



U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

Member / Officer Post-Travel Disclosure Form

☐ Original ☐ Amendment

This form is for disclosing the receipt of travel expenses from a private source for travel taken in connection with a Member or officer's official duties. This form does not eliminate the need to report privately-funded travel on the Member or officer's annual *Financial Disclosure Statement*. In accordance with House Rule 25, clause 5, you must complete this form and file it with the Clerk of the House, B-81 Cannon House Office Building, within 15 days after travel is completed. Please **do not** file this form with the Committee on Ethics.

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

1. Name of Traveler: Rep. Eric Swalwell
2. a. Name of Accompanying Relative: Brittany Swalwell
b. Relationship to Traveler: ☒ Spouse ☐ Child ☐ Other (specify): _____ **OR** None ☐
3. a. Dates: Departure: Sat. 2/15/2020 Return: Thurs. 2/20/2020
b. Dates at Personal Expense, if any: _____ **OR** None ☒
4. Departure City: Washington D.C. Destination: Munich Return City: Washington D.C.
5. Sponsor(s), Who Paid for the Trip: German Marshall Fund
6. Describe Meetings and Events Attended (attach additional pages if necessary): This trip was a series of non-partisan public policy meetings aimed at promoting Europe and North America.
7. Attached to this form are **each** of the following, signify that each item is attached by checking the corresponding box:
 - a. ☒ a completed *Sponsor Post-Travel Disclosure Form*;
 - b. ☒ the *Primary Trip Sponsor Form* completed by the trip sponsor **prior** to the trip, **including** attachments **and** the *Grantmaking or Non-Grantmaking Sponsor Forms*;
 - c. ☒ page 2 of the completed *Traveler Form* submitted by the Member or officer; **and**
 - d. ☒ the letter from the Committee on Ethics approving my participation on this trip.
8. a. I represent that I participated in each of the activities reflected in the attached sponsor's agenda. **Signify statement is true by checking the box:** ☒
b. If not, explain: _____

I certify that the information contained in this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge. I have determined that all of the expenses on the attached *Sponsor Post-Travel Disclosure Form* were necessary and that the travel was in connection with my duties as a Member or officer of the U.S. House of Representatives and would not create the appearance that I am using public office for private gain.

Member / Officer Signature: Eric Swalwell

Date: 9/18/2020

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U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

Sponsor Post-Travel Disclosure Form

☒ Original ☐ Amendment

This form must be completed by an officer of any organization that served as the primary trip sponsor in providing travel expenses or reimbursement for travel expenses to House Members, officers, or employees under House Rule 25, clause 5. **A completed copy of the form must be provided to each House Member, officer, or employee who participated on the trip within ten days of their return.** You must answer all questions, and check all boxes, on this form for your submission to comply with House rules and the Committee's travel regulations. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in the denial of future requests to sponsor trips and/or subject the current traveler to disciplinary action or a requirement to repay the trip expenses.

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

1. Sponsor(s) who paid for the trip: The German Marshall Fund of the United States and The Robert Bosch Stiftung

2. Travel Destination(s): Elmau, Germany and Munich, Germany

3. Date of Departure: Saturday, February 15, 2020 Date of Return: Thursday, February 20, 2020

4. Name(s) of Traveler(s): Congressman Eric Swalwell & Brittany Swalwell

Note: You may list more than one traveler on a form only if **all** information is **identical** for each person listed.

5. Actual amount of expenses paid on behalf of, or reimbursed to, each individual named in Question 4:

	Total Transportation Expenses	Total Lodging Expenses	Total Meal Expenses	Total Other Expenses (dollar amount per item and description)
Traveler	\$3745.41	\$883.50	\$360.53	\$292.77 Conference Fees
Accompanying Family Member	\$3745.41	N/A	\$360.53	N/A

6. All expenses connected to the trip were for actual costs incurred and not a *per diem* or lump sum payment. Signify statement is true by checking box: ☒

I certify that the information contained in this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: Karen P. Donfried Sandra Breka Date: 02/26/2020

Name: Dr. Karen Donfried/ Sandra Breka Title: President/ Member of Board

Organization: The German Marshall Fund of the United States/ Robert Bosch Stiftung

I am an officer of the above-named organization. Signify statement is true by checking box: ☒

Address: 1744 R St NW, Washington D.C. 20009/Französische Straße 32, 10117 Berlin, Germany

Telephone: +1 202 683 2605/+49 30 220025-311 Email: kdonfried@gmfus.org/sandra.breka@bosch-stiftung.de

Committee staff may contact the above-named individual if additional information is required.

If you have questions regarding your completion of this form, please contact the Committee on Ethics at 202-225-7103.



U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

Primary Trip Sponsor Form

This form should be completed by private entities offering to provide travel or reimbursement for travel to House Members, officers, or employees under House Rule 25, clause 5. A completed copy of the form (and any attachments) should be provided to each invited House Member, officer, or employee, who will then forward it to the Committee together with a *Traveler Form* **at least 30 days before the start date of the trip**. The trip sponsor should **NOT** submit the form directly to the Committee. The Committee website (ethics.house.gov) provides detailed instructions for filling out the form.

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Failure to comply with the Committee's Travel Regulations may also lead to the denial of permission to sponsor future trips.

1. Sponsor who will be paying for the trip: The German Marshall Fund of the United States; Robert Bosch Stiftung
2. I represent that the trip will not be financed, in whole or in part, by a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent. Signify that the statement is true by checking box: ☒
3. **Check only one.** I represent that:
 - a. The primary trip sponsor has not accepted from any other source, funds intended directly or indirectly to finance any aspect of the trip: ☒ **OR**
 - b. The trip is arranged without regard to congressional participation and the primary trip sponsor has accepted funds only from entities that will receive a tangible benefit in exchange for those funds: ☐ **OR**
 - c. The primary trip sponsor has accepted funds from other source(s) intended directly or indirectly to finance all or part of this trip and has enclosed disclosure forms from each of those entities. ☐If "c" is checked, list the names of the additional sponsors: _____
4. Provide names and titles of **ALL** House Members *and* employees you are inviting. **For each House invitee, provide an explanation of why the individual was invited** (include additional pages if necessary): Please see addendum.
5. Is travel being offered to an accompanying family member of the House invitee(s)? ☒ Yes ☐ No
6. Date of Departure: February 15, 2020 Date of Return: February 20, 2020
7. a. City of departure: Washington, D.C.
b. Destination(s): Elmau, Germany & Munich, Germany
c. City of return: Washington, D.C.
8. **Check only one.** I represent that:
 - a. The sponsor of the trip is an institution of higher education within the meaning of section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965: ☐ **OR**
 - b. The sponsor of the trip does not retain or employ a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent: ☒ **OR**
 - c. The sponsor employs or retains a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent, but the trip is for attendance at a one-day event *and* lobbyist / foreign agent involvement in planning, organizing, requesting, or arranging the trip was *de minimis* under the Committee's travel regulations. ☐
9. **Check only one of the following:**
 - a. I checked 8(a) or (b) above: ☒
 - b. I checked 8(c) above but am not offering any lodging: ☐
 - c. I checked 8(c) above and am offering lodging and meals for one night: ☐ **OR**
 - d. I checked 8(c) above and am offering lodging and meals for two nights: ☐ If you checked this box, explain why the second night of lodging is warranted: _____



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10. Attached is a detailed agenda of the activities House invitees will be participating in during the travel (i.e., an hourly description of planned activities for trip invitees). *Indicate agenda is attached by checking box:* ☒
11. **Check only one of the following:**
- a. I represent that a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent will not accompany House Members or employees on any segment of the trip. *Signify that the statement is true by checking box:* ☒ **OR**
- b. *Not Applicable.* Trip sponsor is a U.S. institution of higher education: ☐
12. For **each** sponsor required to submit a sponsor form, describe the sponsor's interest in the subject matter of the trip **and** its role in organizing and/or conducting the trip:
- GMF seeks to promote cooperation between the United States and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. Robert Bosch
- Stiftung is a German foundation that supports projects in many important fields, including international relations. This Forum brings together U.S. and German lawmakers for policy discussions. GMF and Robert Bosch Stiftung are responsible for all aspects of the trip, including recruitment of participants and creation of the agenda.
13. **Answer parts a and b. Answer part c if necessary:**
- a. Mode of travel: Air ☒ Rail ☐ Bus ☒ Car ☐ Other ☐ (specify: _____)
- b. Class of travel: Coach ☐ Business ☒ First ☐ Charter ☐ Other ☐ (specify: _____)
- c. If travel will be first class, or by chartered or private aircraft, explain why such travel is warranted:
- _____
14. I represent that the expenditures related to local area travel during the trip will be unrelated to personal or recreational activities of the invitee(s). *Signify that the statement is true by checking box:* ☒
15. **Check only one.** I represent that either:
- a. The trip involves an event that is arranged or organized *without regard* to congressional participation and that meals provided to congressional participants are similar to those provided to or purchased by other event attendees: ☐ **OR**
- b. The trip involves events that are arranged specifically *with regard* to congressional participation: ☒
- If "b" is checked:
- 1) Detail the cost *per day* of meals (approximate cost may be provided): Approximately \$94 per day in Munich.
Please note that the hotel in Elmau is inclusive and costs include all meals. +
- 2) Provide the reason for selecting the location of the event or trip: The Congress-Bundestag Forum alternates each year between a city
in the United States and Germany. Munich was chosen as it is the capital city of an important German state. Elmau was chosen for its superior conference facilities.
16. Name, nightly cost, and reasons for selecting each hotel or other lodging facility:
- Hotel Name: Schloss Elmau City: Elmau Cost Per Night: \$611.77
- Reason(s) for Selecting: Superior conference facilities
- Hotel Name: Le Meridien City: Munich Cost Per Night: \$208.41
- Reason(s) for Selecting: Capital of an important German state, where attendees can better understand the German federal system
- Hotel Name: _____ City: _____ Cost Per Night: _____
- Reason(s) for Selecting: _____
17. I represent that all expenses connected to the trip will be for actual costs incurred and not a per diem or lump sum payment. *Signify that the statement is true by checking box:* ☒



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18. Total Expenses for each Participant:

<input type="checkbox"/> Actual Amounts	Total Transportation Expenses per Participant	Total Lodging Expenses per Participant	Total Meal Expenses per Participant
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Good Faith Estimates			
For each Member, Officer, or Employee	\$3,438.84	\$2,043.81	\$376
For each Accompanying Family Member	\$3,438.84	N/A	\$376

	Other Expenses (dollar amount per item)	Identify Specific Nature of "Other" Expenses (e.g., taxi, parking, registration fee, etc.)
For each Member, Officer, or Employee		
For each Accompanying Family Member		

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

19. Check only one:

- a. I certify that I am an officer of the organization listed below: ☒ OR
b. Not Applicable. Trip sponsor is an individual or a U.S. institution of higher education. ☐

20. I certify that I am not a registered federal lobbyist or foreign agent for any sponsor of this trip. ☐

21. I certify by my signature that the information contained in this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: Karen P. Donfried Sandra Breka Date: January 15, 2020

Name: Karen Donfried Sandra Breka

Title: President Member, Board of Management

Organization: German Marshall Fund of the United States Robert Bosch Stiftung

Address: 1744 R St NW, Washington, D.C. 20009 Französische Straße 32, 10117 Berlin, Germany

Telephone: +1 202 683 2650 +49 30 220025-317

Email: kdonfried@gmfus.org sandrabreka@bosch-stiftung.de

If there are any questions regarding this form, please contact the Committee at the following address:

Committee on Ethics

U.S. House of Representatives

1015 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515

Phone: 202-225-7103 General Fax: 202-225-7392



U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

TRAVELER FORM

1. Name of Traveler: Eric Swalwell
2. Sponsor(s) who will be paying for the trip: German Marshall Fund
3. City and State **OR** Foreign Country of Travel: Munich, Germany
4. a. Date of Departure: 2/15/2020 Date of Return: 2/20/2020
b. Will you be extending the trip at your personal expense? ☐ Yes ☒ No
If yes, list dates at personal expense: _____
5. a. Will you be accompanied by a family member at the sponsor's expense? ☒ Yes ☐ No If yes:
(1) Name of Accompanying Family Member: Brittany Watts Swalwell
(2) Relationship to Traveler: ☒ Spouse ☐ Child ☐ Other (specify): _____
(3) Accompanying Family Member is at least 18 years of age: ☒ Yes ☐ No
6. a. Did the trip sponsor answer "Yes" to Question 8(c) on the *Primary Trip Sponsor Form* (i.e., travel is sponsored by an entity that employs a registered federal lobbyist or a foreign agent)? ☐ Yes ☒ No
b. If yes, and you are requesting lodging for two nights, explain why the second night is warranted:

7. *Primary Trip Sponsor Form* is attached, including agenda, invitee list, and any other attachments and contributing sponsor forms: ☒ Yes ☐ No
NOTE: The agenda should show the traveler's individual schedule, including departure and arrival times and identify the specific events in which the traveler will be participating.
8. Explain why participation in the trip is connected to the traveler's individual official or representational duties. Staff should include their job title and how the activities on the itinerary relate to their duties.
The GMF is a non-partisan public policy think tank aimed at promoting cooperation b/w Europe & North America - this trip will help the Congressman foster better relationships with our European allies.
9. Is the traveler aware of any registered federal lobbyists or foreign agents involved planning, organizing, requesting, or arranging the trip? ☐ Yes ☒ No
10. For staff travelers, to be completed by your employing Member:

ADVANCED AUTHORIZATION OF EMPLOYEE TRAVEL

I hereby authorize the individual named above, an employee of the U.S. House of Representatives who works under my direct supervision, to accept expenses for the trip described in this request. I have determined that the above-described travel is in connection with my employee's official duties and that acceptance of these expenses will not create the appearance that the employee is using public office for private gain.

