnad, Senior Visiting Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States



Oliver Gnad is the co-founder and managing director of the Bureau für Zeitgeschehen (Bureau of Current Affairs), a Berlin-based think-and-do-tank specialized in strategic foresight and scenario planning. He is a Member of the pan-European Think Tank “New Pact for Europe,” a fellow of the Dahrendorf Forum and a certified senior instructor of Globalytica Ltd., a Washington-based thought leader in building analytic cultures. Since 2015, he is also an adjunct

faculty member of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. From 2008 to 2016, he served as director of GIZ AgenZ, an in-house consultancy of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, German Development Cooperation). Between 2003 and 2007, he was the director for international programs of the Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius ZEIT Foundation in Hamburg. He is the author of several books and articles on the Cold War, the German party system, sustainable development as well as foreign and security policy issues. He holds a doctoral degree in contemporary history from Goethe University Frankfurt.

Lisa Simon, Assistant to the CEO, Munich Security Conference



Lisa Simon works as assistant to the CEO at the Munich Security Conference. Before joining the MSC, she worked with the Bavarian Center for Transatlantic Relations. Prior to that, she gained experience at, among others, the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin and DC, and MindLinks, a Munich based student Refugee Network. She holds a certificate in Intercultural Communication from the University of Munich and gained teaching experience at the Gjimnazi Sami Frasherri, a German language high school in Tirana. Lisa studied North American Studies at the University of Munich

before completing her master’s degree in German as a Foreign Language.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The U.S. and Europe Need to Get Their Act Together on China

Noah Barkin | Foreign Affairs | October 19, 2023

When he talks about the transatlantic relationship, German Economy Minister Robert Habeck likes to recount a conversation he had last year with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, after the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was unveiled.

According to his telling, Habeck pointed out to Yellen on a teleconference that the U.S. legislation would create huge problems for European carmakers by shutting them out of a massive subsidy scheme for electric vehicles. "I will never forget the silence on the other side of the telephone," Habeck recalled during a speech in Berlin last month. "Then she was very direct and said, 'Well, I think we forgot you.'"

U.S. President Joe Biden entered the White House in 2021 promising a new approach to China, based on robust outreach to U.S. allies across the globe. A landmark agreement for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, the historic Camp David summit in August with the leaders of Japan and South Korea, and a lavish state visit held for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in June, which yielded cooperation agreements on defense and technology, have demonstrated that, when it comes to America's partners in Asia, Biden has largely delivered. But as Habeck's story makes clear, the results with Europe have been less than stellar.

On the positive side, the United States and Europe have set aside Trump-era trade irritants, from steel and aluminum tariffs to a long-running Airbus-Boeing subsidy dispute. They have reached an agreement on transatlantic data flows and set up new structured dialogues focused on China as well as trade and technology challenges.

In European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the Biden team has found an ally in its push to rewrite the rules of economic engagement with China. Von der Leyen, with a landmark China speech in March and an economic security strategy that she unveiled three months later, has tried to build a bridge between Brussels and Washington. The Biden administration has adopted her language on "de-risking" from China, distancing itself from the idea of a more far-reaching "decoupling" that had never had any support in Europe. When von der Leyen travels to Washington this week for a U.S.-EU summit with Biden, the two sides could announce a transatlantic deal on critical raw materials that, from a European perspective, would take some of the sting out of the IRA.

But the reality is that the transatlantic consensus on China—and the trade, technology, climate, and security issues at the heart of this discussion—remains fragile nearly three years into Biden's term. The French have yet to fully recover from the Australia-U.S.-U.K. (AUKUS) submarine deal, which torpedoed their own defense agreement with Canberra

and undermined their strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. And Europe is still smarting from the Biden administration's campaign to pressure the Netherlands into restricting the sale of advanced chip equipment to China, a result that exposed Europe's export control policies as flawed and fragmented. The IRA, meanwhile, remains a major bone of contention in the big European capitals, which view it, more than a year after its unveiling, as a slap in Europe's face and a violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.

Crucially, neither German Chancellor Olaf Scholz nor French President Emmanuel Macron appear ready to jump on the von der Leyen bandwagon. They are pushing back against core tenets of her de-risking strategy, notably her plans to restrict European corporate investments in China in a narrow set of sensitive sectors, from advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence to quantum computing and biotechnologies.

French officials are still seething about a joint statement that was put out by Biden and von der Leyen in early March, during her last visit to Washington, in which she committed Europe to upgrading its export control policies and pursuing a U.S.-style outbound regime. "She seems to believe that she has powers that she doesn't have," a senior French government official told me recently.

At the U.S.-EU summit on Oct. 20, the two sides are expected to fall short of their ambitions to deliver a pioneering deal that would simultaneously reduce carbon emissions and tackle unfair trade practices by China in the steel and aluminum sector. The two sides have been working on the pact since late 2021, when they agreed to temporarily suspend Trump-era tariffs in the sector, as well as EU countermeasures targeting a range of U.S. products from Harley-Davidson motorcycles to Kentucky bourbon and Levi's jeans. The struggle to deliver a deal that would definitively remove the threat of tariffs underscores how far apart the United States and Europe remain on climate, trade, and China policy.

This is a worrying state of affairs. Closer alignment between the United States and Europe on China will be essential to developing an effective response to Beijing's growing authoritarianism at home and assertiveness abroad. If the U.S. and Europe can't develop common answers to the challenges posed by China, transatlantic tensions are likely to increase over time. It is especially unsettling when one considers that Biden may be the last U.S. president for whom the transatlantic relationship is a top priority. If the Biden team can't forge a consensus with Europe, who will?

In truth, both Washington and the big European capitals deserve a share of the blame. The Biden administration has scored a series of own goals with Europe by failing to take into account the interests of its allies as it pressed ahead with AUKUS and the IRA. It has stepped up its game over the past year, conducting extensive outreach in Europe on export controls and its outbound investment plans. But some senior members of the administration remain skeptical about whether more consultation with European capitals will lead to better outcomes. "Europe is criticizing us for an industrial policy that is designed to save our democracy," one senior administration official told me. "At


the same time, they have given China a free pass.” Macron’s trip to China in April, when he appeared to blame the United States for tensions over Taiwan, was ammunition for those in Washington who believe Europe is not worth the blood, sweat, and tears.

U.S. – Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin To Show

Jacob Poushter, Sneha Gubbala, and Jordan Lippert | Pew Research Center | November 27, 2023

Americans and Germans continue to see bilateral relations as good

% who say relations today between the U.S. and Germany are ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. Prior to 2022, U.S. surveys were conducted over the phone. German results are all from telephone surveys.

Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023. Q2.

Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.

"U.S.-Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin to Show"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Findings from the seventh joint survey between Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung demonstrate that Americans and Germans see the relationship between their countries in a positive light, even as major world events test the limits of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

With the war between Ukraine and Russia stretching almost two years and the more recent explosion in violence between Hamas and Israel threatening to escalate into a regional conflict, the stakes of foreign policy for the two allies remain critical. And each country's relationship with a more assertive China remains a major topic in world affairs.

Here are some key takeaways from the joint survey, conducted in September 2023 among 1,014 American and 1,057 German adults:

The U.S.-Germany relationship

85% of Americans and 77% of Germans see the relationship between their countries as good. This is consistent with recent years, though prior to President Joe Biden's election in 2020, German views of the relationship were much more negative.

A majority of Americans see Germany as a partner on key issues, including dealing with China and the war in Ukraine. But Germans are less confident about partnering with the United States on China policy and on climate protection, though most affirm that the U.S. is a partner in free trade, democracy promotion and dealing with the war in Ukraine.

In the U.S., Democrats and those who lean toward the Democratic Party are more likely to see Germany as a partner on key issues than are Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. But in general, positive sentiment toward Germany is bipartisan.

Americans see the United Kingdom as their most important foreign policy partner, even as Germans see the U.S. filling that role. France is Germany's second choice as the most important foreign policy partner, while Americans see China as second-most important.

57% of Germans see their country's international power as diminishing in recent years, even as most Americans think German power has not changed much in that time.

American and German views of Russia

Many Americans and Germans see Russia as a military threat, but Americans are much more convinced of this – 68% say Russia is a major threat, compared with 36% of Germans. Concerns about Russia's military as a major threat are up 14 percentage points in Germany since last year.

People in both countries see the U.S.-Germany relationship as more important than their respective relationships with Russia. But among Germans, supporters of the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) are keener on Russian ties than supporters of other parties.

American and German views of China and other emerging economies

Seven-in-ten Americans see China as a major economic and security threat. But only 13% of Germans say China is a major threat to Germany's security, and 49% say the same about China as an economic threat. Majorities in both the U.S. and Germany see China's growing influence as a bad thing for their countries.

There is less concern among Americans and Germans about the rise of other emerging economies such as Brazil, India and South Africa. In fact, 51% of Germans say the rise of emerging economies is a good thing for their country. Americans are more divided on this; 39% say it is a good thing, 23% say it is a bad thing and 35% say it does not make a difference.

There is strong agreement in both countries that democratic nations are best equipped to deal with major international catastrophes such as military tensions, climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Around eight-in-ten Americans and Germans hold this view.

These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey of 1,014 U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023, as well as a Körber-Stiftung survey of 1,057 German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.


As in 2022, the survey of Americans was conducted online. From 2017 to 2021, Pew Research Center’s U.S. surveys on this topic were conducted via telephone. The surveys of Germans were conducted entirely via phone in all years, including 2023. Additional results from the Körber Stiftung survey can be found in the newly released “Berlin Pulse” publication.

How Americans and Germans see bilateral relations

People in the United States and Germany continue to say that relations between their countries are good: 85% of Americans see relations between the U.S. and Germany as somewhat or very good. Meanwhile, 77% of Germans say the same.

Since 2021, German views of the trans-Atlantic relationship have been positive, as have overall attitudes toward the U.S. and toward President Joe Biden. However, prior to 2021, when President Donald Trump was in office, most Germans saw relations with the U.S. in a negative light as America’s image crumbled across Europe.

Americans and Germans see each other as partners on trade and the war in Ukraine, but less so on environmental protection and dealing with China




* In Germany, the survey asked about “climate protection.”

Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023. Q3a-e. Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.

“U.S.-Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin to Show”

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In the U.S., there are relatively few differences across demographic and political groups on views of Germany. In Germany, however, AfD supporters tend to be more skeptical of U.S.-Germany relations than supporters of other parties.




Americans tend to view Germany as a partner on a variety of international issues. A majority of Americans see Germany as a partner on promoting free trade, protecting the environment, promoting democracy around the world, dealing with the war in Ukraine and relations with China.

Similar shares of Germans also see the U.S. as a partner on Ukraine, trade and democracy promotion. However, only about half of Germans see the U.S. as a partner on China, and even fewer see the U.S. as a partner on protecting the environment (29%). In the 2022 survey, four-in-ten Germans considered the U.S. a partner on climate protection.

For all the issues asked about, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to see Germany as a partner. This difference is most apparent on the issue of protecting the environment. But majorities of Republicans still see Germany as a partner on all the issues in the survey.

Germans see Germany losing international influence, but Americans see German power holding steady

% who say Germany's international influence in the world over the last two years has ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023. Q10.

Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.

"U.S.-Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin to Show"

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
Germans and Americans do disagree on whether Germany has lost international influence in recent years. A majority of Germans say that their country's influence has decreased in the past two years, rather than increased or stayed the same. However, a majority of Americans say that Germany's influence has remained the same. This two-year period roughly corresponds to the post-Angela Merkel era: Merkel left office in December 2021 after 16 years as chancellor of Germany.

Germans who support the parties in opposition to the ruling Social Democratic Party (SPD) coalition are more likely to see Germany's international influence in decline.

Most important foreign policy partner for U.S. and Germany

Germans say the U.S. is their most important partner in foreign policy, while Americans name the UK

% who say ___ is the most important partner for American/German foreign policy



Note: Open-ended question. In the U.S., responses that were given by fewer than 3% of respondents are not shown. In Germany, responses that were given by fewer than 1% of respondents are not shown. Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023. Q1.

Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.

"U.S.-Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin to Show"

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While Americans and Germans both view the relationship between their countries as generally positive, they have differing views on their countries' most important partners for foreign policy. Germans generally name the United States as their most important foreign policy partner, with 43% saying this. Far fewer Americans say the same of Germany (6%). Instead, a quarter of Americans name the United Kingdom as the most important partner for American foreign policy. These findings are consistent with those from similar surveys in recent years.

The next largest share of Americans (11%) say that China is the most important foreign policy partner for the U.S. Another 6% say Canada, while smaller shares name Israel, Japan, Mexico or the U.S. itself.

Among Germans, about a quarter (26%) name France as the most important partner for German foreign policy, while another 5% choose China. Since last year, the percentage of German respondents who refer to the U.S. as their country's most vital foreign policy partner has grown seven percentage points, while those who opt for France has diminished by six points.

While there are no major partisan differences among those who name the UK as America's most important partner, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say that Canada is the most important partner to the U.S.


Republicans are far more likely than Democrats to see Israel as their country's most important partner. (The survey was conducted before the latest Israel-Hamas war.)

In Germany, 14% of AfD supporters name Russia as their country's most important partner, a significantly larger share than any other party.

American and German views on Russia and Ukraine

Americans and Germans alike prioritize their bilateral relations over relationships with Russia

% who say it is more important for their country to have a close relationship with ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown. "Neither" was a response option only in the U.S. "Both" was a volunteered category in Germany.

Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023. Q9.

Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.

"U.S.-Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin to Show"

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Both Americans and Germans prioritize their country's relationship with each other over relations with Russia. About half of Americans (51%) say it is more important for the United States to have a close relationship with Germany, while about a third (32%) say relationships with both Germany and Russia are equally important. Another 7% say that it is more important for the U.S. to prioritize a close relationship with Russia over one with Germany. And a similar share says that neither relationship is important.

Among Germans, three-quarters say a close relationship with the U.S. is more important than a relationship with Russia. Conversely, 14% prioritize a relationship with Russia over one with the U.S., and another 8% volunteer that both relationships are important.

In both countries, views are divided along party lines:

In the U.S., Democrats are more likely than Republicans to prioritize a relationship with Germany over Russia (62% vs. 49%).

In Germany, supporters of AfD are divided on whether it is more critical for Germany to have a close relationship with the U.S. (44%) or Russia (39%).

Americans with a bachelor's degree or more education are 22 percentage points more likely than those with less education to say the relationship with Germany is more important than the relationship with Russia.

Echoing their relatively similar views on the relationship between the U.S. and Germany, as well as their country's relations with Russia, Americans and Germans also are aligned when it comes to seeing each other as a partner in addressing the situation in Ukraine. Over six-in-ten (64%) in the U.S. say that Germany is a partner in dealing with the war in Ukraine, and a similar share of Germans (69%) say the same of the U.S.

Views in the U.S. vary by age, with adults ages 65 and older being more likely than their younger counterparts to see Germany as a partner in dealing with the war in Ukraine.


In Germany, while there are no significant differences between the oldest and youngest age groups, AfD supporters are much less likely to see the U.S. as a partner on Ukraine than supporters of other parties.

At the same time, Americans and Germans diverge on the severity of Russia's military threat. Those in the U.S. are far more likely than those in Germany to say Russia represents a major military threat to their country's security.

Nearly seven-in-ten Americans (68%) view Russia as a major military threat, while about a quarter consider Russia a minor threat. Only 5% say Russia constitutes *no* threat at all to American security.

Americans are more likely than Germans to view Russia as a major military threat

% who say Russia represents (a) ___ military threat to American/German security



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023. Q7.

Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.

"U.S.-Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin to Show"

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
In contrast, 36% of Germans say that Russia represents a major military threat to German security. Four-in-ten Germans say that Russia represents a minor threat, while about two-in-ten (21%) do not view Russia as a threat to Germany security at all.

Both American and German views are largely consistent with findings from last year, with Americans being significantly more likely than Germans to say Russia represents a major threat to their country's security. The share of Germans who say Russia is a major threat has increased somewhat from last year (from 22% in 2022 to 36% in 2023).

In the U.S., older adults are more likely than their younger counterparts to view Russia as a major military threat. About three-quarters (74%) of those 65 and older say this, compared with roughly six-in-ten adults under 30 (59%).

Views of China’s rise and its economic and military threat

Americans overwhelmingly see China’s gain in global influence in recent years as more of a bad thing for the U.S. A majority of Germans say the same regarding their country.



More Republicans than Democrats hold the opinion that China’s rise is bad for the U.S. (82% vs. 70%).


In Germany, AfD supporters are less concerned about China’s rise: Nearly equal shares say China’s rise is more of a bad thing (42%) as say it does not make a difference (38%). Another 19% say it is a good thing.

Americans ages 50 and older are more convinced than Americans ages 18 to 49 that China’s rise is a bad thing for the U.S. (81% vs. 62%), as are Americans who have at least a bachelor’s degree compared with those who have less education (79% vs. 67%).

In Germany, majorities across age groups and education levels see China’s rise as more of a bad thing.

Americans also see China as both a military threat to U.S. security and an economic threat to the U.S. economy, with seven-in-ten saying so on each question.

How different demographic groups see China as a military and economic threat largely mirrors opinions on China's rise:



Republicans and Democrats agree that China is both a major military threat (81% vs. 67%) and a major economic threat (79% vs. 69%), but Republicans feel this more acutely.

Americans ages 50 and older are more likely to see China as both a major military threat (79%) and major economic threat (75%) than Americans ages 18 to 49 (62% and 67%, respectively).

Germans do not see China as an equal military and economic threat. Instead, Germans are much more worried about China as an economic threat.


Over eight-in-ten Germans see China as a major or minor economic threat, with 49% saying the country presents a major economic threat. Supporters of the Greens are especially likely to say this.

Although 55% of Germans do consider China a major or minor military threat, just 13% consider it a major threat to German security.

Views on the rise of emerging economies

Many in the U.S. and Germany see rise of emerging economies in a positive light

% who say, in future years, if emerging economies such as Brazil, India and South Africa gained influence globally, it would be ___ for their country



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023. Q5.

Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.

"U.S.-Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin to Show"

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When asked about the rise of emerging economies such as Brazil, India and South Africa, Americans are less concerned than they are about China's rise. Around four-in-ten say that if these types of countries gained global influence in future years, it would be more of a good thing for the U.S. A similar share says it does not make a difference (35%). Roughly one-in-four Americans say it would be more of a bad thing for the U.S.


Overall, German respondents viewed the rise of emerging economies more positively than Americans: Some 51% of Germans said it would be more of a good thing for Germany, while 17% said it would be more of a bad thing and 27% see it neutrally.

Supporters of the Greens in Germany are most likely to see rise of emerging economies as a good thing, with three-quarters saying so.

Views of whether democracies or non-democracies are better equipped for global problems

Large majorities think democracies are better global problem solvers than non-democratic governments

% who say a government that is ___ is better able to deal with long-term global challenges such as pandemics, climate change and military tensions



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 15-24, 2023. Q11. Körber-Stiftung survey of German adults conducted Sept. 6-12, 2023.
"U.S.-Germany Relationship Remains Solid, but Underlying Policy Differences Begin to Show"
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Americans and Germans overwhelmingly say democratic governments are better than non-democracies at dealing with long-term global challenges such as pandemics, climate change and military tensions, with roughly eight-in-ten holding this opinion in each country.

Overwhelming majorities of Republicans and Democrats agree that a democracy is the system of government best able to deal with global issues. However, Republicans are more open to non-democratic governance (19%) than Democrats (10%).

In Germany, 62% of AfD supporters say democracies are better able to solve global issues, while 28% say non-democracies are better equipped to deal with these problems.

The Fading Era of Hyperglobalisation Is a Study in Success

Alan Beattie | Financial Times | November 30, 2023

Death notices for the surge in globalisation that started in the 1990s have been posted for about as long as the process itself. Covid-19, the US-China conflict, climate change and the struggle for green industrial supremacy are all being offered as reasons for globalisation coming to a stop. And yet it moves.


Now, it's true that the era of "hyperglobalisation" from roughly 1992 to 2008, where trade grew markedly faster than global gross domestic product, is over — a shift very well described in this new paper from Arvind Subramanian, Martin Kessler and Emanuele Properzi.

Yet on close examination it appears some of the positive parts of globalisation have either slowed naturally or are still in train, and what has gone into reverse wasn't much of a loss. There are some serious challenges ahead in navigating macroeconomic shocks, particularly in China, and always the risk that geopolitical tensions will escalate rapidly. But only those who fetishise the internationalisation of an ever-larger share of activity in every conceivable economic sector need worry much about what's happened so far.

Globally, goods trade relative to GDP has flatlined or shrunk a little since the financial crisis in 2008. Services trade is still rising as a share of GDP, though at a slower rate than before, and in any case the numbers are distorted by inaccurate reporting for tax avoidance purposes. But, as the study notes, the remarkable development isn't that goods trade is slowing but that it's remained as strong as it has. It has faced stiff headwinds, but they are more to do with the evolution of the world's economies than with shocks such as Covid or meddling governments.

Flattening out

Trade relative to global GDP



Percentage ratio

Source: Peterson Institute for International Economics

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
For one, the process of labour-cost arbitrage — rich countries sourcing from lower-income economies — has somewhat run out of space, at least in those countries (such as China) where good infrastructure has connected low-cost workers to global value networks. (There's a lot more that could be done in countries like India, but poor infrastructure and business climate have held them back.) That's a good outcome to be celebrated. Trade in goods postwar has played such a big part in reducing global inequality that there are fewer poor workers left for it to liberate.

Relatedly, although industrial output held its own as a share of global GDP in the 2010s, a smaller share of global manufacturing was traded internationally. China, getting economically more sophisticated and moving up the value chain, took more supply networks inside its own economy.

There is one part of globalisation that has definitely retreated, but that, if anything, is a cause for relief. Cross-border capital flows have never recovered their levels from before the global financial crisis. Good thing too: pre-crisis capital movements reflected a financial bubble. It was always a mistake for supporters of globalisation to equate free trade in goods and services with liberalised capital accounts.