Signature of Employing Member _____ Date _____



U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

TRAVELER FORM

This form should be completed by House Members, officers, or employees seeking Committee approval of privately-sponsored travel or reimbursement for travel under House Rule 25, clause 5. The completed form should be submitted directly to the Committee by each invited House Member, officer, or employee, together with the completed and signed trip sponsor form(s) and any attachments. A copy of this form, minus this initial page, will be made available for public inspection. This form, and any attachments, may be faxed to the Committee at 202-225-7392, sent or delivered to the Committee at 1015 Longworth, or e-mailed to travel.requests@mail.house.gov.

Your completed request must be submitted to the Committee no less than 30 days before your proposed departure date. Absent exceptional circumstances, permission will not be granted for requests received less than 30 days before the trip commences. You must receive explicit approval from the Committee before you depart on this trip.

Name of Traveler: Eric Swalwell

NOTE: Willful or knowing misrepresentations on this form may be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

I certify that the information contained on both pages of this form is true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: Eric Swalwell

Name of Signatory (if other than traveler): _____

For Staff (name of employing Member or Committee): _____

Office Address: 407 Cannon House Building Washington, DC 20515

Telephone Number: 202-225-5065

Email Address of Contact Person: lizzzy.olive@mail.house.gov

☐ Check this box if the sponsoring entity is a media outlet, the purpose of the trip is to make a media appearance sponsored by that entity, and these forms are being submitted to the Committee less than 30 days before the trip departure date.

NOTE: You must complete all of the contact information fields above, as Committee staff may need to contact you if additional information is required.

KEEP A COPY OF THIS FORM. Page 2 (but not this page) must be submitted to the Clerk as part of the post-travel disclosure required by House Rule 25. Travel Regulation § 404(d) also requires you to keep a copy of all request forms and supporting paperwork for three subsequent Congresses from the date of travel.

If there are any questions regarding this form, please contact the Committee on Ethics at 202-225-7103 or via e-mail: travel.requests@mail.house.gov.

Theodore E. Deutch, Florida
Chairman
Kenny Marchant, Texas
Ranking Member

Grace Meng, New York
Susan Wild, Pennsylvania
Dean Phillips, Minnesota
Anthony Brown, Maryland

John Ratcliffe, Texas
George Holding, North Carolina
Jackie Walorski, Indiana
Michael Guest, Mississippi



ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

Thomas A. Rust
Staff Director and Chief Counsel

David W. Arrojo
Counsel to the Chairman

Christopher A. Dones
Counsel to the Ranking Member

1015 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6328
Telephone: (202) 225-7103
Facsimile: (202) 225-7392

February 11, 2020

The Honorable Eric Swalwell
U.S. House of Representatives
407 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Colleague:

Pursuant to House Rule 25, clause 5(d)(2), the Committee on Ethics hereby approves your and your spouse's proposed trip to Germany,¹ scheduled for February 15 to 20, 2020, sponsored by German Marshall Fund of the United States and Robert Bosch Stiftung.

You must complete a Member/Officer Post-Travel Disclosure Form and file it, together with a Sponsor Post-Travel Disclosure Form completed by the trip sponsor, with the Clerk of the House within 15 days after your return from travel. As part of that filing, you are also required to attach a copy of this letter and both the Traveler and Primary Trip Sponsor Forms (including attachments) you previously submitted to the Committee in seeking pre-approval for this trip. You must also report all travel expenses totaling more than \$390 from a single source on the "Travel" schedule of your annual Financial Disclosure Statement covering this calendar year. Finally, Travel Regulation § 404(d) also requires you to keep a copy of all request forms and supporting information provided to the Committee for three subsequent Congresses from the date of travel.

Because the trip may involve meetings with foreign government representatives, we note that House Members may accept, under the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (FGDA), gifts "of minimal value [currently \$390] tendered as a souvenir or mark of courtesy" by a foreign government. Any tangible gifts valued in excess of minimal value received from a foreign government must, within 60 days of acceptance, be disclosed on a Form for Disclosing Gifts from Foreign Governments and either turned over to the Clerk of the House, or, with the written approval of the Committee, retained for official use.

¹ Please be aware that the Committee's review of the proposed trip does not extend to either the security situation in the destination country or security related to foreign travel in general. We recommend you contact the Office of House Security (OHS) for a safety and security briefing prior to your departure. OHS may be reached at (202) 226-2044 or ohsstaff@mail.house.gov. House travelers should also register for the U.S. State Department's Smart Traveler Enrollment Program at <https://step.state.gov>.

If you have any further questions, please contact the Committee's Office of Advice and Education at extension 5-7103.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Theodore E. Deutch".

Theodore E. Deutch
Chairman

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Kenny Marchant".

Kenny Marchant
Ranking Member

TED/KM:adw

House Ethics Addendum
Congress-Bundestag Forum 2020

The following Members of Congress were chosen to participate due to their interest in the transatlantic relations and international affairs:

- Congresswoman Robin Kelly (D-IL)
- Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA)
- Congressman Barry Loudermilk (D-GA)
- Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH)
- Congresswoman Brenda Lawrence (D-MI)
- Congresswoman Debbie Lesko (R-AZ)
- Congressman Robert Bishop (R-UT)
- Congressman Mark Green (R-TN)
- Congressman Eric Swalwell (D-CA)
- Congressman C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD)
- Congressman Bill Flores (R-TX)

AGENDA

Congress-Bundestag Forum

Schloss Elmau and Munich February 16 – 20, 2020

Sunday, February 16, 2020

U.S. Members of Congress and German Members of the Bundestag arrive on individual travel itineraries.

Transport to the hotel is provided. Please look for a “Congress-Bundestag Forum” sign upon arrival at the airport or upon your pick-up.

Accommodation: Schloss Elmau
82493 Elmau/Oberbayern
Tel. +49 8823 18 0

(Business casual)

12:55 U.S. lawmakers and spouses meet in the lobby and walk to Kaminstüberl

13:00 – 14:45 Welcome Lunch for U.S. Member of Congress on Germany’s Perspective on the International Order

With remarks by GMF and Robert Bosch Stiftung’s experts
Location: Kaminstüberl

Description: At this working lunch, Members of Congress will engage in discussion about the bilateral relationship between Germany and the United States the challenges and opportunities presented by the current state of global affairs. Experts from the Robert Bosch Stiftung and the German Marshall Fund will provide perspectives on the importance of international engagement for both countries, and participants will discuss the ways in which German and American perspectives on engagement converge and diverge. Should Members of the Bundestag arrive early, they are welcome to lunch.

Please note that the entirety of the lunch will be allocated to discussion.

14:50 U.S. and German lawmakers meet in the patio for a 3-minute walk to the Retreat Building

(If you require a transfer to the Retreat Building, please come to the lobby, where staff will assist you)

15:00 – 16:45 **Welcome and Facilitated Opening Session on Role of Legislators in Transatlantic Relations** with **Sandra Breka**, Member of the Board of Management, Robert Bosch Stiftung; and **Dr. Karen Donfried**, President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Mark Shillaker, Facilitator, FLAG Consulting & Training Location:
tbd

Description: At this facilitated session, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will discuss the role that legislators play in shaping the transatlantic relationship. In particular, discussants will focus on, the most constructive ways to engage with their foreign counterparts, and the general role of the legislative branch in facilitating transatlantic cooperation. The discussion will be informed by the personal experience and backgrounds of each Member of Congress and Bundestag. Remarks will be given by the Robert Bosch Stiftung's Sandra Breka and GMF's Dr. Karen Donfried.

16:45 – 18:00 Personal Work Period

18:00 – 20:30 **CBF Opening Dinner Discussion: An Asian Perspective on Transatlantic Relations and the Global Order**

Dr. Huang Jing, Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute on National and Regional Studies, Beijing Language and Culture University
Location: Restaurant Fidelio

Description: At this working dinner, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will hear remarks by Dr. Huang Jing about the Asian perspective on the transatlantic relationship. China's growing influence in world affairs both poses a challenge and presents an opportunity for German and American policymakers, and the future of the transatlantic relationship will be shaped significantly by the countries' respective policies towards China. The delegation will explore the ways in which American and German policy on China converges and diverges, especially as it pertains to technology.

Please note that the entirety of the dinner will be allocated to discussion.

Monday, February 17, 2020

Starting at 7:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

(Business casual)

U.S. and German lawmakers meet in the patio for a 3-minute walk to the Retreat Building

(If you require a transfer to the Retreat Building, please come to the lobby, where staff will assist you)

09:00 – 10:45

Session I: Global Order – Challenges to the West

Federica Mogherini, Former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission

General John R. Allen, President, The Brookings Institution Location: Pavillon

Description: At this working session, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will hear remarks by Federica Mogherini, Former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, and General John R. Allen, President of the Brookings Institution, about their perspectives on challenges to the transatlantic relationship. Participants will discuss the challenges they identify as most relevant with the two experts and present a German or American perspective to their respective counterparts. The discussants will then answer questions from the delegation.

10:45 – 11:00

Coffee Break

11:00 – 12:00

Facilitated Group Working Phase

Description: In this facilitated group working phase, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will discuss, in small groups, the topic of global order, which was held with Federica Mogherini and General John R. Allen. The purpose of this session is to facilitate relationship-building among participants, foster collaborative approaches to transatlantic policymaking, and identify policy areas in which German and American perspectives converge and diverge. Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will reflect on the perspectives they heard and give their views on the topic.

12:15 – 13:45

Lunch Break

Location: La Salle and Kaminstüberl

14:00 – 15:30

Discussion of Global Order Session

Location: Pavillon

Description: In this facilitated discussion, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will have the opportunity to present the results of the group working phase to the plenum and suggest collaborative solutions and common transatlantic approaches. Integrating the conversation with Federica Mogherini and General John R. Allen, the participants will further develop the collaboration they began in the facilitated group working phase.

15:50 Lawmakers and interested spouses meet at the hotel lobby

16:00 – 18:00 Facilitated team-building activity

Description: In this facilitated session, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will participate in an on-site team-building exercise. The purpose of this activity is to engage Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag to engage in both candid and informal discussions about their experience at the Congress-Bundestag Forum thus far. They will have the opportunity to reflect on the perspectives they have heard, discuss whether they agree or disagree, and build personal connections with their transatlantic counterparts.

18:00 – 19:00 Personal Work Period

19:00 – 21:00 Dinner Discussion: Europe Reunited – 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall

Sonja Licht, President, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence

Sławomir Sierakowski, Founder, Krytyka Polityczna

Location: Restaurant Fidelio

Description: At this working dinner, the delegation will engage in conversation about the process and impacts of Europe's "reunification" after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Perspectives from Middle and Eastern Europe will be provided by two guest discussants: Sonja Licht, President of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, a Belgrade-based nonpartisan organization dedicated to Serbia's democratization and European integration, and Sławomir Sierakowski, founder of Krytyka Polityczna (The Political Critique), a Polish intellectual organization and independent news provider.

Please note that the entirety of the dinner will be allocated to discussion.

Tuesday, February 18, 2020

Starting at 7:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

(Business casual)

8:55 Lawmakers meet at the Pavillon

Description: In this facilitated session, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will discuss the best practices and policies to foster social cohesion in changing societies. Immigration, aging populations, and a widening disparity between urban and rural areas will be topics of conversation, and the delegations will share their views on the most constructive ways to manage such changes.

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 11:45 **Continue with group working phase**

12:00 – 13:00 **Lunch Break**

Location: La Salle and Kaminstüberl

Lawmakers walk back to Pavillon

13:15 – 15:00 **Session III: Opportunities and Risks: Energies for the Future**

Mechthild Wörsdörfer, Director, Sustainability, Technology and Outlooks,
International Energy Agency (invited)

Location: Pavillon

Description: In this session, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will engage in a facilitated discussion about energy and energy policy, with focus on how emerging technologies will change how energy is sourced and used. As promoting sustainable energy becomes a more prominent political and economic goal across the world, energy has become one of the fields in which technology has advanced rapidly. The implications of such change for the transatlantic relationship and the ways in which Germany and the United States can cooperate on energy policy will be explored.