Falling back

Global gross financial flows



Inward flows, percentage ratio to GDP

Source: Peterson Institute for International Economics


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It's somewhat concerning that flows of foreign direct investment have also fallen off, since that is more closely connected with economic growth. But a lot of FDI is merger and acquisition activity, which generates fees for lawyers and bankers but doesn't do much for recipient economies.

Greenfield FDI, which adds to productive capacity, is of much greater help, and the number of new such projects has remained fairly constant since the financial crisis. Lots more investment in low and middle-income countries is needed, especially to effect the green transition. But that's a failure of governments in not creating adequate incentives for climate finance, not the global financial system seizing up.

Construction time again

Greenfield FDI projects started globally



Absolute numbers of new cross-border projects

Source: fDiMarkets

© FT

As ever when being optimistic about globalisation, it's as well to offer chunky caveats. China's economic travails — the failure of growth to pick up post-Covid, the collapse of FDI — look quite serious. The Chinese authorities, initially reacting to the 2008 financial crisis, moved their policy focus from export promotion to infrastructure spending, particularly in housing. (The country's exports continued to gain global market share, however.) Shifting demand to the domestic economy is in general the right policy for China, but not through fuelling a property boom.

Of course, a fall in FDI to China need not be devastating to the creation of global value networks as international companies may simply switch their investments to other economies. But if China returns to actively promoting exports and creates more gluts in goods such as semiconductors and electric vehicles, the resulting flood of exports will heighten trade tensions. It may also do more to postpone a Chinese economic crash, rather than prevent it.

Still, the study by Subramanian et al should remind us why we care about globalisation. The integration of world markets in goods, services, capital, data and people is not something to be pursued at all costs. It is a means to an end. For 30 years, goods and services trade have promoted prosperity, including creating and (admittedly imperfectly) disseminating technologies to improve lives. Managed properly, it can help do the same to combat climate change.

Globalisation has certainly not failed. Nor, for the moment, has it hit a wall. It is evolving, partly in response to the changes wrought by its own success. The much-hyped era of hyperglobalisation has faded, but solid gains are still being made.

The Surprising Thing A.I. Engineers Will Tell You if You Let Them

Ezra Klein | The New York Times | April 16, 2023

Among the many unique experiences of reporting on A.I. is this: In a young industry flooded with hype and money, person after person tells me that they are desperate to be regulated, even if it slows them down. In fact, especially if it slows them down.

What they tell me is obvious to anyone watching. Competition is forcing them to go too fast and cut too many corners. This technology is too important to be left to a race between Microsoft, Google, Meta and a few other firms. But no one company can slow down to a safe pace without risking irrelevancy. That's where the government comes in — or so they hope.

A place to start is with the frameworks policymakers have already put forward to govern A.I. The two major proposals, at least in the West, are the "Blueprint for an A.I. Bill of Rights," which the White House put forward in 2022, and the Artificial Intelligence Act, which the European Commission proposed in 2021. Then, last week, China released its latest regulatory approach.

Let's start with the European proposal, as it came first. The Artificial Intelligence Act tries to regulate A.I. systems according to how they're used. It is particularly concerned with high-risk uses, which include everything from overseeing critical infrastructure to grading papers to calculating credit scores to making hiring decisions. High-risk uses, in other words, are any use in which a person's life or livelihood might depend on a decision made by a machine-learning algorithm.

The European Commission described this approach as "future-proof," which proved to be predictably arrogant, as new A.I. systems have already thrown the bill's clean definitions into chaos. Focusing on use cases is fine for narrow systems designed for a specific use, but it's a category error when it's applied to generalized systems. Models like GPT-4 don't do any one thing except predict the next word in a sequence. You can use them to write code, pass the bar exam, draw up contracts, create political campaigns, plot market strategy and power A.I. companions or sexbots. In trying to regulate systems by use case, the Artificial Intelligence Act ends up saying very little about how to regulate the underlying model that's powering all these use cases.

Unintended consequences abound. The A.I.A. mandates, for example, that in high-risk cases, "training, validation and testing data sets shall be relevant, representative, free of errors and complete." But what the large language models are showing is that the most powerful systems are those trained on the largest data sets. Those sets can't plausibly be free of error, and it's not clear what it would mean for them to be representative. There's a strong case to be made for data transparency, but I don't think Europe intends to deploy weaker, less capable systems across everything from exam grading to infrastructure.

The other problem with the use case approach is that it treats A.I. as a technology that will, itself, respect boundaries. But its disrespect for boundaries is what most worries the people working on these systems. Imagine that “personal assistant” is rated as a low-risk use case and a hypothetical GPT-6 is deployed to power an absolutely fabulous personal assistant. The system gets tuned to be extremely good at interacting with human beings and accomplishing a diverse set of goals in the real world. That’s great until someone asks it to secure a restaurant reservation at the hottest place in town and the system decides that the only way to do it is to cause a disruption that leads a third of that night’s diners to cancel their bookings.

Sounds like sci-fi? Sorry, but this kind of problem is sci-fact. Anyone training these systems has watched them come up with solutions to problems that human beings would never consider, and for good reason. OpenAI, for instance, trained a system to play the boat racing game CoastRunners, and built in positive reinforcement for racking up a high score. It was assumed that would give the system an incentive to finish the race. But the system instead discovered “an isolated lagoon where it can turn in a large circle and repeatedly knock over three targets, timing its movement so as to always knock over the targets just as they repopulate.” Choosing this strategy meant “repeatedly catching on fire, crashing into other boats, and going the wrong way on the track,” but it also meant the highest scores, so that’s what the model did.

This is an example of “alignment risk,” the danger that what we want the systems to do and what they will actually do could diverge, and perhaps do so violently. Curbing alignment risk requires curbing the systems themselves, not just the ways we permit people to use them.

The White House’s Blueprint for an A.I. Bill of Rights is a more interesting proposal (and if you want to dig deeper into it, I interviewed its lead author, Alondra Nelson, on my podcast). But where the European Commission’s approach is much too tailored, the White House blueprint may well be too broad. No A.I. system today comes close to adhering to the framework, and it’s not clear that any of them could.

“Automated systems should provide explanations that are technically valid, meaningful and useful to you and to any operators or others who need to understand the system, and calibrated to the level of risk based on the context,” the blueprint says. Love it. But every expert I talk to says basically the same thing: We have made no progress on interpretability, and while there is certainly a chance we will, it is only a chance. For now, we have no idea what is happening inside these prediction systems. Force them to provide an explanation, and the one they give is itself a prediction of what we want to hear — it’s turtles all the way down.

The blueprint also says that “automated systems should be developed with consultation from diverse communities, stakeholders, and domain experts to identify concerns, risks and potential impacts of the system.” This is crucial, and it would be interesting to see the White House or Congress flesh out how much consultation is needed, what type is sufficient and how regulators will make sure the public’s wishes are actually followed.

It goes on to insist that “systems should undergo predeployment testing, risk identification and mitigation, and ongoing monitoring that demonstrate they are safe and effective based on their intended use.” This, too, is essential, but we do not understand these systems well enough to test and audit them effectively. OpenAI would certainly prefer that users didn’t keep jail-breaking GPT-4 to get it to ignore the company’s constraints, but the company has not been able to design a testing regime capable of coming anywhere close to that.

Perhaps the most interesting of the blueprint’s proposals is that “you should be able to opt out from automated systems in favor of a human alternative, where appropriate.” In that sentence, the devil lurks in the definition of “appropriate.” But the underlying principle is worth considering. Should there be an opt-out from A.I. systems? Which ones? When is an opt-out clause a genuine choice, and at what point does it become merely an invitation to recede from society altogether, like saying you can choose not to use the internet or vehicular transport or banking services if you so choose.

Then there are China’s proposed new rules. I won’t say much on these, except to note that they are much more restrictive than anything the United States or Europe is imagining, which makes me very skeptical of arguments that we are in a race with China to develop advanced artificial intelligence. China seems perfectly willing to cripple the development of general A.I. so it can concentrate on systems that will more reliably serve state interests.

China insists, for example, that “content generated through the use of generative A.I. shall reflect the Socialist Core Values, and may not contain: subversion of state power; overturning of the socialist system; incitement of separatism; harm to national unity; propagation of terrorism or extremism; propagation of ethnic hatred or ethnic discrimination; violent, obscene, or sexual information; false information; as well as content that may upset economic order or social order.”

If China means what it says, its A.I. sector has its work cut out for it. A.I. is advancing so quickly in the United States precisely because we’re allowing unpredictable systems to proliferate. Predictable A.I. is, for now, weaker A.I.

I wouldn’t go as far as China is going with A.I. regulation. But we need to go a lot further than we have — and fast, before these systems get too many users and companies get addicted to profits and start beating back regulators. I’m glad to see that Chuck Schumer, the Senate majority leader, is launching an initiative on A.I. regulation. And I won’t pretend to know exactly what he and his colleagues should do. But after talking to a lot of people working on these problems and reading through a lot of policy papers imagining solutions, there are a few categories I’d prioritize.

The first is the question — and it is a question — of interpretability. As I said above, it’s not clear that interpretability is achievable. But without it, we will be turning more and more of our society over to algorithms we do not understand. If you told me you were building a next generation nuclear power plant, but there was no way to get accurate readings on whether the reactor core was going to blow up, I’d say you shouldn’t build

it. Is A.I. like that power plant? I'm not sure. But that's a question society should consider, not a question that should be decided by a few hundred technologists. At the very least, I think it's worth insisting that A.I. companies spend a good bit more time and money discovering whether this problem is solvable.

The second is security. For all the talk of an A.I. race with China, the easiest way for China — or any country for that matter, or even any hacker collective — to catch up on A.I. is to simply steal the work being done here. Any firm building A.I. systems above a certain scale should be operating with hardened cybersecurity. It's ridiculous to block the export of advanced semiconductors to China but to simply hope that every 26-year-old engineer at OpenAI is following appropriate security measures.

The third is evaluations and audits. This is how models will be evaluated for everything from bias to the ability to scam people to the tendency to replicate themselves across the internet.

Right now, the testing done to make sure large models are safe is voluntary, opaque and inconsistent. No best practices have been accepted across the industry, and not nearly enough work has been done to build testing regimes in which the public can have confidence. That needs to change — and fast. Airplanes rarely crash because the Federal Aviation Administration is excellent at its job. The Food and Drug Administration is arguably too rigorous in its assessments of new drugs and devices, but it is very good at keeping unsafe products off the market. The government needs to do more here than just write up some standards. It needs to make investments and build institutions to conduct the monitoring.

The fourth is liability. There's going to be a temptation to treat A.I. systems the way we treat social media platforms and exempt the companies that build them from the harms caused by those who use them. I believe that would be a mistake. The way to make A.I. systems safe is to give the companies that design the models a good reason to make them safe. Making them bear at least some liability for what their models do would encourage a lot more caution.


The fifth is, for lack of a better term, humanness. Do we want a world filled with A. I. systems that are designed to seem human in their interactions with human beings? Because make no mistake: That is a design decision, not an emergent property of machine-learning code. A.I. systems can be tuned to return dull and caveat-filled answers, or they can be built to show off sparkling personalities and become enmeshed in the emotional lives of human beings.