15:00 – 15:15 Coffee Break

15:15 – 17:15 **Closing Session: Transatlantic Relations – The Way Forward**

Facilitated discussion on the future of the transatlantic relationship

Mark Shillaker, Facilitator, FLAG Consulting & Training

Location: Pavillon

STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

Description: In this session, Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will engage in a facilitated discussion about the future of the transatlantic relationship. The problems it faces, the solutions required, and the best methods of cooperation will be topics of discussion. Attendees will have the opportunity to reflect on how their experience at the Congress-Bundestag Forum has informed their views on policy and transatlantic engagement.

17:15 – 19:00 Personal Work Period

19:00 – 21:30 CBF Closing Dinner with remarks from **Sandra Breka**, Member of the Board of Management, Robert Bosch Stiftung; and **Dr. Karen Donfried**, President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Location: Restaurant Summit

Description: At this working dinner, the delegation will hear remarks on the state of the transatlantic relationship from the Robert Bosch Stiftung's Sandra Breka and GMF's Dr. Karen Donfried. The delegation will engage in a discussion about policy areas of focus (including trade and technology), areas in which cooperation may be strengthened, ways in which German and American politicians might constructively engage.

Please note that the entirety of the dinner will be allocated to discussion.

Wednesday, February 19, 2020

Starting at 7:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

(Business casual)

8:00 Check out of Schloss Elmau
German Members of the Bundestag depart on individual itineraries

8:00 Transfer to Munich airport
U.S. Members of Congress depart to Munich

10:00 – 11:30 Visit to the Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism

Tour and discussion with **Dr. Mirjam Zadoff**, Director of the Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism

Description: The Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism was built upon the site of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) headquarters and opened in 2015 as an

educational facility with permanent and special exhibitions. On this site visit, the delegation will learn about the history, crimes, and consequences of the Nazi dictatorship and will explore how the lessons of the rise of Nazism are relevant today.

11:30 Transfer to BMW (exact BMW location to be confirmed)

12:00 – 14:00 Lunch Discussion on Digitalization and Workforce Development in Germany

Description: At BMW, the delegation will discuss how BMW approaches Germany's modern economic opportunities and challenges: an aging workforce, rapid advances in technology, European economic integration, and increased global competition. They will explore how the company, which has its American headquarters in New Jersey, approaches the transatlantic relationship against a backdrop of changing trade policy.

Please note that this site visit includes lunch, and the entire lunch period is allocated to discussion.

14:00 – 16:00 City tour of Munich

16:00 – 16:30 Meeting with Vice President of the Bavarian Parliament Karl Freller

Description: At the Bavarian Landtag [Parliament], the delegation will meet Karl Freller, Vice President of the Bavarian Parliament, for a discussion about Bavarian politics and relationship with the United States. The discussion will allow participants to better understand Germany's federal system of government and the way it impacts German relations with the European Union and United States.

16:30 – 17:00 Tour of the Bavarian Parliament with Member of Parliament Gerhard Hopp

Description: At the Bavarian Landtag [Parliament], the delegation will meet Gerhard Hopp, Member of Parliament, for a discussion about Bavarian politics and relationship with the United States.

1700 Transfer to Le Meridien Hotel

17:30 – 18:00 Personal Work Period at Hotel

18:00 Transfer to Zum Franziskaner Restaurant

Gregor Peter Schmitz, Editor-in-Chief, Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung

Description: At this working dinner, the delegation will engage in a discussion with Gregor Peter Schmitz, Editor-in-Chief of the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, about the state of German politics. As Germany's traditional political parties decline, new parties and parties on the fringes of politics have drastically increased their share of votes and have, in many cities and federal states, entered government – changing the way politics is conducted in Europe's largest national economy. In this discussion, the causes and consequences of these developments will be explored, with focus on the implications for the transatlantic relationship.

Please note that the entirety of the dinner will be allocated to discussion.

Thursday, February 20, 2020

U.S. Members of Congress depart to airport on individual itineraries

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AGENDA

Congress-Bundestag Forum Schloss Elmau and Munich February 16 – 20, 2020

Sunday, February 16, 2020

U.S. Members of Congress and German Members of the Bundestag arrive in Munich on individual travel itineraries

Transport to the hotel is provided. Please look for a "Congress-Bundestag Forum" sign upon arrival.

Accommodation: Schloss Elmau
82493 Elmau/Oberbayern
Tel. +49 8823 18 0

(Business casual)

13:00 – 14:45 **Welcome Lunch for U.S. Member of Congress**

Location: Kaminstüberl

14:50 Meet in the lobby, walk to Retreat building

15:00 – 16:45 **Welcome and introduction to the program/Facilitated Opening Session**
with **Sandra Breka**, Member of the Board of Management, Robert Bosch Stiftung; and **Dr. Karen Donfried**, President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Mark Shillaker, Facilitator, FLAG Consulting & Training

Location: tbd

16:30 – 18:00 Personal Work Period

18:00 – 20:30 **CBF Opening Dinner Discussion**
Dr. Huang Jing, Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute on
National and Regional Studies, Beijing Language and Culture University
(confirmed)
Location: Restaurant Fidelio

Monday, February 17, 2020

Starting at 7:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant
(Business casual)

09:00 – 10:45 **Session I: Global Order – Challenges to the West**
General John R. Allen, President, The Brookings Institution (confirmed)
Federica Mogherini, Former High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission
(pending)

10:45 – 11:00 Coffee Break

11:00 – 12:00 **Continue with group working phase**

12:00 – 13:00 **Lunch Break**

Location: La Salle and Kaminstüberl

13:15 – 14:30 **Discussion of Global Order Session**

Location: Pavillon

14:30 – 15:30 Personal Work Period

15:30 – 18:00 Site-visit

- 18:00 – 19:00 Personal Work Period
- 19:00 – 21:00 **Dinner Discussion: Europe Reunited – 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall**
Sonja Licht, President, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence (confirmed)
Sławomir Sierakowski, Founder, Krytyka Polityczna (confirmed)
Location: Restaurant Summit

Tuesday, February 18, 2020

- Starting at 7:30** Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant
(Business casual)
- 9:00 – 12:00 **Session II: Social Cohesion in Changing Societies**
Tim Dixon, Co-Founder, More in Common (confirmed)
Location: Pavillon
- 12:00 – 13:00 **Lunch Break**
Location: La Salle and Kaminstüberl
- 13:15 – 15:00 **Session III: Opportunities and Risks: Energies for the Future**
Mechthild Wörsdörfer, Director, Sustainability, Technology and Outlooks,
International Energy Agency (invited)
Professor Claudia Kemfert, Head of Department Energy, Transportation,
Environment, German Institute for Economic Research (invited)
Location: Pavillon
- 15:00 – 15:15 Coffee Break
- 15:15 – 16:45 **Reflections on transatlantic cooperation led by participants**
- 17:00 – 18:00 **Closing Session: Transatlantic Relations – The Way Forward**

Facilitated discussion on the future of the transatlantic relationship

Mark Shillaker, Facilitator, FLAG Consulting & Training

Location: Pavillon

18:00 – 19:00 Personal Work Period

19:00 – 21:30 **CBF Closing Dinner**

with remarks from **Sandra Breka**, Member of the Board of Management, Robert Bosch Stiftung; and **Dr. Karen Donfried**, President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Location: Restaurant Fidelio

Wednesday, February 19, 2020

Starting at 7:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

(Business casual)

9:00 – 11:00 **Check-out**

German Members of the Bundestag depart on individual itineraries

9:00 **U.S. Members of Congress depart to Munich**

11:00 – 12:00 **Meeting with President of the Landtag of Bavaria Ilse Aigner (CSU)**
(invited)

12:00 – 12.30 Transfer

12:30 – 14:30 **Digitalization and Workforce Development in Germany**

Lunch discussion and visit at a Germany company/BMW

14:30 – 15:00 Transfer

15:00 – 16:30 **Visit to the Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism**

Tour and discussion with **Dr. Mirjam Zadoff**, Director (confirmed)

16:30 – 17:00 Transfer to hotel

17:00 – 18:00 Personal Work Period

18:00 – 18:30 Transfer to restaurant

18:30 – 20:30 **Dinner Discussion on Current German Politics with journalists**
Gregor Peter Schmitz, Editor-in-Chief, Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung
(confirmed)

Thursday, February 20, 2020

U.S. Members of Congress depart to airport on individual itineraries



The 17th Annual
Congress-Bundestag Forum

February 16 – 20, 2020 | Elmau and Munich, Germany

The 17th Annual Congress-Bundestag Forum

OVERVIEW

The Congress-Bundestag Forum (CBF) is a project undertaken annually by The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. The forum is a parliamentary exchange that brings together Members of the German Bundestag and Members of the U.S. House of Representatives for a series of discussions on areas of mutual concern. The forum alternates location each year between the United States and Germany.

Since its inception in 2004, the purpose of the forum has been to bring together influential members of Congress and the German Bundestag for discussions on policy issues affecting the United States and Europe and to develop informal connections among colleagues. Expert panelists will give input on a variety of transatlantic policy issues. In light of current challenges, common policy priorities such as trade and globalization, challenges to the global order, social cohesion in changing societies, Europe 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and energies for the future will be discussed.

The 17th Congress-Bundestag Forum will take place from February 16 - 18 in Schloss Elmau and from February 19 - 20, 2020, in Munich.

PROGRAM PARTNERS



G | M | F The German Marshall Fund
of the United States
STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

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Catharine Carstens, Program Assistant, Congressional Affairs	+1 202 867 6787

February 16 - 20, 2020

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Congress

The Honorable Rob Bishop (R-UT)

The Honorable Bill Flores (R-TX)
Ms. Gina Flores

The Honorable Mark Green (R-TN)

The Honorable Robin Kelly (D-IL)
Dr. Nathaniel Horn

The Honorable Brenda Lawrence (D-MI)
Mr. McArthur Lawrence

The Honorable Barbara Lee (D-CA)
Rev. Dr. Clyde Oden

The Honorable Debra Lesko (R-AZ)
Mr. Joseph Lesko

The Honorable C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD)
Ms. Kay Ruppersberger

The Honorable Eric Swalwell (D-CA)
Ms. Brittany Swalwell

The Honorable Mike Turner (R-OH)
Ms. Jessica Turner

German Bundestag

The Honorable Ekin Deligöz (Alliance 90/The Greens)

The Honorable Otto Fricke (FDP)

The Honorable Metin Hakverdi (SPD)

The Honorable Sebastian Hartmann (SPD)

The Honorable Mark Hauptmann (CDU/CSU)

Ms. Jasmin Akram

The Honorable Dieter Janecek (Alliance 90/The Greens)

Ms. Birgit Janecek

The Honorable Lars Klingbeil (SPD)

The Honorable Günter Krings (CDU/CSU)

The Honorable Stefan Liebich (The Left)

The Honorable Tobias Lindner (Alliance 90/The Greens)

The Honorable Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU)

The Honorable Andreas Nick (CDU/CSU)

The Honorable Dietmar Nietan (SPD)

The Honorable Omid Nouripour (Alliance 90/The Greens)

The Honorable Johannes Vogel (FDP)

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Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH

Sandra Breka, Member of the Board of Management

Henry Alt-Haaker, Senior Vice President, Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy

Laura Strömpel, Project Manager, Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)

Dr. Karen Donfried, President

Reta Jo Lewis, Esq., Senior Fellow and Director of Congressional Affairs, Washington, DC

Sudha David-Wilp, Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Deputy Director, Berlin Office

Maurice Velazco, Program Officer, Congressional Affairs, Washington, DC

Corinna Blutguth, Program Coordinator, Berlin Office

Elisabeth Winter, Program Assistant, Berlin Office

Catharine Carstens, Program Assistant, Congressional Affairs, Washington, DC

17th Annual
Congress-Bundestag Forum
Schloss Elmau and Munich, Germany

LOGISTICS

Transportation

Transportation will be provided throughout the program.

Upon arrival at the airport, please look for a **Congress-Bundestag Forum** sign.

Accommodations

Elmau, Germany
Schloss Elmau
82493 Elmau, Germany
Tel: +49 8823 180

Munich, Germany
Le Méridien
Bayerstrasse 41
80335 Munich, Germany
Tel: +49 892 4220

February 16 - 20, 2020

AGENDA

U.S. Members of Congress and German Members of the Bundestag arrive on individual travel itineraries.

Accommodation: Schloss Elmau
82493 Elmau/Oberbayern
Tel. +49 8823 18 0

Spouses are welcome at all meal events in Elmau as well as at the team-building activity.

Sunday, February 16, 2020

Business Casual Attire

12:55 U.S. lawmakers and spouses meet in the lobby and walk to Kaminstüberl

13:00 – 14:45

Welcome Lunch

Members of Congress will engage in discussion about the bilateral relationship between Germany and the United States, the challenges and opportunities presented by the current state of global affairs.

Location: Kaminstüberl

14:50 Lawmakers meet in the tea lounge for a 3-minute walk to Retreat Building
If you require a transfer to the Retreat Building, please come to the lobby, where staff will assist you.

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15:00 – 16:45

Welcome & Facilitated Opening Session

with remarks by **Sandra Breka**, Member of the Board of Management, Robert Bosch Stiftung and **Dr. Karen Donfried**, President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will discuss the role that legislators play in shaping the transatlantic relationship.

Location: Pavillon

Facilitated by **Mark Shillaker**, Facilitator, FLAG Consulting & Training

16:45 – 18:00

Personal Work Period

18:00 – 20:30

CBF Opening Dinner Discussion: An Asian Perspective on Transatlantic Relations and the Global Order

Members of Congress and Members of the Bundestag will hear remarks about the Asian perspective on the transatlantic relationship. China's growing influence in world affairs poses a challenge and presents an opportunity for German and American policymakers.

Dr. Huang Jing, Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute on National and Regional Studies, Beijing Language and Culture University

Location: Restaurant Fidelio

20:30 - 22:00

Networking Event

with live music by **Bolandi Trio**

Location: Restaurant Fidelio

February 16 - 20, 2020

Monday, February 17, 2020

Business Casual Attire

- Starting at 07:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant
- 08:45 U.S. and German lawmakers meet at the Pavillon
If you require a transfer to the Retreat Building, please come to the lobby, where staff will assist you.
- 09:00 – 10:45 Session I: Global Order – Challenges to the West**
U.S. and German lawmakers will hear remarks by Federica Mogherini and General John R. Allen about their perspectives on challenges to the transatlantic relationship.
- Federica Mogherini**, Former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
General John R. Allen, President, The Brookings Institution
- Location: Pavillon**
- 10:45 – 11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00 – 12:00 Continuation of Session I: Group Working Phase**
U.S. and German lawmakers will discuss, in small groups, the topic of global order, taking into account the previous discussion.
- Location: Pavillon**
- 12:00 Short walk to the main building
- 12:15 – 13:45 Lunch Break**

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Schloss Elmau and Munich, Germany

Location: La Salle and Kaminstüberl

13:55 U.S. and German lawmakers meet at the Pavillon
If you require a transfer to the Retreat Building, please come to the lobby, where staff will assist you.

14:00 – 15:30 Continuation of Session I: Discussion of Results

U.S. and German lawmakers will have the opportunity to present the results of the group working phase to the plenum and suggest collaborative solutions and common transatlantic approaches.

Location: Pavillon

15:50 Lawmakers and interested spouses meet in the hotel lobby
The team-building activity takes place outdoors; please dress warmly.

16:00 – 18:00 Team-Building Activity

Lawmakers and interested spouses will participate in an on-site team-building exercise. The purpose of this activity is to engage the delegation in candid and informal discussions.

18:00 - 19:00 Personal Work Period

19:00 – 21:30 Dinner Discussion: Europe Reunited – 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall

The delegation will engage in conversation about the impacts of Europe's "reunification" after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Sonja Licht, President, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence
Sławomir Sierakowski, Founder, Krytyka Polityczna

Location: Restaurant Fidelio

February 16 - 20, 2020

Tuesday, February 18, 2020

Business Casual Attire

Starting at 07:30 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

08:55 U.S. and German lawmakers meet at the Pavillon
If you require a transfer to the Retreat Building, please come to the lobby, where staff will assist you.

9:00 – 10:30 Session II: Social Cohesion in Changing Societies
U.S. and German lawmakers will discuss the best practices and policies to foster social cohesion in changing societies.

Tim Dixon, Co-Founder, More in Common

Location: Pavillon

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 11:45 Session II: Continuation of Group Working Phase
U.S. and German lawmakers will discuss, in small groups, the topic of social cohesion in changing societies global order, taking into account the previous discussion.

Location: Pavillon

12:00 – 13:00 Lunch Break
Location: La Salle and Kaminstüberl

13:10 U.S. and German lawmakers meet at the Pavillon
If you require a transfer to the Retreat Building, please come to the lobby, where staff will assist you.

13:15 – 15:00

Session III: Opportunities and Risks: Energies for the Future

U.S. and German lawmakers will engage in a discussion about energy and energy policy, with focus on how emerging technologies will change how energy is sourced and used.

Prof. Dr. Veronika Grimm, Professor of Economic Theory, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

Location: Pavillon

15:00 – 15:15

Coffee Break

15:15 – 17:15

Closing Session: Transatlantic Relations – The Way Forward

U.S. and German lawmakers will engage in a facilitated discussion about the future of the transatlantic relationship: the problems it faces, the solutions required, and the best methods of cooperation.

Mark Shillaker, Facilitator, FLAG Consulting & Training

Location: Pavillon

17:15 – 19:00

Personal Work Period

19:00 – 21:30

CBF Closing Dinner

with remarks from **Henry Alt-Haaker**, Robert Bosch Stiftung and **Dr. Karen Donfried**, GMF

The delegation will engage in a discussion about policy areas of focus areas in which cooperation may be strengthened, ways in which German and American politicians might constructively engage.

Location: Restaurant Ganesha

February 16 - 20, 2020

Wednesday, February 19, 2020

Business Attire

Accommodation: Le Méridien
Bayerstraße 41
80335 München, Germany
Tel. +49 89 24220

Spouses are welcome to join all meetings in Munich.

Starting at 7:00 Buffet breakfast at La Salle Restaurant

07:50 Check out of Schloss Elmau

U.S. Members of Congress depart to Munich
German Members of the Bundestag depart on individual itineraries

10:00 – 11:30 Visit to the Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism

The Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism opened in 2015 as a place of education and remembrance documenting and addressing the crimes of the Nazi dictatorship and their origins, manifestations and consequences right up to the present day.

Tour and discussion with **Dr. Mirjam Zadoff**, Director

11:30 Transfer to BMW

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- 12:00 – 14:00** **Digitalization and Workforce Development in Germany:
Lunch Discussion and Visit at BMW Plant**
This lunch discussion will focus on workforce development in Germany,
with focus on how digitalization is changing the way people work and
are trained.
- Location: Riesenfeldstraße 60
80809 Munich, Germany**
- 14:00 – 16:00** **City Tour of Munich**
- 16:00 - 16:30** **Meeting with Vice President of the Bavarian Parliament
Karl Freller, MdL (CSU)**
- 16:30 - 17:00** **Tour of the Bavarian Parliament with Member of the Presidium
Dr. Gerhard Hopp, MdL (CSU)**
At the Bavarian Landtag [Parliament], the delegation will meet Karl
Freller, Vice President of the Bavarian Parliament, and Dr. Gerhard
Hopp, member of the Presidium, for a discussion about Bavarian and
German politics and relationship with the United States.
- 17:00 - 17:30** **Transfer to Hotel**
- 17:30 – 18:30** **Personal Work Period**
- 18:30** **Transfer to Restaurant Zum Franziskaner**

February 16 - 20, 2020

19:00 – 21:00

Dinner Discussion on Current German Politics

At this working dinner, the delegation will engage in a discussion with Gregor Peter Schmitz, Editor-in-Chief of the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, about the state of German politics.

Gregor Peter Schmitz, Editor-in-Chief, Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung

Location: Zum Franziskaner

Thursday, February 20, 2020

U.S. Members of Congress depart to airport on individual itineraries.

BIOGRAPHIES

Members of Congress

The Honorable Rob Bishop (R-UT)



Congressman Rob Bishop represents Utah's 1st Congressional District. In the 116th Congress, Rep. Bishop serves as the ranking member of the House Committee on Natural Resources. He also serves on the House Armed Services Committee as a member of the Readiness Subcommittee. In his nine years as member of the U.S. Congress, Rep. Bishop has co-founded the 10th Amendment Task Force, and the Western States Coalition. In the past he has served as chair of the Congressional Western Caucus. Before being elected to Congress in 2003, he served sixteen years in the state legislature, including as majority leader and unanimously elected Speaker of the House. He served terms as state chairman of the

Republican Party. Rep. Bishop spent twenty-eight years as a high school teacher in Utah, focusing on American history and government. Rep. Bishop graduated from the University of Utah with a degree in political science.

The Honorable William Flores (R-TX)



Congressman William (Bill) Flores represents Texas' 17th Congressional District. He serves as a member on the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on the Budget. Congressman Flores sits on the House Congressional Taiwan Caucus, the Congressional Kyrgyzstan Caucus, and the Congressional Czech Caucus. Before being elected to Congress, Rep. Flores used his undergraduate degree in accounting, an MBA, and licensure as a CPA to advance through progressively higher-impact leadership ranks during his 30-plus year career in finance and energy. During that career, he served as a "C" level officer in the energy business for over 20 years, where he helped

create hundreds of well-paying American jobs in private and privately held companies. Prior to retiring from the private sector in late 2009 to run for public office, Rep. Flores served as president and CEO of Phoenix Exploration Company, a successful and rapidly growing exploration and production company headquartered in Houston, Texas. He graduated from Texas A&M University-College and from Houston Baptist University.

The Honorable Mark Green (R-TN)



Congressman Mark Green represents Tennessee's 7th Congressional District. For the 116th Congress, Congressman Green serves as a member on the House Committee on Homeland Security, including Subcommittees on Intelligence and Counterterrorism, and Transportation and Maritime Security. He also serves on the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, including the Subcommittee on National Security. Before being elected to Congress in 2019, Rep. Green was a flight surgeon for the premier special operations aviation regiment and was deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan. For his service he was awarded numerous medals including the Bronze Star and the Meritorious Service Medal. After his service, Rep. Green founded an emergency department staffing company that provided staffing to 52 hospitals across 11 states. He also founded two free medical clinics that provide healthcare to under-served populations in Memphis and Clarksville as well as numerous medical mission trips throughout the world. Rep. Green graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1986 where he earned a bachelor of science degree majoring in quantitative business Management.

The Honorable Robin Kelly (D-IL)



Congresswoman Robin Kelly represents the 2nd Congressional District of Illinois. In the 116th Congress, Rep. Kelly serves as a member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and serves on the Health, Energy, and Consumer Protection and Commerce subcommittees. She is also a member of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform and serves on the national security and civil rights and civil liberties subcommittees. Before being elected to Congress in 2013, Rep. Kelly was a member of the Illinois House of Representatives, served as chief administrative officer of Cook County, and was chief of staff to Illinois State Treasurer Alexi Giannoulias. Rep. Kelly attended Bradley University in Peoria where she earned her B.A. in psychology and an M.A. in counseling. She later received a Ph.D. in political science from Northern Illinois University.

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The Honorable Brenda Lawrence (D-MI)



Congresswoman Brenda Lawrence represents Michigan's 14th Congressional District. In the 116th Congress, Rep. Lawrence serves on the House Appropriations Committee, including the Subcommittees on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development (THUD) and Commerce, Justice, Science and the Subcommittee on Interior, and Environment. She also serves as a member on the House Oversight and Reform Committee, the Subcommittee on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on National Security. Before being elected to Congress, Rep. Lawrence served as the mayor of Southfield for fourteen years, from 2001 to 2015. Lawrence had a 30-year career with the U.S.

Postal Service, advancing to work in human resources. Rep. Lawrence earned her bachelor's degree in public administration from Central Michigan University.

The Honorable Barbara Lee (D-CA)



Congresswoman Barbara Lee represents California's 13th Congressional District. In the 116th Congress, Rep. Lee serves as a member of the Budget Committee and the Appropriations Committee. Rep. Lee also serves as vice chair of the Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations Committee. She is a member of the Subcommittee on Labor, Health, and Human Services, Education, and of the Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration. She is the co-chair of the Policy and Steering Committee. She also serves as the chair of the majority leader's Task Force on Poverty and Opportunity. Before being elected to Congress in 1998, Barbara Lee was a small

business owner, community advocate, and was a California Legislator for eight years. Rep. Lee received her Master of Social Work from the University of California, Berkeley, and attended Mills College for her undergraduate work. During her graduate work Rep. Lee founded the Community Health Alliance for Neighborhood Growth and Education (CHANGE, Inc.) which provided mental health services to many of the East Bay's most vulnerable individuals.

The Honorable Debra Lesko (R-AZ)



Congresswoman Debbie Lesko represents Arizona's 8th Congressional District. For the 116th Congress, Congresswoman Lesko serves on the House Judiciary, House Rules, and House Homeland Security Committees. She also serves as the co-chair of the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues. Before being elected to Congress in 2018, Rep. Lesko served in the Arizona Legislature for nine years—the last three of which were in the Arizona Senate. She served as senate president pro-tempore and chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. She was honored by numerous organizations during her time at the Arizona Legislature, including, "Champion of the Taxpayer," "Guardian of

Small Business," and "Senator of the Year." Rep. Lesko received her bachelor's degree from University of Wisconsin.

The Honorable C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD)



Congressman Dutch Ruppersberger represents Maryland's 2nd Congressional District. In the 116th Congress, Congressman Ruppersberger serves as the vice chairman of the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch of the House Appropriations Committee. In addition, he is the co-chair of the Municipal Finance Caucus and the Congressional Army Caucus, and is a member of the U.S.-Japan Caucus. Before being elected to Congress, Rep. Ruppersberger was a former lifeguard and policer officer in Ocean City, Md. After starting with the Baltimore County as an assistant state's attorney, he was promoted to the chief of State's Attorney Office Investigation Division. There, he pursued organized crime, political corruption,

and drug trafficking. Congressman Ruppersberger has served in public office for more than 34 years. He was elected to the Baltimore County Council in 1985 and again in 1989, chosen twice as council chairman. He was elected Baltimore County executive in 1994 and 1998. He graduated from Baltimore City College and earned his J.D. from the University of Baltimore School of Law.