I think the latter class of programs has the potential to do a lot of good as well as a lot of harm, so the conditions under which they operate should be thought through carefully. It might, for instance, make sense to place fairly tight limits on the kinds of personalities that can be built for A.I. systems that interact with children. I'd also like to see very tight limits on any ability to make money by using A.I. companions to manipulate consumer behavior.

This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. Others will have different priorities and different views. And the good news is that new proposals are being released almost daily. The Future of Life Institute's policy recommendations are strong, and I think the A.I. Objectives Institute's focus on the human-run institutions that will design and own A.I. systems is critical. But one thing regulators shouldn't fear is imperfect rules that slow a young industry. For once, much of that industry is desperate for someone to help slow it down.

A Generation after Germany Reunited, Deep Divisions Remain

Economist | May 11, 2023, |



The man in a lilac jumper is blunt. Why, he asks, is Germany a vassal of the USA? In reply, Olaf Scholz, Germany's chancellor, sketches a history of the Federal Republic, patiently adding that the danger it faces right now is not America, but Russia's war on Ukraine. His conclusion, "We do not take orders," wins polite applause.

It may seem odd that 33 years after the cold war ended Germany's leader should need to persuade a fellow citizen that their country, Europe's weightiest by population and GDP, is independent. A clue lies in where this exchange happened: Cottbus, a small city at the heart of the once-vital coal industry of the once-proud country of East Germany. Across the five eastern "new states" that joined the 11 western ones of the Federal Republic in 1990, all too many people still share the dark scepticism of the man in the lilac jumper. Despite decades of massive public investment, wrenching demographic change and growing prosperity, the 20% of Germans who live in the east still tend to think differently, act differently and vote differently.

These differences matter. The east German electorate includes a big proportion of free-floaters, attached to no party. This encourages traditional parties, such as Mr. Scholz's Social Democrats, to try extra-hard to woo them. Politicians may also hesitate to act—the chancellor was accused last year of being slow to release German-made Leopard tanks for Ukraine—for fear of alienating the lilac jumpers.

The worries are not misplaced. Polling by insa, a research group, shows that in early May, for the first time, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) overtook both of Germany's traditional centrist rivals to become the most popular party in the east (excluding Berlin). Aside from the 26% of *Ossis* who would vote for the AfD in a national election, another 9% intend to support the far-left Die Linke party. Those tallies are respectively double and triple what either party scores in the west.

On the subject of Russia and Ukraine, it is not just with other Germans that *Ossis* tend to differ, but with almost everyone else from the former Soviet Bloc. Around half of west Germans agree that America is a "dependable partner", and that Germany should boost military aid to Ukraine. But nearly three-quarters of east Germans reject both suggestions. A survey of attitudes to Russia in 2020 showed a similar gap. Easterners

were far more likely to agree that Vladimir Putin was “an effective president”, and far less likely to describe him as “a threat to Europe”. Several explained in focus groups that experience made them “understand propaganda better” so as to “see through” the Western version. Meanwhile disgruntled elements in the east, such as Soviet-trained former army and intelligence officers whose prestige crumbled after unification, help sustain a constant anti-American hum: NATO “provoked” Russia, American oil companies profit from the war at German expense, etc.

Not exactly ostalgie

Few ordinary *Ossis* want to go back in time, insists Dirk Oschmann, the author of a recent bestseller sympathetic to their grievances. Unification is overwhelmingly a success, and the moaning partly just reflects a national penchant for gloom. Yet the gaps remain striking, starting with demography. The east is markedly older, more thinly populated and less diverse. East Germans remain underrepresented in elite professions. There are no *Ossi* generals in the German army. They account for well below 5% of federal judges or CEOs of Germany’s top 100 companies. A 2022 study suggests they hold a minority of leading positions even in the east.

This lingering lag is partly a result of obvious handicaps. Unification barely touched most *Wessis*, but it tipped the east upside down, notes Katja Hoyer, an East German-born academic, in a new history of the communist state, “Beyond the Wall”. It felt less like a merger than an abrupt takeover, into which the “new states” fell with zero capital of their own, few marketable assets and the wrong skills.

Not surprisingly a quarter of *Ossis* between the ages of 18 and 30, often the most qualified or ambitious, moved west. Some 3m moved the other way, but largely into bigger towns, leaving rural areas desolate. The newcomers grabbed choice property, pushing natives to cheaper urban fringes. In March, a local plebiscite about stronger environmental measures in Berlin, Germany’s once-divided capital, revealed a stark new divide: gentrified central districts voted hugely in favour, whereas among the bleak suburban housing estates of Marzahn-Hellersdorf, an AFD stronghold, three-quarters voted against.

Yet what bothers easterners, says Mr. Oschmann, is less economics than attitudes. To the extent that they care at all, west Germans see the east as “a place of sickness, of imbalance, of noisy whining”, he says. The old East Germany may in fact have enjoyed better day care for children, less class friction and greater equality for women, but to say so invites charges of ignoring the brutish side of communist rule. Popular culture tends to portray eastern Germany as either a chamber of horrors or a theme park of ghastly fashion.

Germany’s two parts are in fact slowly converging. The income gap, in particular, is shrinking, helped by big investments from firms such as Infineon, Intel and Tesla. But as jolts such as the war in Ukraine expose, the underlying fissures in German society may take yet another generation to close.

Is Our Society as Divided as it Seems?

Ines Eisele | Deutsche Welle | September 17, 2023

Warnings abound about the risks of ever-deepening cultural rifts. But things may not be as bad as they seem, researchers say. Difference can actually be a healthy part of how society evolves.

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier once suggested that a compulsory year of civil service for young people might be a good way to bridge social divides. In France, President Emmanuel Macron announced after this summer's riots that he wants to take action against the threat of division in the country. And when discussions about compulsory COVID-19 vaccinations flared up in many countries two years ago, there were frequent warnings about said divisions.

Moments like this leave the impression that political and cultural rifts are deeper than ever before in many Western countries. The vicious language often used in public debates on issues such as abortion, gender, climate change, migration and racism have only reinforced this perception.

The fact that societies have become more diverse in recent decades is undeniable, said sociologist Stefan Hradil. "Differentiation is without alternative in modern societies. It's related to growing degrees of freedom, education, migration and much more," said Hradil, a professor emeritus at Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz.

Still, this ought to be clearly separated from what is being called division, he said. "Differentiation does not have to be a split at all. It could develop into one, but a lot has to happen for that to be so."

Bobby Duffy, director of the Policy Institute at King's College London, echoes this sentiment. "Of course there are tensions between different groups in societies, but the way that both our media and social media are structured and then the incentives in politics is to exaggerate those divisions," he said. "When you look at the big picture we're pretty tolerant and happy with each other."

Politicians, social media and distorted perception

Why, then, do we have the impression that things are quite different in many countries?

For one thing, Hradil explained, we need to be aware that politicians, opinion makers and the media often use terms such as "division" or "culture war" to evoke emotions, thereby contributing to a distorted perception.

Social media networks also play a role. Moderate viewpoints with majority support don't attract as much attention as extreme positions and loud minorities.

Duffy, who has published a book on the misperception of social realities, pointed out that cognitive biases, or unconscious distortions in thinking and perception, also play a role. "We know that people have a greater tendency to focus on negative information than positive information. And we know that we are more likely to respond to emotional stories than facts and figures," he told DW.

In social psychology, Duffy said, frequent reference is made to "rosy retrospection," which means "we forget the bad from the past, which makes us think today is worse than it really is."

In every society, there are various fault lines — for example, between rich and poor, right and left, young and old. But what about in Germany specifically?

"In other countries you see quite a lot of tension between people in more rural areas where there's a kind of sense of metropolitan elite versus the rest. You don't see much of that in Germany," said Duffy. "But the one big tension in Germany is around immigration."

How can division be measured?

A society can therefore be more divided in one area, but less so in another. When measuring divisive tendencies, researchers distinguish between "issue polarization" and "affective polarization," among other things. While the former describes dissent on specific political or social issues, the latter is when entire groups dislike and disparage each another. According to Duffy, this kind of tribalism involves fundamental distrust of the other camp and a tendency to "dehumanize them in some ways."

While "issue polarization" has not increased in the United Kingdom in recent decades, for example, there has certainly been "affective polarization" between supporters and opponents of Brexit, for example. "And that is the trend that we're all looking to the US with some worry about because they have certainly seen an affective polarization between Republicans and Democrats," he said.

According to German sociologist Hradil, social division can be grouped into four categories: social, political, economic and sociocultural. Specifically, this means: How much do I tolerate my fellow human beings? How much do I respect political institutions, and how much do politicians respect each other? How divided is society in financial terms? And how much do different social groups tolerate or distrust each other?

For a publication on this topic, he and his colleagues illustrated the results of the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey (see infographic). Citizens of the 27 European Union member states were asked how much they trust their fellow citizens and their national government. The result: On average, 60% of respondents in the EU said they have little trust in their national governments. The least trusted are the

Slovenian government (with 77% of respondents saying they were distrustful) and the Croatian government (76%).

The picture is better when it comes to social cohesion: Only a minority, 28% of respondents on average in the EU, tend not to trust or do not trust at all their fellow citizens. In Denmark, the distrust rate is lowest at 5%, while people in Malta (46%) and France (38%) distrust each other the most.

In Germany, figures show that divisive tendencies at the political and social level are comparatively low. At 44% and 21% respectively, distrust of the government and fellow citizens are both below the EU average.

'Disagreement is a healthy and inevitable part of society'

That there is nevertheless so much talk about division could be related to Germans having a romanticized idea of an ideal society, Hradil suggested. "And when the bar is set particularly high, the astonishment and annoyance at conflicts are all the greater."

Inflationary warnings about societal divisions, however, can become a self-fulfilling prophecy that breeds complacency. Will warnings be taken seriously once the situation becomes truly critical?

Perhaps it helps to keep in mind that modern democratic societies exist based on the fact that different opinions and groups clash and struggle with each other. Otherwise, they would not continue to develop.

"Political or cultural disagreement is a healthy and inevitable part of society," said Duffy. "What becomes unhealthy is where those divisions become so wrapped up in your personal identity that you are part of one tribe that cannot compromise with the other tribe on whatever the issue is."

How Journalist Michele Norris Exposed our 'Hidden Conversations' about Race

Marissa Evans | Los Angeles Times | January 16, 2024

Michele Norris remembers inadvertently eavesdropping on her grandparents' neighbors during the hot summer days when she would visit Alabama. There was no air conditioning, so people had to throw their windows open and risk all of their dinnertime conversations being overheard.

But ever since 2010, when Norris, a Peabody Award-winning journalist for many publications (including The Times) and former co-host of NPR's "All Things Considered," launched the Race Card Project, asking people to submit six-word sentences about race, she has — "with permission" — been eavesdropping on a sizable sampling of the nation. Now it's all collected in a new book, "Our Hidden Conversations: What Americans Really Think About Race and Identity."

"That's what this book feels like," Norris said during a recent phone interview. "The windows are open and I get to hear America." The book features essays written by Norris alongside submissions from people around the world about their intimate thoughts on the intersections of race including their children, their marriages, their commutes, their jobs and interactions at gas stations and grocery stores. The format is inspired by such works as Studs Terkel's "Working" and "Hard Times," as well as Toni Morrison's cultural anthology "The Black Book."

It comes at a time when "we are still struggling with reckoning with race in America," Norris said — and seeking answers as Americans debate the teaching of history and critical race theory. It's difficult, she added, to tell the story of America unless people are willing to examine and embrace how race intersects with topics such as politics, sports, health, housing and education.

The book also surprised her. "I created the Race Card project because I thought that nobody wanted to talk about race," Norris said. "It's true that people are uncomfortable talking about race — that has been my experience as a human being and as a journalist. But this project, if anything, has shown me that a lot of people actually do want to talk about it, that in fact they talk about it all the time."

She also hopes that the book becomes an indispensable historical artifact: "Imagine what this will mean to someone years from now, that is trying to understand the sort of messiness that we're experiencing," she said. "... Maybe it will be in service to people, to journalists, to sociologists, to researchers, to storytellers of the future, who want to understand this time that we're living in right now."

When did you realize you wanted to make this book?

I realized pretty quickly that I needed to collect these in a bigger way. At the very beginning, when the cards started coming in, I knew — "OK, wait a minute, people,

we've cracked the code here." People are really opening up, they're sharing things that I don't hear in studio. I was

a host of "All Things Considered" at the time, I'm hearing things that I don't hear when I'm out in the world reporting.

Which essay in the book challenged you the most?

There are a couple that challenged me. "Black babies cost less to adopt" challenged me and challenges me even now. When I go back and read what I wrote it hurts. It makes me angry. It makes me very sad that we established this sort of caste system from birth. And that in something as beautiful as adoption, when people open up their hearts and their homes, that there are market forces at work. I have not enjoyed that work. There's joy in the work of writing, there's joy in the collection of stories, there's joy in the reporting, even when it's difficult, [but] that really taxed me. That has tap danced on every single one of my emotions in reporting that story and meeting various people involved in the process.

What do you feel like you're still reckoning with about race in America?

One of the things that I realized is that we have this mistaken assumption that no one wants to talk about race when actually a lot of people do, and another thing that I realized is that a lot of them are white. Our discussions around race in America are often framed around people of color and more specifically Black people. I thought that a lot of the submissions would come from people of color, and probably primarily Black people. I continue to be surprised at how many people of all colors have pulled up to the table. Usually, the expectation is that Black people are going to lead the discussion, that Black people will be the focus of the discussion. That was a surprise for me, but also, that's wrapped up in a revelation for me — Why should people of color be the only ones having this discussion? Why should there be an expectation that to the extent racism is a problem that Black people will solve it? How are people going to solve something that they themselves did not create?

How would you say your approach to reporting on race has changed from when you first started writing about it?

The time that I was hosting "All Things Considered," something happens in the world, we're gonna have a conversation about race. There's this cadre of people that you reach out over and over again, you just sort of know who you're gonna hear on the radio, who you're gonna see on TV, who you're gonna read columns from, right? And when we're talking about race, the expectation is that we're gonna talk to Black folks, or maybe we're looking at Hispanics, but white people get bystander status. That's sort of changed for me. I'm always now thinking, let's make sure that there will be full participation from lots of different people. I think that we sometimes ask the question, did race play a role in this? And I think the more apt question is, what role did race play?

Because so often it does play a role. I'm more curious, I'm more emboldened, I'm more willing to try to understand what's happening.

You've talked about developing a sense of patience over time with people who you maybe don't agree with. How?

Just listening. The changes in my life have made it easier to do that because I think I have more time. When you're hosting a show, you just don't have time to do that. My kids, they're young adults, they're off in the world. But some of it also is just developing a muscle that you use — and you realize, OK, I'm learning things by listening.

Did you fear, going into this project, having to be one of the Black people leading the conversation on race?

Well, that's kind of the irony, isn't it? Ask any person of color if they've been in mandatory conversations about race in the workplace. It's just like they'll lead or fully participate in that and that can be burdensome, and that can also mask a deeper conversation that probably needs to happen. So yes, I was concerned about that and I tried to take what I have learned and apply it.

One of the things I've learned is, there's usually a cohort of people who feel like they're marginalized. And often, they're white. They're white men who are single dads. And there are all kinds of programs for working parents, but they're all really aimed at women for whom the juggle is real. But no one is thinking about what it's like for that dad who only gets to see his kids on the weekend, who is concerned about what happens at 3 p.m. when the latchkey kid is on the way home. Sometimes it's because they are very conservative, and they're working in a place where they're presumed to have a certain kind of politics. And maybe they do, but because of that, they feel like they are an outlier, that they are at the fringe. And so now I look for that, because if they're feeling marginalized, it might not be articulated, but it is still having an impact on the workplace. It's still having an impact on the institution.

What the West Forgot about Democracy

Erica Benner | Financial Times | January 17, 2024

Democracies have always presented themselves as beacons of human progress. In 431BC, the statesman Pericles declared that Athens's democracy was "the school for all Greece" — while over the past two centuries, democracy warriors everywhere have measured their countries' success or failure by comparison with western models: American, British, French, Swedish.

It's harder to do now that these formerly self-congratulating democracies are doing battle with new and older demons. Today, millions of people around the world crave freedom from authoritarian rule. Yet when they hear almost daily that the liberal heartlands are plagued with inflation, strikes, high crime rates, gun violence and ill-informed voters who care little about truth, many of them doubt that democracy is the best alternative.

"So many people I know are giving up on democracy," said my new friend Vaibhav when we met while travelling through Xinjiang in western China last summer. He worked at an international bank in Hong Kong, living there through the pro-democracy protests in 2019-20, then strict lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Some of the sceptics were Vaibhav's colleagues from east Asian countries and his native India. Feeling helpless about politics but wanting to do some good in the world — even bankers worry about losing their souls, he insisted — they focus on what they call "development": improving technological knowhow, winning new markets and beating their rivals for the sake of country as well as company. "They think we should give more power to technocrats, or to leaders who offer a clear vision for our country."

Other doubters were still reeling from the results of controversial popular votes in Britain, the US and beyond. If democracy can't deliver leaders or policies that command widespread trust, they ask, how can it help us navigate dangerous global rivalries, brutal wars, climate disaster and digital technologies that mislead citizens and split them into warring camps?

The spread of global pessimism about the superior merits of democracy can be deeply unsettling for people whose political mindsets were configured during the cold war. Growing up in Japan in the 1960s and '70s, I was taught that democracy was unquestionably the best kind of government ever invented, getting better and better each decade. For the time being, it was locked in a life-or-death struggle against authoritarian regimes that controlled most of our neighbours in east Asia and up to the western borders of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. But while it was almost impossible to envision how that might change, small signs of resistance fuelled hope.

In 1993, a few years after Soviet-backed communism fell in Europe, I went to work in Warsaw. Although my official brief was to teach anglophone political philosophy, I was

more interested in discovering what my students thought about the changes they were living through. Apart from membership of Nato and probably the EU — affording protection from a humiliated Russia — what did they expect from the new order of liberal democracy? Did it look as good to them as its local and foreign champions said?


We discussed a new book by American political philosopher John Rawls. When you debate policies and laws in democracies, he wrote, you should make a point of appealing to “public reasons” — respect for everyone’s freedom, for example, or to the common safety of the union — not just make arguments that resonate only with people who share your narrower concerns or ideological repertoire. Could this be our future? My students’ eyes twinkled with friendly irony. “Maybe that’s what people are like in Britain or America,” someone said. “Lucky them.”

Sometimes I took the tram home with a student called Agnieszka. She would race from our classes to tutor schoolchildren in English and German or write articles for a local newspaper, sharing her earnings with struggling parents. Marcin taught English and sometimes drove a taxi. Małgozata’s mother was a nurse in a badly underfunded hospital; privatisation had already cost her father his longtime industrial job. She worked at a cinema and night café. How did they manage all that and demanding university studies? Shrugs. That’s life.

My older Polish friends were as relieved as I was to wave goodbye to old ideological -isms. But we were unsure what to think about the brave new world of -isations: “liberalisation” and its sub-isations, chiefly “privatisation” and “democratisation”.

Privatisation meant putting industries and agencies that had been owned by the state under private or partially private control — housing, food production and distribution agencies, gas and electricity, transport. Democratisation meant replacing the one-party state with a pluralist, multi-party, representative system; redistributing power between the big cities and Poland’s staunchly independent countryside; establishing the rule of law, freedoms of speech and press, church and state separate yet mutually respectful.

Countries holding elections in 2024



When we did speak of two other big -isms, capitalism and communism, it was with a wariness about being dragged back into the either/or, good vs evil ways of thinking about politics that had dominated our younger lives. State-based communism had lost the cold war and was probably tainted forever by its authoritarian exemplars. But did that vindicate capitalism? And was its way of producing and distributing social goods suited to democracy?

As a student, I had an acquaintance who is now an eminent member of the British government. The purpose of democracy, he said, was to protect individual freedoms. Since capitalism left people free to engage in trade and industry for profit, of course it supports democracy like no other economic system.

But almost no one I met in Poland shared his confidence that weakly regulated private competition could be good for democracy. Most thought about privatisation much as they thought about God: let's try to have faith that it eventually rewards the industrious and virtuous, even if we see zero evidence that it does.

While privatisation made already well-connected ex-communists and foreign émigrés stupendously wealthy overnight, my colleagues worked several jobs to pay rent and other bills that their deflated salaries could no longer cover. Some worried that the gap between winners and losers in the privatisation stakes would threaten the delicate work of democratisation. Students spoke of relatives who lived outside the big cities, predicting that insecurities among older and rural voters would make it easy for political entrepreneurs to blame urban and "cosmopolitan" elites and bring out toxic strains of nationalism.

When I'd go back west and report these conversations to people in the UK, France or Germany, I was struck by how quick some were to dismiss these concerns. Newly liberalising populations had a low tolerance for competition and the insecurities it bred because communism had spoiled them, said one inheritance-rich (West) German friend; expecting government to check growing inequalities was a bad paternalistic habit.

I found even less interest in asking how western-guided processes of democratisation and privatisation raised concerns about national identity and local control. There was a more convenient explanation for nationalism in post-communist lands: an old cliché that "western" democracies have something called "civic" national identities — saturated with rational, individualistic values and open to the world — while "eastern" peoples have "ethnic" nationalism, a relic of bygone provincialism that global liberalisation was busy washing away.

We in the "west" got so used to contrasting our self-flattering free-world mentalities with less enlightened ones elsewhere that many failed to see how similar we all are: in our progressivist communist-or-liberal utopianisms, nostalgic nationalisms and fears of being left behind in hypercompetitive societies.

Few of my Polish friends were surprised when an alternative to liberal democracy emerged in central and eastern Europe. Hungary's liberal-turned-sour leader Viktor Orbán dubbed it "illiberal democracy"; liberal commentators preferred "populism". It burgeoned after the global economic crash of 2008, then spread westward where it found a warm welcome in the US, Britain, France, the Netherlands and other countries around the world. This came as a shock to many people in the liberal democratic west, where most people had accepted gaps in wealth and political influence as normal — even as they or their neighbours were tumbling down the security ladder.