17th Annual Congress-Bundestag Forum Schloss Elmau and Munich, Germany

The Honorable Eric Swalwell (D-CA)



Congressman Eric Swalwell represents California's 15th Congressional District. He serves as a member on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and is the chair of the Subcommittee on Intelligence Modernization and Readiness. He also serves on the Judiciary Committee and is the co-chair of the Steering & Policy Committee, chairman (and founder) of the Future Forum and lead's the Democratic Policy & Communications Committee in millennial outreach. Prior to being elected to Congress in 2012, Rep. Swalwell served as a prosecutor in the Alameda County District Attorney's Office for seven years. He also served as chairman of the Dublin Heritage & Cultural Arts Commission, on the Dublin Planning Commission, and was elected to the Dublin City Council. Rep. Swalwell earned his undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Maryland and became the first person in his family to attend college on a soccer scholarship.

The Honorable Mike Turner (R-OH)



Congressman Mike Turner represents Ohio's 10th Congressional District. In the 116th Congress, Congressman Turner serves as a subcommittee chairman on the House Armed Services Committee and a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He also serves as the ranking member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. In December of 2014, Rep. Turner was elected president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He now serves as chairman of the Defense and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Before being elected to Congress, Rep. Turner practiced law in Dayton for over 17 years and in 1991, he opened his own private legal practice specializing in real estate and corporate law. Rep. Turner served as mayor of the City of Dayton for eight years from 1993 to 2001. He received his education in Ohio and received a bachelor's degree from Ohio Northern University; an MBA from the University of Dayton; and a Juris Doctorate from Case Western University School of Law.

Members of the German Bundestag

The Honorable Ekin Deligöz (Alliance 90/The Greens)



Ekin Deligöz has been a member of the German Bundestag since October 1998 and is affiliated with the Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary group. From 2002 to 2005, she has been their parliamentary manager and vice-chair from 2009 to 2013. She is a member of the Budget Committee, the Audit Subcommittee, as well as a substitute member of the Committee of Labour and Social Affairs. Deligöz was born on April 21, 1971 in Tokat, Turkey and came to Germany at the age of 8. Here, she studied administrative sciences at the Universities of Constance and Vienna. Since 1988, she has been a member of Alliance 90/The Greens. She is also member of the committee of UNICEF Germany, where she was a member of the board of directors from 2008 until 2018. She is vice-chair of the association Gegen Vergessen - Für Demokratie e.V. and boardmember of the Deutscher Kinderschutzbund e. V. In 2007 she received the German-Turkish Friendship Award.

The Honorable Otto Fricke (FDP)



Otto Fricke has been a Member of the German Bundestag from 2002 - 2013 and again since 2017 for the Free Democratic Party (FDP). He was chairman of the Committee of Budget from 2005 to 2009, is currently a member of this committee, the Body of Financing and Debt, as well as substitute member of the Committee of Culture and Media Affairs and the Election Committee. Between 1986 and 1995 he studied law at the Albert-Ludwigs-University in Freiburg and Düsseldorf. Fricke is a member of the Free Democratic Party since 1989, has been their parliamentary whip between 2009 and 2013 and their spokesperson for Budget since 2009 as well as a member of their federal board. He is integrated in the board of directors of the Leo Baeck Foundation, the German-Netherlands Forum, the association World Vision Deutschland e.V. and the Stichting Vrienden van Ysselsteyn.

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The Honorable Metin Hakverdi (SPD)



Metin Hakverdi has been a member of the German Bundestag since 2013. He went to high school in Simi Valley, California, from 1985–86, studied law at the Christian-Albrecht University in Kiel and the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, and was licensed to practice as a lawyer in 2000. Hakverdi joined the SPD in 2002. He was a member of the Parliament of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg from 2008 to 2013, where he served on the Budget Committee and the Committee of Public Companies and Assets. In the Bundestag, he is a member of the Finance Committee, the Committee on European Union Affairs and a substitute member of the committee of Budget. Hakverdi is chairman of the Working Group on USA/North America within the SPD Parliamentary Group. He is a member of the German–U.S. Parliamentary Friendship Group in the German Bundestag, the Atlantik-Brücke e.V., Global Bridges e.V. and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

The Honorable Sebastian Hartmann (SPD)



Sebastian Hartmann has been a member of the German Bundestag since 2013. He is a member of the Committee of Internal Affairs and Community, as well as a substitute member in the Committee for Transport and Digital Infrastructure, the Committee of Finance and the Committee for Scrutiny of Elections. He was born on July 7, 1977 in Oberhausen, Germany and studied law at the University of Cologne. Since 1993 he has been a member of the Social Democratic Party, worked with Martin Schulz at the European Parliament, integrated the city council in Rhein-Sieg and is chairman for the Social Democratic Party in his homestate of North Rhine-Westphalia since 2018. He integrates the board of trustees of the German Centre for Political Education and is a member of the workers union ver.di, the industry union IG BCE, the Workers' Welfare Federal Association among others.

The Honorable Mark Hauptmann (CDU/CSU)



Mark Hauptmann has been a member of the German Bundestag since 2013, directly elected in his constituency in the Free State of Thuringia. Currently, he is a member of the Committee on Economic and Energy Affairs, as well as a substitute member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Before entering the German Bundestag, Hauptmann worked in Brussels, Beijing, Erfurt, and as a chief of staff in the office of MP Christian Hirte in Berlin. He earned a master's degree in political sciences, intercultural business communication, and economic and social history, studying in Jena, Osaka, and New Haven, CT. After joining the Junge Union (Young Union) in 1999, he became a member of the CDU in 2003. From 2012-2014, Hauptmann acted as member of the federal executive board of Junge Union Germany and held the position of chairman of the Junge Union's International Commission on European, Foreign, and Security Affairs. He is a member of the CDU's Federal Committee on Matters of Foreign, Security, Development, and Human Rights Policy. Since 2014, he has served as a city council member in his hometown Suhl. In November 2016, Mark Hauptmann became Chairman of the district association of the CDU Suhl. In 2018, he was elected as the chairman of the Young Group of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, as well as a member in the executive committee of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group.

The Honorable Dieter Janecek (Alliance 90/The Greens)



Dieter Janecek has been a member of the German Parliament since 2013. He is chairman of the Green parliamentary group of the Committee on the Digital Agenda and the Committee on Economic Affairs and Energy. Furthermore, he is a member of the Committee of Enquiry on Artificial Intelligence. Currently, he also serves as the parties spokesperson for Industrial Policy and Digital Economy. He was born in 1976 in Pirmasens and obtained his Abitur 1995 in Eggenfelden. Janecek went on to study at the Bavarian School of Public Policy in Munich, graduating with a degree in political science in 2001. After working as a PR consultant from 2001 to 2003, he served in various positions within the Bavarian branch of the Greens: as an advisor on internal communications (2003-2005), as executive secretary (2005-2008), as chairman (2008-2014) and as a member of the Upper Bavarian district council (2008-2013). Among other commitments, he is a member of the political advisory committee of the Federation BioEnergy (BBE), member of the political advisory committee of the Federation of the Entrepreneurs Associations (BUV), member of the

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political advisory committee of the German AI Federation, member of the political advisory committee of the Federation 3D printing.

The Honorable Lars Klingbeil (SPD)



Lars Klingbeil was elected to the German Bundestag in 2009 and re-elected in 2013 and 2017. Mr. Klingbeil is substitute member in the Committee on the Digital Agenda and the Defense Committee of the Bundestag. Since 2017, he holds the office of Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party. From 2001 to 2003, Klingbeil worked in the constituency office under Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. He holds a master's degree in political science, sociology, and history from the Leibnitz University of Hannover. In addition, he was a trainee at the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung and the German public broadcaster ARD in New York.

The Honorable Günter Krings (CDU/CSU)



Dr. Günter Krings became parliamentary state secretary of the German Federal Home Affairs ministry in 2013. He has been a member of the Bundestag since 2002, where he represents the city of Mönchengladbach in North Rhine-Westphalia. During this time, he has been the vice chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, thus responsible for homeland security as well as legal politics, and coordinated the election of federal judges for the CDU/CSU. Within the Bundestag, he worked in the Committees for Legal Affairs, Culture and Media, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and Sustainable Development. He is chairman of the North Rhine Westphalian members of the CDU Parliamentary Group of the German Bundestag, a member of the CDU's Executive Committee for North Rhine-Westphalia, and chairman of the National Association of Christian-Democratic Lawyers. He obtained an LL.M. at Temple University, Philadelphia, and a doctorate at the University of Cologne. Presently, he teaches constitutional law at the University of Cologne as an honorary professor.

The Honorable Stefan Liebich (The Left)



Stefan Liebich represents the Berlin district, Pankow/Prenzlauer Berg/Weißensee in the German Bundestag since 2009. He is a member of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and spokesperson for Foreign Affairs for The Left in the parliament. He began his political career in 1990 when he became a member of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) at the age of 18. In 1995, he was elected to the Berlin House of Representatives for the first time. After being re-elected in 1999 and 2001, he became chairman of the PDS Berlin. He led the Party of Democratic Socialism in Berlin to its first coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which governed successfully for ten years. Between 2002 and 2006 Liebich was the Group Chairman of the PDS in the House of Representatives and was re-elected to the House in 2006. He became a member of the party The Left (Die Linke) following the merger of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (WASG) in 2007. Born in Wismar in the German Democratic Republic in 1972, Liebich studied business economics with a focus on information systems at the Technische Fachhochschule Berlin upon graduation from high school. He integrates the board of directors of associations like the German Africa Foundation e.V., Help for Selfhelp e.V. and Humanity in Action e.V.

The Honorable Tobias Lindner (Alliance 90/The Greens)



Dr. Tobias Lindner is a member of the Bundestag and the spokesman for security policy of the Alliance 90/ The Greens parliamentary group in the Bundestag. He is part of the Defense Committee, the Budget Committee, the Joint Committee with the German Bundesrat and vice chairman of the Audit Subcommittee. Further, he chairs the Rhineland-Palatinate parliamentary group of his party in the Bundestag. Previous functions include chairman of the Budget Committee of the Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, vice chairman of the Rhineland-Palatinate parliamentary group of his party in the Bundestag, spokesman for economic policy of his parliamentary group in the Bundestag, and membership in multiple different committees in the Bundestag. Lindner was first elected into the Bundestag in 2011. Prior to that, he was a member of the city council of Germersheim County. Lindner holds a diploma in economics engineering from the University of Karlsruhe and a Ph.D. in economics from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.

The Honorable Stephan Mayer (CDU/CSU)



Stephan Mayer was elected to the Bundestag in 2002. He was born in 1973 in Burghausen. From 1993 to 1997 Stephan Mayer studied law at the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich. Since 1993 Stephan Mayer is member of the county executive board of the Medium and Small Business Union of the Christian Social Union (CSU). From 1998 to 2000 he followed his period of practical legal training in the Higher Regional Court Munich and Government of Upper Bavaria practicing finally as lawyer in the Salzberger, Reiter, Mandlsberger & Kollegen Mühldorf (2000 – 2009). Since 2002 Stephan Mayer is Member of the German Bundestag (MP) and Deputy chairman of the CSU group on the county council Altötting and since 2008 he is also member of the executive Committee of the Union of Expellees. From 2010 to 2018 he was President of the THW-Bundesvereinigung e. V. (THW). This Federal Agency for Technical Relief is active across the world and as a partner in civil protection in Germany, THW assists people after catastrophes and accidents. In 2013, Stephan Mayer was appointed as Spokesman for Home Affairs of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag and during the years acknowledged as expert in terms of migration and security issues. Since the 14th of March 2018 he works as Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community. Stephan Mayer is prior responsible - among further topics - for Migration, Integration, EU-Coordination, (Border) Security and Civil Defence. As Parliamentary State Secretary he helps the minister to carry out his duties. In particular, he works to maintain good relations with the Bundestag and Bundesrat and their committees, with the parliamentary groups and their task forces, and with the political parties. Stephan Mayer represents the Federal Minister in the areas he is responsible for and in individual cases as the minister decides.

The Honorable Andreas Nick (CDU/CSU)



Dr. Andreas Nick has been a CDU member of the German Bundestag since 2013. Since 2018 he is also vice president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and Head of the German Delegation to PACE. In the Bundestag, he serves on the Committee on Foreign Affairs as rapporteur for the Council of Europe, the United Nations and issues of global order, as well as regional rapporteur for Turkey, Hungary and South America. He is also a ranking member of CDU/CSU in the Subcommittee on the United Nations, International Organizations and Globalization. Dr. Nick holds a master's degree and a doctorate in business administration from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management in

Vallendar, as well as a Master of International Public Policy (MIPP) from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC.

The Honorable Dietmar Nietan (SPD)



Dietmar Nietan is a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and a substitute member of the Committee on Education, Research and Technology Assessment. Nietan serves as the treasurer of the SPD since January 2014. His parliamentary work focuses on the European Foreign and Neighborhood Policy, the Western Balkans, relations with Turkey, Poland, and Israel, as well as transatlantic relations. From 2009 to 2013, Nietan served as the SPD parliamentary group's deputy spokesperson for European affairs. From 2005 to 2009, Nietan was the EU foreign policy coordinator for the SPD parliamentary group in the European Parliament in Brussels and the German Bundestag in Berlin. He

was senior foreign policy advisor to Martin Schulz, Chairman of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament. Nietan was first elected to the German Bundestag in 1998 and re-elected in 2009. Today, he is chairman of the SPD's Steering Committee on Turkey, Member of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation, "Remembrance, Responsibility and Future," and he co-chairs the Board of the Foundation for the International Youth Meeting Center Oświęcim/Auschwitz.

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The Honorable Omid Nouripour (Alliance 90/The Greens)



Omid Nouripour has been a member of the German Parliament since 2006, taking over former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's seat. He has been an active member of the German Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) since 1996. In December 2002, Nouripour was elected to the managing board of the federal Green Party and retained office until December 2006. From 2002 until 2009 he served as the spokesperson of the Green Party's Federal Working Committee on Migrants and Refugees. Nouripour is currently the chairman of the Green caucus in the Defense Committee as well as his party's spokesperson on foreign policy issues. He is also a member of the Jointed Committee with the German Bundesrat and a substitute member of the Committee of Defense and Sports. He previously worked as an assistant for a member of the European Parliament and as a journalist for one of Germany's largest newspapers. After graduating from high school in Frankfurt/Main, he studied German philology, political science, law, philosophy, and macroeconomics at the Johannes Gutenberg-University in Mainz. Born in Tehran, Nouripour came to Germany at the age of thirteen and holds passports from both countries.

The Honorable Johannes Vogel (FDP)



Johannes Vogel has been a member of the German Bundestag since 2017 and spokesperson for labor market and pension policy of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). He is a member of the Committee on Labour Market and Social Affairs, a deputy member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as the vice-chairman of the German-Chinese Parliamentary Group. From 2005 to 2010, Johannes Vogel was the federal chairman of the Young Liberals, the FDP youth organization and has been a member of the FDP Federal Executive Board since 2007. He was born in 1982 in Wermelskirchen, Germany, where he did his community service as a paramedic before studying political science, history, and international law in Bonn. From 2009 to 2013, he served his first term as a member of the German Bundestag. From 2014 to 2017, he was an executive at the German Federal Employment Agency and served as the head of strategy and business development at the agency's international department, among other roles. Vogel has been the Secretary-General of the FDP in North-Rhine Westphalia since 2014 and was the campaign manager for his party in the successful election in North Rhine-Westphalia in 2017, which achieved the best result for the FDP in the history of the federal state and was the first political election campaign to receive the "effie-award" in gold.

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SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES

Mark Shillaker, Facilitator, FLAG Consulting & Training



Mark Shillaker has been a leadership trainer and facilitator for over 20 years. Born in the U.K., he studied language and linguistics before moving to France, where he taught business English and intercultural communication skills. He moved to Germany in the 1990s and began working together with multinational organizations, facilitating workshops and developing training programs for leaders and teams. He is currently based in Munich. Mark facilitates meetings and group events for clients in the public and corporate sectors worldwide, including strategy meetings, leadership forums, and team development workshops.

He collaborates with partners and clients to create a framework for open dialog, cooperation and commitment. Mark provides training and coaching programs for international leaders and teams, focusing on transformational leadership, conflict management, presentations skills and self-efficacy. His approach to training and coaching is based on sustainable learning transfer and encouraging a growth mindset as the foundation for behavior change. Mark is in demand as a keynote speaker on the subjects of transformational leadership, mindful communication, and intercultural collaboration. Mark is passionate about music and its power to move, change, and unite. A pianist in his spare time, he also organizes and hosts charity concerts.

Dr. Jing Huang, Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute on National and Regional Studies, Beijing Language and Culture University



Dr. Jing Huang is a university professor and dean (Academic Affairs) of the Institute on International and Regional Studies at Beijing Language and Culture University. Prior to that, he was a chair professor and director of the Centre on Asia and Globalization (CAG) at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP), National University of Singapore. He is an internationally recognized expert on Chinese politics, U.S.-China relations, China's foreign policy, and security issues in Asia-Pacific. Prof. Huang has written two books and edited seven volumes. He has published numerous journal articles, book chapters and policy papers on Chinese politics, China's foreign policy, Chinese security policy and military, U.S.-China relations, and security issues in Asia-Pacific (e.g., Taiwan, North Korean Nuclear crisis, South China Sea, and Sino-Japan tension). His book, *Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics* (Cambridge

University Press, 2000), won the prestigious Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize in 2002. Before joining the LKYSPP, Prof Huang was a senior fellow at Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution (2004-2008). He also taught at Harvard University (1993-94), Utah State University (1994-2004) and Stanford University (2002-2003). He received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, and his M.A. in history from Fudan University.

Federica Mogherini, Former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission



Federica Mogherini is visiting professor to the College of Europe in Bruges and co-chair of the UN High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement. She was the high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and vice-president of the European Commission from 1st November 2014 to 30th November 2019. Previously, she was the Italian minister for Foreign Affairs from February to October 2014 and a member of the Italian Parliament (Chamber of Deputies) from 2008 to 2014. During her terms in parliament, she was the head of the Italian Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and vice-president of its Political Committee (2013-2014); member of the Italian Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2008-2013); secretary of the Defence Committee (2008-2013) and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Mogherini also coordinated the Inter-Parliamentary Group for Development Cooperation. In Italy, she has been in the leadership of the Democratic Party since it was founded in 2007: first as secretary for Institutional Reforms, then as a member of the National Council, and in 2013-2014 as secretary for European and International Affairs. Previously she was a member of the Bureau of PES (Party of European Socialists), vice-president of the European Community Organization of Socialist Youth (ECOSY), member of the Bureau of the European Youth Forum, and a member of the Secretariat of the Youth Forum of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Among other affiliations, she is a member of IAI—Istituto Affari Internazionali—and a fellow of the German Marshall Fund for the United States. She is also a member of the European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (ELN) and of the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Federica Mogherini was born in Rome in 1973 and graduated in political science at the University of Rome “La Sapienza.”

General John R. Allen, President, The Brookings Institution



John Rutherford Allen assumed the presidency of the Brookings Institution in November 2017, having most recently served as chair of security and strategy and a distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. Allen is a retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. Allen served in two senior diplomatic roles following his retirement from the Marine Corps. First, for 15 months as senior advisor to the secretary of defense on Middle East Security, during which he led the security dialogue for the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. President Barack Obama then appointed Allen as special presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. During his nearly four-decade military career, Allen served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Marine Corps and the Joint Force. He commanded 150,000 U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan from July 2011 to February 2013. Allen's first tour as a general officer was as the principal director of Asia-Pacific policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a position he held for nearly three years. In this assignment, he was involved extensively with policy initiatives involving China, Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia. Allen also participated in the Six Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and played a major role in organizing the relief effort during the South Asian tsunami from 2004 to 2005. Beyond his operational and diplomatic credentials, Allen has led professional military educational programs, including as director of the Marine Infantry Officer Program and commanding officer of the Marine Corps Basic School. He twice served at the United States Naval Academy, first as a military instructor, where he was named instructor of the year in 1990, and later as commandant of midshipmen; the first Marine Corps officer to hold this position. Allen was the Marine Corps fellow to the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the first Marine officer to serve as a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where today he is a permanent member. Among his other affiliations, Allen is a senior fellow at the Merrill Center of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. He is an "Ancien" of the NATO Defense College in Rome, and a frequent lecturer there. Allen is the recipient of numerous U.S. and foreign awards. He holds a Bachelor of Science in operations analysis from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Master of Arts in national security studies from Georgetown University, a Master of Science in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College, and a Master of Science in national security strategy from the National Defense University.

Sonja Licht, President, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence



Sonja Licht is the president of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence (BFPE). She founded BFPE in 2003 in order to create an organization that will continuously work on capacity building of people active in political and public life. BFPE pays a special attention to the empowerment of women, youth and minorities active in politics and civil society, and has been involved in numerous bilateral and regional projects dealing with European and trans-Atlantic integration of the entire Balkan Peninsula. It is the principal organizer of the Belgrade Security Forum, an annual international relations and security conference that became one of the most outstanding policy events in South East Europe. Ms.

Licht was part of the Yugoslav dissident movement from the late sixties. Between 1991 and 1995 was the co-chair of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, a broad civic coalition from all the OSCE countries founded in Prague in 1990. From 1991 to 2003 she was the CEO of the Fund for an Open Society (Soros Foundation) in Yugoslavia (later Serbia). The Fund was the main donor and partner of independent media and civil society in Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro in the '90s. From its inception in July 1999 she was the head of the Task Force of the Bratislava Process (established to support the democratic opposition of Serbia) and member of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe in 2010 that authored the report: 'Living Together: Combining Freedom and Diversity in Europe of 21st Century'. Between 2008 and 2012 she was the chair of the Council of Foreign Affairs of the Serbian MFA and member of the Council of European Integration of Serbia. Sonja is member of the European Council on Foreign Relations, chair of the Roma Program of the Open Society Foundations, and board member of the Jefferson Institute, Washington DC. She has been a board member of many reputable international and local organizations, and laureate of numerous awards including the Pro Merit Medal of the Council of Europe, the Star of Italian Solidarity, French Legion of Honor and the Order of Merit of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany. She is a Richard von Weizsacker Fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy.

Sławomir Sierakowski, Founder, Krytyka Polityczna



Sławomir Sierakowski is a Polish sociologist and political commentator. He is the founder and leader of Krytyka Polityczna (Political Critique), an Eastern European movement of liberal intellectuals, artists, and activists. He is also the director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Warsaw and the senior fellow at the German Council for Foreign Relations (DGAP). He has been awarded fellowships from Yale, Princeton, Harvard, twice from the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna and Richard von Weizsacker from Robert Bosch Stiftung. Sierakowski became a contributing author for the New York Times in 2013 and a monthly columnist for the Project Syndicate in 2015. In Poland he is a weekly columnist for the largest Polish portal Onet.pl and a political commentator in the Polityka weekly. Journalistic publications include essays and op-eds mainly devoted to Polish and European politics and culture, for publications such as the Financial Times, Foreign Policy, The Guardian, Die Zeit, Le Monde, and others.

Tim Dixon, Founder, More in Common



Tim Dixon works on tackling the threats of polarisation and social fracturing in western democracies. He co-founded More in Common in 2018, an organisation with programs in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Tim previously worked in senior political roles, including as economic adviser and chief speechwriter for two Australian Prime Ministers. He trained as an economist, worked as a tech sector lawyer for law firm Baker & McKenzie from 1999 to 2004 and built a leading educational publishing business that was acquired by Pearson Australia in 2004. Since 2010 he has lived and worked between New York and London, co-founding social change agency Purpose Europe in 2013 and helping to start social movement organizations around the issue of modern day slavery, the Syrian crisis, the Colombian peace process, economic inequality, gun control and civic participation. He serves on several boards in the US, UK and Australia.

Prof. Dr. Veronika Grimm, Professor of Economic Theory, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg



Dr. Veronika Grimm (born in 1971) has been professor of economic theory at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU) since 2008. She studied economics and sociology at the Universities of Hamburg and Kiel and received her PhD in economics from Humboldt University Berlin in 2002. After her PhD she was an assistant professor at University of Alicante and spent some time at CORE (Université Catholique de Louvain) and ULB (Brussels), before she joined University of Cologne, where she earned her habilitation in 2008. Her research interests are in the fields of market design (economic engineering), behavioral economics, industrial organization, and energy economics. She is the founding director of the Laboratory of Experimental Research in Nuremberg (LERN) and head of the division “Energy Market Design” at Energie Campus Nürnberg (EnCN). Veronika Grimm is a fellow of CESifo and member of several scientific committees and boards. She has published widely in prestigious economics journals, such as the Journal of Economic Theory, the Economic Journal, Games and Economic Behavior, or the European Economic Review. Her research has been funded by the German Research Foundation, as well as other public and private institutions. She also regularly cooperates with public institutions or firms in joint projects.