The easy explanation for illiberal populism in liberal democracies is to see it as a top-down phenomenon, the work of stunningly successful political manipulators who distort rather than reflect reality.

Top-down accounts do tell an important part of the story, the part about the narratives people buy into when they support illiberal policies. A trademark populist trick is to blame false culprits — usually immigrants and ethnic minorities — and offer unrealistic cures for voters' discomforts. Fingering the even more vulnerable gives anxious supporters an illusion of power by putting them in the same "We're So Great" camp as successful businesspeople and rich elites — even when these routinely reject policies aimed at checking social inequalities.

But voter manipulation is just the upper layer of a more complex story of the material and psychological insecurities fanned by weak regulation and widening social gaps. You no longer need to be a diehard leftist to talk about the intense competitive pressures of weakly regulated markets and how they produced a handful of super-wealthy individuals who — through media ownership and campaign funding — acquired disproportionate political influence.

In the US, only the wealthiest families grew richer after the Great Recession began in 2007. From then up to 2016, the median net worth of the richest 20 per cent increased by 13 per cent — while that of less wealthy families decreased by more than 20 per cent between 2007 and 2016. It became increasingly evident that a small percentage of citizens in many liberal democracies had far easier access to the prerequisites for a secure existence — housing, education, food, healthcare — and that competition among the wealthy for the best pickings of these goods was driving costs sky-high for the rest.

The connection between these multiple insecurities and illiberal nationalism isn't always straightforward. Current anxieties about national identity and control have deep, emotional histories in most countries today, which makes them highly user-friendly for opportunistic elites. But as I learnt from living in Poland and Japan, these anxieties can't always be dismissed as irrational tribalism. Identifying with groups not only gives most individuals a sense of social anchoring in times of change; it's also a key resource for enhancing our sense of power — however illusory — in high-stress situations. Identity concerns loom large when the less equal combine to fight for their share, or when the previously more-than-equal fear falling.

The older powerhouses of liberal democracy were born to the tune of high-flying rhetoric, and their disproportionate global power encouraged overconfidence. People struggling to bring forth or salvage newer democracies aren't so confident. For two and a half centuries, people from a handful of English-speaking countries and western Europe have been telling the rest of the world how to do liberal democracy. Now we need people in struggling new democracies to tell us how not to do it. They often have a clearer sense of democracy's great advantages, but also of the obstacles that can spring up and weaken even well-crafted institutions — material inequalities, clashes between hyper-progressivism and tradition, and gaps between ruling elites and the rest.

To motivate people to keep striving for democracy, we need to go behind modern ideologies and recover some core concerns that democracies are supposed to address. The first founding story of democracy on record has none of the heroics or optimism of most modern founding myths. Rather, it's a cautionary tale about how hard it is to do democracy right, and how easily it gets subverted if you're not vigilant.

Before Athens acquired the form of government that its founders called *demokratia* in 507BC, the main political faultline wasn't tyranny vs the people; it was the ever-wealthier rich vs the vulnerable poor. Wealthy landowners leased property to the poor, who worked it for a living. Every so often, the owners would increase their rents. If tenants couldn't afford to pay, the rich offered them loans at high rates of interest. The wealth gap widened. Tenants struggled, defaulted on their debts. Athens's plutocracy-friendly laws allowed creditors to force debtors into slavery, until poorer Athenians revolted.

In the early sixth century BC, terrified plutocrats asked a man called Solon to fix things before they got worse. He made it illegal to enslave debtors, created stimuli for a range of new trades and abolished hereditary political privileges.

This wasn't yet full democracy, and Solon's new deal soon failed. The plutocrats went back to exploiting their compatriots, who did what the vulnerable always do: turned to a tyrant who promised to fight their corner. Though Peisistratos confiscated some of the nobility's lands and gave them to the poor, this didn't lead to democracy, since the tyrant monopolised political power for himself and his family.

When a group of well-born Athenians deposed Peisistratos's son, they realised two things. First, that very unequal societies are less stable, productive and humane than those where inequalities are held in check. Second, that you can't trust a single class or party to do the checking in a way that seems fair to all. The reformers put all free Athenian men on a more equal footing than ever before and redesigned government into units where rich, poor and middling citizens were forced to sit together in assemblies, arguing, compromising and rotating positions by lot.

Sometimes it's good to go back to basics, to the still-healthy roots of ideas and institutions that have grown weak and confused over time. According to the Solon story, democracy was designed as a realistic solution to a concrete problem: how to stop the endless civil strife that came from gaps in personal and social security between richer and the rest. This was common democratic sense for centuries before the modern era introduced a sharp ideological divide — initially within a broad liberal tradition — between weakly and strongly regulated markets.

Democratic freedom isn't a condition where my private wishes can roam unchecked and acquire as much power or wealth as I can without considering how this affects others. It's a key part of a power-sharing scheme called democracy. What makes democratic freedom democratic is precisely that it sets limits on my personal freedoms within this scheme, leaving opportunities and decent options for everyone else.

People in newer democracies often see more clearly how imbalances of power and fears of losing one's chances in a poorly regulated hypercompetitive world can weaken respect for institutions that are supposed to channel and protect popular power: voting, traditional parties and media, judicial systems, representative assemblies. But they still want the benefits that only democracy can secure, and often have a clearer view of what they are.

Teetering precariously between democracy and tyranny, they see that the best way to tackle problems is to spread political power more widely and evenly, not concentrate it further in the hands of leaders who may or may not care about our personal wellbeing and common future. Having struggled with recent civil wars and seeing the relative peace still found in some democracies, they think that collaboration among multitudes of people can lead to more lasting successes, improve everyone's quality of life, and give individuals a far deeper sense of security than government by a few.

Today millions around the world are taking to the streets to fight for these modest boons, risking imprisonment, torture and even their lives. A down-to-earth view of what makes democracy better than the alternatives will help us see how best to support it. Instead of going into hard battle modes for old “models”, we need to think about how to promote democratic goals with properly democratic means at home and abroad.

On the global front, scepticism about older ways of doing democracy isn’t necessarily a bad thing: the hole where western models used to be leaves room for creative thinking about what locals need and what kinds of change they can support.

It’s time to abandon the idea that people from powerful countries are uniquely qualified to design and build democracies for others. They may have money and weapons to help new democracies defend themselves. But without knowledge of local histories and sensitivities, money and weapons are useless. When outsiders promote democracy in an impatient or immodest spirit, the predictable result is illiberal, nationalist or authoritarian backlash.

We see the same urgent need to give more effective authority and voice to people on the ground inside today’s older democracies. There are organisations around the democratic world whose members advocate the creation of citizen assemblies, chosen by lot instead of personality-driven or partisan campaigns, to advise and monitor existing branches of government. By avoiding pathological rivalries among (and within) political parties, such assemblies might stand a better chance of coming up with policies aimed at narrowing the gaps in unbalanced societies.

But even well-crafted institutions can’t function without popular support. Change has to start with our own attitudes. Take other people’s beliefs and discomforts more seriously than ideologies that preach faith in the inevitable progress of whatever you think best. Fight to take power back, of course, from democracy’s most obvious enemies — extremists, insatiable plutocrats and tyrannical leaders. But also take a more modest, closer-to-home kind of responsibility: for getting our own hypercompetitive societies and psyches into better shape.

What Are Young Voters Looking For?

Michelle Cottle | New York Times | December 31, 2023

Want to ruin a Democratic strategist's New Year? Bring up President Biden's popularity problem with younger voters.

The strategist may start furiously tap-dancing about this outreach plan or that policy achievement. But she has seen the polling trend line. She has heard the focus groups. She knows that millennials and Gen Z-ers are not feeling the Biden love. Many are threatening to sit out next year's election. Some are flirting with supporting Donald Trump — or a third-party rando.

And even if only a few of them follow through, the president and his party could be in big trouble. Americans younger than 45 have saved the Democrats from disaster in multiple recent elections. Their creeping alienation has the blue team rattled and raging: For the love of God, what will it take to lock in these voters?!

This is not a new question. The political world, especially the Democratic Party, has long been in search of the secret formula for wooing younger voters to the polls. Strategists noodle over which issues members of this cohort care about, which candidates they connect with, how best to reach them. In 1994, Bill Clinton ventured onto MTV and overshared about his underwear in an effort to impress the young 'uns. Now that is desperation.

Spoiler: There is no secret formula. Or rather, there is a whole host of formulas with scores of constantly shifting variables. Millennials and Gen Z-ers don't just expect different things from candidates than do older voters; they approach the entire concept of voting differently, generally in ways that make them harder to persuade and mobilize.

The people who obsess about this issue for a living can overwhelm you with data and analysis, competing priorities and suggestions. Even the bits they think they have figured out can abruptly shift. (Just when some thought they had a solid grip on this election, along came the war in Gaza.) All that, of course, is on top of the concrete systemic challenges of getting younger people registered for, informed about and comfortable with voting in general.

As a close friend who spent years neck deep in the political weeds of cultivating younger voters observed, "The big theme is that there is no theme."

And yet there are a few recurring subthemes that bubble up when you talk with the professionals and with the younger voters themselves. These insights won't crack the turnout code. Or necessarily save Mr. Biden's presidency. But they do shed light on some of the more amorphous reasons younger Americans are so hard to turn out — and can maybe even point a way forward.

“The No. 1 rule when you’re talking about young people: They may be progressive, but they are not Democrats,” warned Joshua Ulibarri, a partner with the Democratic polling firm Lake Research Partners. “They don’t turn out for parties.”

Younger Americans may vote more Democratic than their elders, but that does not mean they want to join the team. And while their politics are generally to the left of the party’s center of gravity, this isn’t merely a matter of ideology.

“Parties are institutions, and Gen Z-ers aren’t really into institutions,” said Morley Winograd, a senior fellow at the Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership and Policy at the University of Southern California. The research on Gen Z-ers indicates they have little trust in most major U.S. institutions, and it’s hard to get more establishment or institutional than a political party. Certainly among the Gen Z-ers I know (I have kids, and they have friends), maintaining their independence from and skepticism of a compromised political establishment they feel is not working for them is a point of pride.

Today’s hyperpartisan system, with its Manichaeian mentality, can make parties even more unappealing for younger voters, said John Della Volpe, the director of polling at the Harvard Kennedy School Institute of Politics, whose specialty is younger voters. “They are not willing to take that responsibility to have to defend one party and create an enemy of the other.”

And definitely don’t expect them to be moved by appeals to help a party take control of Congress or even the White House, Mr. Ulibarri said.

Younger voters also are less inclined to turn out simply because they like a candidate’s personality. Now and then, one comes along who inspires them (think Barack Obama) or, alternatively, outrages them enough to make them turn out in protest (think Donald Trump). But more often they are driven by issues that speak to their lives, their core values or, ideally, both.

The most outstanding current example of this is the issue of abortion rights, which has emerged as a red-hot electoral force since the Supreme Court overturned *Roe v. Wade* last year. Younger voters express anxiety about the practical repercussions of this decision and fury at the government intrusion into people’s personal lives. The issue has a clarity, immediacy and tangibility that appeal to younger voters. This is especially true when it appears as a stand-alone ballot initiative.