Dr. Mirjam Zadoff, Director, Munich Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism



Dr. Mirjam Zadoff is the director of the Munich Documentation Centre for the History of National Socialism since May 2, 2018, succeeding the founding director, who headed the Documentation Centre from October 2012 until April 2018. Mirjam Zadoff was previously professor of history at Indiana University Bloomington in the United States, where she held the Alvin H. Rosenfeld chair in Jewish Studies. A native of Innsbruck, Austria, she completed her doctorate ‘summa cum laude’ at Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU) in Munich in 2006 and obtained her post-doctoral qualification (Habilitation) there in 2013. Dr. Zadoff looks back on a career of extensive research and publication activities. Her research and teaching have focused on Jewish history and culture and Holocaust studies. The conferences and discussions she has led have earned her high acclaim in both academic and non-academic circles. Mirjam Zadoff has won many awards, in particular for her innovative concepts in continuing education, designed for students, researchers and teaching

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staff. For many years now she has regarded her work in education as addressed not only to an academic audience but also to a broad public. Her special areas are the Holocaust, racism, anti-Semitism, refugees, and migration.

Gregor Peter Schmitz, Editor-in-Chief, Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung



Dr. Gregor Peter Schmitz is editor-in-chief of the German daily paper Augsburger Allgemeine with a circulation of 200.000 papers in the state of Bavaria and all of Germany. Just in 2018, the newspaper was awarded eight prizes at the European Newspaper Awards and he was nominated for the Lead Awards for his outstanding work at the newspaper. He has previously been the director of the Berlin Office of the Wirtschaftswoche from 2015 to 2018, as well as a correspondent for SPIEGEL in Brussels and Washington, DC from 2007 until 2015, where he was a member of the WikiLeaks and NSA-Teams of the magazine. During this time, he was awarded the Arthur F. Burns price for his work on civil rights and the Henri-Nannen price for his research relating to the NSA affair. In 2014, he wrote the international bestseller *Wetten auf Europa* on the political crisis in Europe together with George Soros. Schmitz frequently comments on political events in the most important German television channels and the radio. He holds a degree in law and political science and studied in Munich, Paris, and Cambridge at Harvard University.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Americans and Germans Disagree on the State of Bilateral Relations, but Largely Align on Key International Issues


Jacob Poushter & Alexandra Castillo | Pew Global Research | March 4, 2019

Americans and Germans have vastly different opinions of their bilateral relationship, but they tend to agree on issues such as cooperation with other European allies and support for NATO, according to the results of parallel surveys conducted in the United States by Pew Research Center and in Germany by Körber-Stiftung in the fall of 2018.

In the U.S., seven-in-ten say that relations with Germany are good, a sentiment that has not changed much in the past year. Germans, on the other hand, are much more negative: 73 percent say that relations with the U.S. are bad, a 17-percentage-point increase since 2017.

Americans and Germans diverge sharply in their views of bilateral relations

Relations today between the U.S. and Germany are ...



Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 11-16, 2018. Q6. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 13-26, 2018.

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
Nearly three-quarters of Germans are also convinced that a foreign policy path independent from the U.S. is preferable to the two countries remaining as close as they have been in the past. But about two-thirds in the U.S. want to stay close to Germany and America's European allies. Similarly, while 41 percent of Germans say they want more cooperation with the U.S., fully seven-in-ten Americans want more cooperation with Germany. And Germans are about twice as likely as Americans to want more cooperation with Russia. All this is happening against a backdrop of previously released research showing a sharply negative turn in America's image among Germans.

Americans, for their part, are politically divided over tariffs on Germany (while Germans overwhelmingly support retaliatory tariffs), and few Americans see Germany as the most or second-most important foreign policy partner. About a third of Germans still rank the U.S. as one of their most important partners (35 percent), second only to France (61 percent).


Despite the differences of opinion on the overall relationship, Americans and Germans have remarkably similar views when it comes to attitudes toward Russia and China, as well as opinions about the economy.

Americans and Germans have similar views on international, economic issues

Favorable views of ...



Americans/Germans who say ...



Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q3, Q17b-c & Q25. Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 11-16, 2018. Q3 & Q4. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 13-26, 2018.

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Both Germans and Americans still think highly of NATO, and Germans have become more inclined to believe their country must increase spending on defense. Americans and Germans also want to cooperate more with France, the United Kingdom and China.

Americans and Germans share similar opinions on economic issues. People in both countries say that trade with other countries is good, but there is less agreement on the specific benefits of trade. And there is an overarching pessimism in each country about the economic future for children and the financial progress of average citizens over the last 20 years.

There is a distinct partisan divide in the U.S. on many aspects of the American-German relationship. For example, Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are 46 percentage points more likely than Democrats and Democratic-leaning

independents to support the U.S. policy of tariffs on imported goods from Germany and other European countries. Republicans are also more likely to characterize America's relationship with Germany as good. Democrats, on the other hand, are more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. should cooperate more with Germany and more readily name Germany as a top foreign policy partner.

On confidence in German Chancellor Angela Merkel, there is a 20-percentage-point partisan gap, with Democrats expressing more confidence in the German leader. These are among the major findings from a Pew Research Center survey conducted among 1,006 American adults from Sept. 11-16, 2018, a Körber-Stiftung survey conducted among 1,002 German adults from Sept. 13-26, 2018, and from the Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey in the U.S. and Germany, conducted among 2,501 adults from May 14-June 30, 2018.


Germans want more independent foreign policy, but both publics rate NATO positively

When asked about the future of U.S.-European relations, nearly two-thirds of Americans say they would like relations to remain as close as they have been (65 percent), while 30 percent think the U.S. should take a more independent approach to foreign policy. However, when Germans were asked specifically about U.S.-German relations, roughly seven-in-ten (72 percent) said they would like their country to pursue a more independent approach.

Democrats (77 percent) are more likely than Republicans (51 percent) to say the U.S. should remain as close as it has been with Europe on foreign policy.

Americans want to remain close to Europe, but Germans want more foreign policy independence from U.S.

Do you think the relationship between the U.S. and Europe/U.S. and Germany should remain as close as it has been, or do you think the U.S./Germany should take a more independent approach to foreign policy than it has in the past?



Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 11-16, 2018. Q5. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 13-26, 2018.

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Despite their differences, Americans and Germans are both favorable toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This convergence follows findings from Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung in 2017 in which roughly half of Americans said NATO was doing too little to help solve global problems, while about the same proportion of Germans said the organization was doing the right amount. NATO favorability continues to remain high in both countries even after U.S. President Donald Trump and Chancellor Merkel publicly clashed over defense spending and Russian influence at the NATO summit in Brussels in July 2018.

The two publics have moved in opposite directions regarding defense spending, which has been a contentious issue in relations between the U.S. and its NATO allies. The share of Americans who say their European allies should increase their defense spending dropped by 6 percentage points between 2017 and 2018, while the share saying European allies should keep their spending about the same rose 9 points. Germans, on the other hand, saw an 11-point increase in the share saying they wanted their own country to spend more on national defense.

In the U.S., Republicans (59 percent) are more likely than Democrats (27 percent) to say European allies should increase spending on national defense. American men (46 percent) are more supportive of increased spending than women (32 percent) are.


In terms of political affiliation, 40 percent and 44 percent of the CDU/CSU and SPD coalition partners, respectively, want increased spending, compared with 28 percent of Left Party backers and 29 percent of Greens supporters. In Germany, 47 percent of men say the country should spend more on national defense, while 39 percent of women agree.

German and American views of the world

When asked about the top international threats facing their countries, majorities of Americans and Germans say cyberattacks from other countries, the Islamic militant group known as ISIS and global climate change are major concerns.

Americans and Germans have similar concerns about global threats

... is a major threat to our country



Note: U.S. power and influence question not asked in the U.S.
Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q22a-h

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Americans are slightly more concerned about cyberattacks (74 percent major threat) than are Germans (66 percent), and Germans are more likely to consider climate change as a major concern (71 percent) compared with Americans (59 percent). Americans also are generally more concerned about North Korea's weapons program, the power and influence of Russia and China and the condition of the global economy.


Germans' sentiment that U.S. power and influence is a major threat to their country has been rising in recent years. In 2013, only 19 percent of Germans said the U.S. was a major threat, but that rose to 35 percent in

2017, after the election of Donald Trump, and to 49 percent in 2018. Only around a third of Germans express similar concerns about China (33 percent) and Russia (30 percent).

Roughly one-in-three Germans (35 percent) have a positive view of Russia, compared with only about one-in-five Americans. Ratings for Russia in both the U.S. and Germany have fallen sharply since 2011, when massive protests swept across Russia after accusations of ballot-rigging in the December parliamentary elections. They reached a low point in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea (19 percent favorable in both countries).

Republicans and Democrats have differing views on relations with Germany and Angela Merkel

Americans who ...



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
*The full question was: "As you may know, the U.S. has recently increased tariffs or fees on imported goods from Germany and other European countries. In response, Germany and other European countries have increased tariffs on American goods. Do you support or oppose the U.S. policy of increased tariffs on Germany and other European countries?"
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 11-16, 2018. Q2a, Q6 & Q8. Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey. Q35d

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Americans want more cooperation with Germany, but Germans don't reciprocate

On the international stage, majorities of Americans and Germans align on their mutual desire for more cooperation with the United Kingdom, France and China. On Russia, however, differences emerge. Roughly one-third of Americans (35 percent) want more cooperation with Russia, while nearly twice as many Germans (69 percent) want the same. There are also stark contrasts between the U.S. and Germany on collaboration with each other: 70 percent of Americans say they want more cooperation with Germany, but only 41 percent of

Germans share this sentiment toward the U.S. Rather, 47 percent of Germans want less cooperation with the U.S.

Opinion on U.S. cooperation with international allies is also divided by partisan affiliation. Democrats generally want to work more with other countries than Republicans do, except for Russia. To illustrate this point, 70 percent of Democrats want more cooperation with China compared with 48 percent of Republicans. However, Republicans are 13 percentage points more likely than Democrats to want increased cooperation with Russia, an issue shaped by partisan debates over Russian interference with the 2016 election.

Along with Democrats, men (76 percent) are more likely than women (65 percent) to want increased cooperation with Germany. Those with at least a completed college education or more (81 percent) agree with this sentiment more than those with some college education (67 percent) or a high school education or less (63 percent).

In Germany, backers of Angela Merkel's center-right coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) rank U.S. cooperation last vis-à-vis the other countries evaluated on desired levels of cooperation. Views of collaboration with the U.S. varies greatly by party: 48 percent of CDU/CSU supporters want more cooperation with the U.S., while 52 percent of their center-left coalition partner the Social Democratic Party (SPD) want the same. Among supporters of the Left Party (Die Linke), 23 percent want more cooperation with the U.S., while 37 percent of backers of the Greens (Grüne) want the same.


Who do Americans and Germans see as their top foreign policy partners?

Roughly one-in-ten Americans name Germany as the United States' most or second-most important foreign policy partner, while about one-third of Germans say the U.S. is a top foreign policy partner. For Americans, the U.K., China and Canada rank as the most important partners for foreign policy. Roughly six-in-ten Germans name France as their most or second-most important ally for foreign policy, followed by the U.S. and Russia.

There is a partisan gap regarding countries Americans see as important foreign policy partners, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to name Germany as one of the two most important partners for the U.S.

Partisan differences in the U.S. on top foreign policy partners

is the most or second-most important partner for American foreign policy



Note: Combined responses. Only top seven countries shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 11-16, 2016. Q1a-b.
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
And while the U.K. and China rank in the top three positions across party lines, more Republicans (25 percent) than Democrats (5 percent) name Israel as a top foreign policy partner for the U.S. There are also significant partisan differences in opinion on views about Canada and Mexico.

Older Americans (ages 50 and older) are more likely to name the U.K. as a top foreign policy partner than younger Americans (ages 18 to 29). This pattern is reversed for China, which younger Americans are more likely to say is a top foreign policy partner.

About six-in-ten Germans name France as one of their country's top two foreign policy partners, while roughly one-third name the U.S. These results are consistent across a range of political parties: Supporters of the CDU/CSU, their coalition partner the SPD, the Left Party and the Greens all rank France and the U.S. as Germany's most important foreign policy allies.

Russia and China rank third and fourth, respectively, as the most important foreign policy partner across selected political parties except for the Greens, where these countries' rankings are reversed.

While opinion of Russia is low in both countries, Republicans in the U.S. are somewhat more




favorable toward the country than are Democrats (27 percent favorable vs. 16 percent). And supporters of Alternative for Germany (AfD) are much more likely to see Russia favorably (50 percent) than are those with an unfavorable view of the right-wing party (31 percent). And Germans living in the East are 16 percentage points more favorable toward Russia than those living in the West (48 percent versus

32 percent).

Germany and the U.S. also have similar attitudes toward China. Roughly four-in-ten in each country have a favorable view of the Asian economic giant. Over the past decade and a half, Americans' opinions of China have generally been more favorable than Germans' views, but a rise in German sentiment over the past few years and a decline in American opinions have pulled attitudes closer together.

As with views of Russia, German views of China differ by region. About half of those in the East have a favorable view toward China (49 percent), while only 39 percent of those in the West have a positive opinion of Germany's largest importer.

Germans previously viewed China less favorably than Americans did, but attitudes have converged of late




Germans and Americans are also skeptical of China's human rights record. Overwhelming majorities in each country say the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its people. This has been true for many years.