Younger voters’ focus on issues and values rather than candidates and parties raises the question of whether ballot initiatives could be a way to engage them and propel them to the polls. Supporting such measures is more straightforward than embracing candidates. Plus, they have the advantage of not being (or at least not seeming) entangled with a particular party. They have more of a direct-democracy vibe. (Please refer to: Institutions suck.) How much more satisfying is it to vote for an issue you are

passionate about than for some flawed politician with a fake smile making promises you're pretty sure he won't keep?

Supporting a candidate, any candidate, means accepting that person's foibles and flaws along with the good parts. It requires balancing multiple concerns and priorities. And the longer the candidate's record in public office, the more variables there are to consider. Just take the example currently giving the Biden campaign the worst nightmares: For progressives, at what point does Mr. Biden's handling of Gaza outweigh his embrace of, say, combating climate change or protecting abortion access or supporting labor unions? What if the only alternative is another Trump term?

For younger voters who reject the team mentality of party voting, these equations get complicated and frustrating — often frustrating enough to just skip voting altogether. When researchers ask younger people why they don't vote, one of the top responses, if not the top one, is: I didn't feel I knew enough about the candidates.

Part of younger voters' disenchantment may be wrapped up in the nature of progressivism. Younger voters tend to be more progressive than older ones, and progressives, by definition, want government to do more, change more, make more progress. You often hear variations on: Sure, the president did ABC, but what we really need is DEFGHIJXYZ. Or: This climate initiative/health care plan/caregiving investment/pick your policy achievement doesn't go nearly far enough.

This is not to suggest that Mr. Biden hasn't racked up some notable missteps (Afghanistan!) and failed promises (the student debt mess). But expectations are an inextricable factor. Harvard's Theda Skocpol refers to "the presidential illusion" among those on the political left, the longstanding idea that the president is a sort of political Svengali and that federal leadership can counter conservatism in states and localities. When reality sets in, these supporters are not shy about expressing their disappointment.

Of course, most voting in America calls for choosing between candidates, in all their messy imperfection. Younger voters are less likely than older ones to have resigned themselves to this, to have curbed their expectations and idealism. So where does all this leave campaigns and, trickier still, parties desperate to win over younger voters?

Younger voters need to be reminded of the concrete changes their votes can effect. Because of the 2020 election, the Biden administration has pushed through a major investment in fighting climate change; billions of dollars for infrastructure are flowing into communities, including rural, economically strapped areas; the first African American woman was appointed to the Supreme Court; many judges from notably diverse professional backgrounds have been placed on the lower courts, and so on.

The dark corollary to this is detailing the explicit damage that can be done if young people opt out, an especially pressing threat with Mr. Trump on the vengeance trail. Separating migrant children from their parents at the southern border, stacking the

Supreme Court with abortion-hostile justices, effectively declaring war on science — these were the fruits of the Trump administration. And that's before you get to his persistent assault on democracy. Think of it all as his practice run, then imagine where another four years could take us.

The key is figuring out and effectively communicating the right balance of positive and negative partisanship for the moment, said Mr. Della Volpe, stressing, "The recipe for 2020 will not be the same as 2024."

Another basic step: Candidates need to make clear that they understand and share younger voters' values, even if they have different plans for working toward realizing their goals. Strategists point to the shrewd decision by Team Biden, after Senator Bernie Sanders dropped out of the 2020 primary contest, to form working groups with Mr. Sanders's team, stressing their shared values. Connecting elections to something that resonates with younger voters — that is meaningful to their lives — is vital, said Abby Kiesa, the deputy director of the Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, a research group at Tufts University's Jonathan M. Tisch College of Civic Life that focuses on youth civic engagement. Issue groups can play a useful role in this, she said.

Most broadly, everyone from interest groups to parties to candidates needs to push the message that a democratically elected government can still achieve big things. This goes beyond any specific bill or appointee. Younger Americans aren't convinced that government can make meaningful progress. Some days it is hard to blame them. But this cynicism has terrible implications for democracy, and all of us would do well to fight it.

Why are Younger Voters Flocking to the Far Right in Parts of Europe?

Jon Henley and Pjotr Sauer | The Guardian | December 1, 2023

Lunching on a tuna sandwich in the central market of Volendam, a picturesque fishing port north of Amsterdam, Gerald, 24, was lucid about his choice in last week's Dutch election.

"I voted for Wilders, and many of my friends did too," he said. "I don't want to live with my parents for ever. I want my own home, and to be able to provide for my family later on. Wilders wants to figure out the housing crisis, and make our healthcare better. Those are the most important topics for me."

If everyone who voted in the election had been aged under 35, Geert Wilders, the far-right populist whose Party for Freedom (PVV) shocked Europe by winning the most parliamentary seats, would have won even more.

In last year's French presidential runoff, Marine Le Pen won 39% of votes from people aged 18-24 and 49% of those aged 25-34. Before Italy's election in September last year, Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy was the largest party among under-35s, on 22%.

Across the continent, the image of the radical-right voter – typically white, male, non-graduate and, above all, old – is changing, and studies suggest that in several countries, support for the far right is growing fastest among younger voters.

Several factors may explain the phenomenon, analysts say. "We really should be careful about assuming a cultural or ideological alignment between young voters and the far right," said Catherine de Vries, a political scientist at Italy's Bocconi university.

"We know in many countries young people are more pro-immigration than older voters. They have not become xenophobic. But their lives are more precarious. These are often votes for what in this Dutch election was called 'livelihood security'."

The Dutch word *bestaanszekerheid* translates roughly as an existence with a sufficient and predictable income, a satisfactory home, adequate access to education and healthcare, and a cushion against unexpected eventualities.

Issues such as housing, overcrowded classes and struggling hospitals were key to the youth vote, De Vries said. "Wilders may want 'Dutch people first' but he promises to fix these things," she said. "The government parties imposed austerity."

In Volendam, where the PVV won 42.9% of the vote, that was Gerald's point. "Younger people, the woke ones from the big cities, care about the climate and gender stuff but they are ignoring the real problems that we have here and now," he said.

"I am not a racist because I voted for Wilders. It frustrates me that migrants receive more help from the government than Dutch people – but I'm not against Islam; I don't want mosques closed. I just think we need to control immigration better."

Koen, 19, a student in Amsterdam, echoed that view. "I still live with my parents – I can't afford a room in Amsterdam," he said. "I have to commute every day. Wilders wants to give housing to people who are from here – I don't think that's strange."

Koen, too, said he did not believe Wilders would go through with his extreme anti-Islam pledges: closing mosques, banning headscarves and outlawing the Qur'an. "I thought Wilders was the best in the debates. He made a lot of sense," he said.

Far-right parties are not the preferred option – or even second choice – for younger voters everywhere in Europe, analysts caution. The trend appears strongest in countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark.

Pawel Zerka, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: "It's a different story in eastern Europe, and often in the south. But it's certainly the case that far-right parties are attracting a lot of support among younger voters."

In Spain, the ultra-conservative Vox party's share of the under-35 vote soared from 22% in April 2019 to a record 34% that November, echoing its rollercoaster performance with the electorate as a whole. It fell back in July this year but still stands at 27%.

In the Netherlands, the PVV surged to become the largest party among 18- to 34-year-olds, winning 17% of their vote against 7% previously. In Sweden's 2022 ballot, 22% of the 18-21 cohort voted for the far-right Sweden Democrats, against 12% in 2018.

In the 2021 Saxony-Anhalt state election in eastern Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) came top among voters under 30, while young voters were likewise predicted to help Austria's far-right Freedom party (FPÖ) win next year's national ballot.

Zerka also identified economic insecurity as the most significant factor. "Young voters haven't moved rightwards on migration, abortion, minority rights," he said. "Far-right parties have convinced them that they offer a credible economic alternative."

Other factors include some far-right parties "managing to position themselves as a 'cool' electoral option", Zerka said. "They are increasingly offering younger voters equally young, often charismatic politicians – people who speak their language."

Jordan Bardella, the president of France's National Rally (RN), for example, was only 23 when he led the party's successful 2019 European election campaign, and 27 when he succeeded Le Pen as the far-right party's official leader last year.

Zerka also cites far-right parties' social media skills: Spain's Vox has a particularly slick operation, and Sławomir Mentzen, the 37-year-old leader of Poland's ultra-liberal far-right Konfederacja (Confederation) party, has 800,000 followers on TikTok.

Several far-right parties have also proposed specific policy initiatives to attract younger voters: Le Pen's 2022 manifesto promised to scrap taxes for the under-30s, provide financial assistance to student workers and boost student housing.

Jacob Davey, the head of policy and research at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue thinktank, identified the influence of a far- and ultra-right youth counterculture, typified by the far-right pan-European Generation Identity group, as an additional factor.

Even if "economic grievances, insecurities around housing, jobs, futures" may account for much of the youth vote, he said, "we're seeing the growth to fruition of a concerted far- and extreme-right effort to reach and radicalise young people".

And finally, said De Vries, there was "simply, normalisation. For many of these young voters, far-right parties have been part of the political landscape their whole lives. They've grown up with them. There's not the stigmatisation there once was."

In Amsterdam, Conny, 22, smoking a cigarette outside a grocery store in the working-class Noord neighbourhood, the only district in the city where the PVV finished first, made the same point.

"It is the first time I voted," she said. "My whole family voted PVV, and we were excited [Wilders] won." Life was becoming more expensive in Amsterdam, she said, but the outgoing government did not seem to care.

"My mother's a nurse, and healthcare is not coping. Wilders campaigned on investing in healthcare and old people's homes. When it comes to migration, people from a war country deserve a better life here but it shouldn't be at the expense of Dutch people."

The wild history of the Bavarian castle hosting this week's G-7 summit

Kate Brady | The Washington Post | June 26, 2022

Framed by the snow-capped peaks of Germany's Bavarian alps, the castle set to host this year's Group of Seven summit starting Sunday has a history almost as dramatic as its backdrop.

Built at the onset of World War I by philosopher and theologian Johannes Müller as a communal retreat for his followers, Schloss Elmau has served as a Nazi military vacation camp, a field hospital, a sanctuary for Holocaust survivors and the site of Germany's last G-7 meeting.

The castle's backstory tracks closely with Germany's tumultuous 20th-century history. Now a luxury hotel, it is still owned by Müller's family, despite falling out of the family's hands temporarily during the denazification process following World War II because of the philosopher's adulation of Adolf Hitler.

While intended as a mountain sanctuary, it has not always been so for all those associated with it. Dietmar Müller-Elmau, Müller's grandson and the hotel's current proprietor, was born in the hotel but said he had been "at war with it" for decades.

"My grandfather wanted to create a place of communal living where you could escape from yourself, from what he called self-interest, self-centeredness," Müller-Elmau said. "The idea was to enable 'freedom from oneself' — which is contrary to what I want to enable: the freedom for oneself."

Before Müller built the turreted Schloss Elmau between 1914 and 1916, he was already filling lecture halls across Germany. He'd attracted a following among Germany's aristocracy, business elite and Jewish community.

Fans of Müller's work — which criticized individualism, materialism and capitalism, as well as the Christian church — flocked to the castle, where they were immersed in dance and music. It hosted prominent politicians and cultural figures of the Weimar Republic, the German government between 1919 and 1933.

When the Third Reich began, Müller had what the Germany government described in 2014 as an "ambivalent attitude to the Nazi regime."

While the philosopher had lauded Hitler as "the receiving organ for God's government" and a "leader of a national revolution of the common good over self-interest," he thought Hitler's anti-Jewish policies were "a disgrace for Germany."

"He marveled at the Jews," said Müller-Elmau, pointing to his grandfather's close network of Jewish academic friends. "He thought they were the 'better Germans.'"

Müller-Elmau said his grandfather justified his paradoxical stance with the argument that Hitler's unexpected assumption of power could be interpreted only as a fate willed

by God “and that one could recognize a God-sent leader precisely by the fact that he would not correspond to rational and wishful thinking.”

There was one particular Nazi slogan that struck a chord with Müller: “Du bist nichts; dein Volk ist alles.” (“You are nothing; your people are everything.”) Müller drew similarities between the Nazis’ collective nationalist ideology and his own emphasis on rebuffing self-interest.

His opposition to antisemitism and his ban on the Nazi salute at Schloss Elmau would have landed most people in a concentration camp — but Müller’s unwavering support for Hitler left Nazi officials with a dilemma. Ultimately, his connections and following protected him.

Still, he was constantly interrogated by the Gestapo, Nazi Germany’s secret police, and eventually his works were banned — although that didn’t shake Müller’s faith in Hitler.

In 1942, in a bid to prevent confiscation of the castle by the SS, the Nazi paramilitary group, Müller rented the castle out to the Wehrmacht, Nazi Germany’s army, as a vacation resort for soldiers coming back from the front.

But two years later, Müller was placed under house arrest and Schloss Elmau was turned into a military hospital for German soldiers. The following year, as the Nazis surrendered, the U.S. Army took control of Elmau, and it briefly became a prison camp for the soldiers who were being treated there, then a military training school.

The war might have been over, but in its aftermath, Müller’s contradictory stance toward the Third Reich remained problematic.

In 1946, Philipp Auerbach, the Bavarian state commissioner for persecuted people and a Holocaust survivor, sued for a denazification trial to be brought against Müller on the grounds of his “glorification” of Hitler.

“My grandfather chose not to defend himself,” Müller-Elmau said. “He confessed to his political error, but not to the theological error on which it was based.” Given that Müller was neither a member of the Nazi party nor involved in acts of war, his conviction was controversial.

Auerbach, frustrated that legal appropriation of the castle was taking too long, took possession of it without legal title. Between 1947 and 1951, the castle served as a sanatorium for Holocaust survivors and displaced people.

Ernst Landauer, a Jewish journalist who survived several Nazi concentration camps including Auschwitz, wrote about marking the Jewish holiday of Purim in Elmau in a text published in 1946. Silence prevailed during the religious readings, “at times interrupted by sobbing,” he wrote.

“Purim used to be a joyous festival and those celebrating it had not suffered directly,” he wrote. “Those celebrating it now did suffer. That is why the rejoicing is subdued. For

later generations Purim will be a joyous festival again. It will be difficult for us, however, to rejoice again in this life.”

Auerbach’s control of Elmau was short-lived. His vigorous pursuit of former Nazis irked parts of the political establishment, and he was arrested on allegations of corruption. In 1952, he was convicted of fraud and embezzlement. Days after the verdict, he took his own life.

The reason for his conviction was the antisemitism that was pervasive at the time, German historian and author Michael Brenner said. “Three judges of the court were former Nazi party members,” he said. In 1954, two years after Auerbach’s death, an inquiry cleared his name.

While Schloss Elmau reflects Germany’s complex history, it also reflects the country’s efforts to come to terms with it, Brenner said. In a country that loves compound nouns, there is, of course, a word for that process: “Vergangenheitsbewältigung,” or coming to terms with the past.

“Müller-Elmau and his family didn’t avoid this past, but confronted it,” Brenner said.

The castle didn’t stay out of family hands for long. Fearing claims for damages by Müller’s family due to the expected appeal of his conviction, the Bavarian state government leased the castle to Müller’s children in 1951. A decade later, they became the legal owners — the same year Müller’s sentence was annulled, 12 years after his death in 1949.

Müller-Elmau became proprietor in 1997 and set out to reestablish Schloss Elmau as a “cultural hideaway,” although he shunned his grandfather’s philosophy. Cutting up the communal dining tables, he said, was as symbolic as it was practical to the hotel’s new mantra: the freedom to choose.

“Previously, it had been a forced community,” he said, adding, “For me, it’s all about individualism.”

The opportunity to make the biggest changes came in 2005, when a fire ripped through the building. Most of the hotel had to be demolished and reconstructed.

“Watching the hotel in flames — well, was a great relief,” Müller-Elmau said. “It was the best thing that could ever happen to me because before I was putting new wine into old bottles. And now I could make a new bottle for a new wine. I could design Elmau as a place for cosmopolitans and for individualists.”

Today, some 220 concerts are held at the castle every year, as it continues to pull in the biggest names in classical music from the world over. None of them expect a paycheck. They play to stay.

The isolated location makes Elmau a prime spot to host world leaders at this week’s G-7 summit. When it was last held here, in 2015, it was the scene for one particularly iconic photograph.

On a wooden bench sat President Barack Obama, relaxed, arms outstretched. In front of him was German Chancellor Angela Merkel, gesticulating with open arms against the backdrop of the majestic mountains.

“Every politician, every guest that comes here wants to have their photo taken on that bench,” Müller-Elmau said.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHARLES C. KETTERING FOUNDATION

Maxine S. Thomas, Director of International Programs, Vice President, and General Counsel



Maxine Thomas is vice president and general counsel for the Kettering Foundation, and secretary for the foundation's board of directors. In 2022, Thomas was also named director of international programs. She also directs Kettering projects in higher education, community leadership, and the relationship between citizens and officeholders. She also has shown an interest in China, having been a Member of the Kettering Foundation task force on China since 1993. Before coming to the Kettering Foundation, Thomas was associate dean of the University of Georgia School of Law, where she also served as associate and assistant professor. She was also previously on the faculty of the University of Oregon School of Law and a

Fulbright lecturer at Tohoku University in Sendai, Japan, from 1988-1989. Thomas received her BA and her JD from the University of Washington.

John R. Dedrick, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer



John Dedrick is executive vice president and chief operating officer at the Kettering Foundation. He has a longstanding research interest in the theory and practice of democracy and has worked closely with higher education professionals and community-based forum moderators on numerous scholarly and community-based research studies. Dedrick has also been employed in the philanthropic and academic sectors. He is the former board president of Philanthropy for Active Civic Engagement and serves on the public policy committee of Philanthropy Ohio. He has previously served as a faculty fellow at Fielding Graduate

University, where he led seminars on topics including deliberation, dialogue, and civic engagement. Dedrick received a BA and MA from the College of William and Mary and an MA and PhD in political science from Rutgers University.

Maia Comeau, Consultant



Maia Comeau is a government and public affairs leader with over 20 years of experience in international government affairs strategy, institution building, leadership development, and event planning in Washington, DC. Before founding her own consulting firm, Comeau served for twelve years at the German Marshall Fund of the United States where she founded both the Congressional Affairs department and the Richard G. Lugar Institute for Diplomacy and Congress. As a leader with the desire to create positive change across the United States, she is a graduate of the 2016 class of

Presidential Leadership Scholars, led by President's Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Her first career was as a professional ballet dancer culminating with a stint with Complexions Dance Company in New York, and she holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from Pennsylvania State University.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG

Christina Söhner, Senior Project Manager



Christina Söhner is senior project manager in the team "Policy Engagement and Partnerships", at the department "Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy". Her portfolio includes the Foundation's political liaison work. Before joining the foundation in 2021, Söhner worked as senior public affairs and strategy consultant at Joschka Fischer & Company from 2018 to 2021. Prior to that, she was head of office and political advisor for different Members of the German Parliament from 2008 to 2018. Söhner studied Social Sciences and Environmental Management at Freie Universität Berlin, Université libre de Bruxelles, and Heinrich-

Heine-Universität Düsseldorf.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

Bailey Childers, Managing Director, Government Relations



Bailey K. Childers is GMF's director of government relations. She previously served as director of federal government affairs at the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and as director of government relations at H&R Block. She was also executive director of the National Public Pension Coalition, where she led national and state efforts to advance retirement security for working Americans, and she managed state legislative efforts to support progressive tax and budget policies at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. A seasoned political operative, Childers ran high-capacity field and get-out-the-vote efforts for Hillary Clinton in 2008 and 2016, the Democratic National Committee in 2006, and John Kerry in 2004. Childers graduated magna

cum laude from Wellesley College and received a master's degree in public management from Johns Hopkins University.

Laura Hope Gammell-Ibañez, Corporate Secretary and Chief of Staff



Laura Hope Gammell-Ibañez is GMF's corporate secretary and chief of staff. In her role, Gammell-Ibañez supports GMF President Heather A. Conley, oversees the relationship with the organization's board of trustees, and contributes to GMF's analyses of the transatlantic relationship, especially those on German-US relations. In 2019 she was a recipient of the Marshall Award for Excellence. She previously worked as a private consultant for small US businesses active in European markets and, before that, as a professional equestrian on the US east coast and in Germany.


Gammell-Ibañez holds a master's degree in European and Eurasian Studies from The George Washington University's Elliott School for International Affairs and a bachelor's degree in German studies from Connecticut College.

Corinna Blutguth, Program Manager



Corinna Blutguth is a program manager in GMF's Berlin office. She coordinates programming and research on U.S.-German relations, transatlantic security, and German domestic and foreign policy. She supports the Alliance for Securing Democracy's work on the German Elections, identifying and analyzing information manipulation targeting Germany's elections. Before joining GMF, Corinna worked as a program officer for a public-private-partnership of the German Federal Foreign Office, the Robert Bosch Foundation, and the German Council on Foreign Relations. She also gained experience working for the Kolleg-Forschergruppe Transformative Power of Europe at Freie Universität Berlin. Corinna holds a master's degree in political science from the University of Potsdam and studied European Studies in Magdeburg and Brno. Next to her native German, she speaks English and Spanish and has a basic knowledge of French and Czech.

Juliette Maresté, Program Assistant



Juliette Maresté is a Program Assistant in the Risk and Strategy workstream at the Berlin Office of the German Marshall Fund. She previously worked for the Munich Security Conference (MSC), where she supported the organization of the 2022 conference. Maresté holds a master's degree in international security from Sciences Po Paris, where she specialized in Intelligence studies. During her studies, she gained professional experience as an intern at the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Israel and the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Foundation in Hamburg.

NOTES

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On the web: www.kettering.org

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The Foundation holds an approximately 94 percent stake in Robert Bosch GmbH and is financed by dividends. The company and the Foundation are independent of each other. Since it was established in 1964, the Robert Bosch Stiftung has invested around 2.2 billion euros in charitable work.

On the web: www.bosch-stiftung.de

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On the web: <https://securityconference.org/en/about-us/american-friends-of-the-msc/>

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The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, transatlantic organization headquartered in Washington, DC, with offices in Ankara, Belgrade, Berlin, Brussels, Bucharest, Paris, and Warsaw.

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