However, since 2013, there has been a steady decline in both Germany and America in the percentage of those saying the U.S. government respects the personal freedoms of its people. In that year, 81 percent of Germans and 69 percent of Americans said the U.S. government respected the personal freedoms of its people. But after multiple scandals involving the exposure of National Security Agency eavesdropping, confidence in American respect for civil liberties began to decline. Now, just 35 percent of Germans and 51 percent of Americans hold this view.

Americans and Germans diverge on who is the world's leading economic power. Roughly half of Americans (49 percent) name the U.S. as the world's economic leader, while only 19 percent of Germans say the same. Over half of Germans (53 percent) say China is the leading economy. A further 21 percent of Germans say the countries of the European Union are the world's top economic power, while only 7 percent of Americans say this.

Americans say the U.S. is the world's leading economy, but Germans think China is

... is the world's leading economic power



Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q29

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Despite their mixed feelings toward American power, Germans clearly prefer the U.S. as the world's leading power over China. Nearly six-in-ten Germans say having the U.S. as the top global power would be better for the world, with only 19 percent saying this about China. However, 17 percent in Germany volunteer "neither" when asked the question.

U.S. image in Germany


America's current image in Germany is generally poor, but that has not always been the case. As recently as 2016, 86 percent of Germans had confidence in then-President Barack Obama and 57 percent had a favorable view of the United States.

With the election of Donald Trump, positive views of the U.S. and confidence in the U.S. president plummeted. As of 2018, only one-in-ten Germans had confidence in Trump and three-in-ten held a favorable view of the U.S., levels of antipathy not seen since the end of the George W. Bush administration.

17th Annual Congress-Bundestag Forum Schloss Elmau and Munich, Germany

Negative ratings for Trump and U.S. in Germany

Among Germans ...



Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q17a & Q35a

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Supporters of the right-leaning anti-immigration party AfD are more favorable toward the U.S. than those who do not support AfD (43 percent vs. 26 percent, respectively), and they are also more likely to express confidence in President Trump. People who look favorably on other German parties tested are more in line with the general population on U.S. image and confidence in Trump.

While there is no corollary question asked in the U.S. about favorable views of Germany, on a 0-100 feeling thermometer, where 100 is "warmest," Germany gets a mean rating of 59 from the American


public, higher than Mexico and India (51) but lower than Japan (61), the U.K. (66) and Canada (71). And a majority of Americans (55 percent) have confidence in Chancellor Merkel to do the right thing regarding world affairs.

American and German views on the economy, trade and migration

Despite their differences, Americans and Germans have remarkably similar views on the fundamentals of the economy and the overall benefits of trade. There are differences, however, over tariffs and migration.

More positive views of the U.S. and confidence in Trump among AfD supporters

Among Germans ...



Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q17a & Q35a

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When asked about the financial situation of average people in their country, roughly equal pluralities of Germans and Americans say it is worse than it was 20

years ago (46 percent and 45 percent, respectively). And only about a third in each country believe the financial situation of ordinary people is better.

In the U.S., 48 percent of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say the finances of average people are better, compared with only 22 percent of Democrats and Democratic leaners. Germans who back the AfD are much more likely than those who do not support the party to say that people are worse off compared with 20 years ago (64 percent versus 42 percent).


There are also corresponding levels of pessimism about children's financial future in each country. Roughly half or more in both Germany and the U.S. say children will be worse off financially when they grow up than their parents were. And only about third in each country say children will be better off.

When it comes to trade, in principle, overwhelming majorities in Germany and the U.S. say increased business ties and trade with other countries is good for their country. And both Americans and Germans believe free trade with other countries is generally beneficial to them personally: 68 percent of Americans say this, while 53 percent of Germans agree.

But on the specific benefits of trade, Germans and Americans are less convinced. For example, only about three-in-ten Germans and Americans say that trade increases wages. Just under four-in-ten in each country say trade with other countries creates jobs. And 32 percent in Germany and 37 percent in the U.S. say trade decreases prices, which is supposed to be one of the primary benefits of international trade.

Americans are divided on initial tariffs for German products, but Germans strongly favor retaliatory tariffs

% who ... the U.S. policy of increased tariffs on Germany and other European countries/the German and EU policy of increased tariffs on the U.S.



Note: The question was preceded by the statement, "As you may know, the U.S. has recently increased tariffs or fees on imported goods from Germany and other European countries. In response, Germany and other European countries have increased tariffs on American goods."

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 13-16, 2018. Q8. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 13-26, 2018.

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In May 2018, the Trump administration's tariffs on European steel and aluminum went into effect. In response, Germany and its European Union allies placed tariffs on American goods, ranging from bourbon to motorcycles.

Among Americans, there are sharp divisions on this policy. About half (51 percent) oppose the initial tariffs, while 44 percent support the measures. But almost three-quarters of Republicans (72 percent) support Trump's EU tariffs while about seven-in-ten Democrats (71 percent) oppose them.

In Germany, about eight-in-ten (78 percent) support the retaliatory tariffs. There are minimal differences by party in Germany on this question, as most agree with the policy across the political spectrum.

Finally, on the topic of immigration, Americans and Germans diverge somewhat about whether they want more, less or about the same level of immigration to their country. A plurality of Americans want to keep immigration levels about the same as they have been, with 24 percent wanting more immigrants in their country and 29 percent wanting fewer immigrants or none at all (“None” is a volunteered category).

Germans want fewer immigrants in their country, while Americans want to keep levels the same

We should allow _____ immigrants to move to our country



Note: Responses of "Fewer" and "None" are combined. Responses of "None" are volunteered. Voluntary responses of "Don't know" and "Refused" not shown.
Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q52.

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However, Germans are much more opposed to more immigration (making them more aligned with other nations asked about this issue), with a 58 percent majority saying that they want fewer or no immigrants in their country. Only one-in-ten want more immigrants.

In the U.S., those on the left are much more likely to say they want more immigration (46 percent) than those on the ideological right (10 percent). Similarly, Germans on the left are more likely to want immigration to remain about the same (49 percent), while those on

the right favor fewer immigrants (77 percent).

Both Germans and Americans are very supportive of high-skilled immigration. Roughly eight-in-ten in both countries support encouraging highly skilled people to immigrate and work in their countries. This holds even for people who oppose allowing more people to immigrate into their countries.

Finally, when it comes to emigration, Germans and Americans are generally not worried about it as an issue (33 percent and 38 percent, respectively, say people leaving their country for jobs in other countries is a problem).

Did China Break the World Order?

Yukon Huang | The New York Times | May 17, 2019

Last Friday, the White House raised the tariffs on \$200 billion worth of Chinese imports up to 25 percent. On Monday, China retaliated with tariffs of its own. The trade war is now full-on—except that it's not really about trade.

China does account for the largest share of America's trade deficit. But many experts don't seem to think that bilateral trade deficits are a problem in themselves—they're just a symptom of other issues (if even that). "The overall United States global trade imbalance is the result of economic conditions in the United States—the excess of investment over savings," Martin Feldstein, a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, has argued, adding that if America's trade imbalance with China were eliminated, it would simply shift to other countries.

Whether President Trump is misguided in doggedly pursuing tariffs or playing coy and using them as leverage with the Chinese government, America's continued drive to levy penalties is less about fixing a trade problem than about changing China's investment rules. In particular, the Trump administration perceives those rules as forcing the transfer of foreign technology to Chinese companies, unfairly helping them.

But even American negotiators who parse the trade versus tech issue this clearly tend to overlook an essential fact: The international trade and financial system that was set up after World War II—with the creation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and, much later, the World Trade Organization (all nurtured and dominated by the United States)—actively encouraged "technological spillovers" from developed economies to developing ones. Under the W.T.O.'s agreements on intellectual property, developed countries are under "the obligation" to provide incentives to their companies to transfer technology to less developed countries.

Such transfers were seen to be in the West's interest, too: Far better that poor countries achieve self-sustaining growth than be dependent on foreign aid, the thinking went. But China did much better than achieve self-sustaining growth.

By the late 2000s, it had come to seem too successful, and a threat: The West was struggling then with a major financial crisis (largely of its own doing). Today, the longstanding principle that knowledge transfers are good all-around is being questioned. Do they continue to serve the global interest and should they still be encouraged—even when it comes to China? Or should China be treated as an exception? It is in a class of its own, by dint of both its size and the state's involvement in its economy.

American negotiators have long complained that China's foreign investment practices are unfair. A report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, published in 2013 and often cited since, estimated that China accounted for 50 to 80 percent of all international intellectual property theft. In its 2018 report, the Office of the United States Trade Representative accused China of using joint ventures to funnel technology to Chinese companies and of failing to protect foreign companies' intellectual property rights.

But the reality is more complex.

Yes, American companies have been granted access to some 35 restricted sectors in China—like auto production, oil exploration, nuclear power, telecommunications, banks and medical institutions—only on the condition that they transfer know-how to local partners. Chinese companies are developing electric vehicles with support from Renault-Nissan and Ford. Amazon and Microsoft are being asked to partner—and share technology—with Chinese companies before they can sell cloud-computing services in China. And yes, DuPont and General Motors have sued their Chinese joint-venture partners for misappropriating trade secrets. Outright theft also has sometimes occurred, including in the defense sector, of information about bombers and missile systems.

But to say all these things in the same breath is to risk conflating inadequate rules with violations of existing rules that may be adequate, and government policy with the behavior of private actors. Officials in the Trump administration suggest that China's foreign-investment requirements themselves amount to theft. In many instances, however, technology is being transferred between companies in the context of consensual, negotiated business agreements.

Also, violations or near-violations are par for the course during certain stages of a country's development. That fact doesn't make them acceptable, but it offers useful context for thinking through how best to react to them. Other rapidly growing economies, including Japan and South Korea in the 1980s, were also accused of unfairly securing technology from foreign partners (or subsidizing their exports). But as those countries' incomes rose and their own capacity to innovate developed, they started complying with the rules—typically when per capita income reached \$25,000.

China, at its current growth rates, is more than a decade away from achieving that income level. And yet it has already made more progress than is usually acknowledged toward protecting intellectual property rights. AmCham China's 2019 China Business Climate Survey Report noted that 59 percent of the more than 300 American companies it interviewed said that China's enforcement of intellectual property rights had improved over the last five years; 37 percent said it had stayed the same. (China is growing up in other respects, too. Both the I.M.F. and the United States Treasury have recently determined that the Chinese government is not manipulating its currency. And its current account surpluses have virtually evaporated.)

That said, penalties for, say, infringing patents remain weak in China and enforcement is lax. The National People's Congress passed a foreign-investment law in March, but it offered too little on implementation. In fact, the United States's latest tariffs were prompted by its perception that the Chinese government was backtracking on its commitment to incorporate into Chinese law major terms of the two countries' draft agreement to end the trade war.

The fundamental question, therefore, is this: Are China's current technology-transfer policies fair, given both past international practice and the country's extraordinary development? Or, to put the point more provocatively, did China's growth break the international economic order? The answer partly depends on the existence, or not, of globally accepted guidelines. Just last year, in its World Economic Outlook report, the I.M.F. again highlighted the vital role that the diffusion of technology worldwide has played in driving growth globally. And China now accounts for almost one-third of global growth every year, according to Bloomberg.

A more innovative China also doesn't mean a less competitive America. For one thing, as the Harvard economist Robert Lawrence has pointed out, developed countries and developing ones generally do not compete in the same product lines. The economist Zhang Jun and others have also argued that much of China's technological capacities are overstated anyway. Many of the more sophisticated components used in products that China exports to the West (think iPhones) are made elsewhere and merely assembled in China.

Curbs on America's exports of "emerging and foundational technologies"—notably to do with artificial intelligence or fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications networks—will curtail knowledge flows to China. But they will also damage America's capacity for innovation, American tech experts have argued. (Likewise, Mr. Trump's decision this week to ban, on security grounds, foreign tech equipment in American telecommunications systems could hurt American companies.)

Technology transfers from the most developed states to less developed ones remain beneficial all-around, including for the most developed states—even if the unique features of China's remarkable growth require adapting existing norms and regulatory mechanisms to better manage those transfers.

The Trump administration, which instinctively recoils at multilateral initiatives, is unlikely to want to turn to the W.T.O. or the World Bank. (It should, though, not least because the United States has usually fared well by W.T.O. rulings.) The next best opportunity to at least broach these issues will be during the Group of 20 summit meeting in Osaka, Japan, in June. China's growth may seem like a challenge to the world's economic order, but it is other states' reactions to it that could threaten the system."

How the U.S. should deal with China

Martin Wolf | Financial Times | November 12, 2019

“It’s easy to win a race when you’re the only one who knows it has begun. China is thus on the way to supplanting the U.S. as the global hegemon, creating a different world as a result. Yet it doesn’t have to end this way.” This anxious view comes from *The Hundred-Year Marathon* by the Hudson Institute’s Michael Pillsbury.

Mr Pillsbury is one of the most influential American thinkers on U.S.-China relations. The book is more than a call to recognise reality: it is a call to arms. On one central point Mr Pillsbury is certainly right: China’s rise is the great political event of our times. Getting the response right is crucial. It is so easy to get it wrong. Today, I fear, the U.S. is getting it frighteningly wrong.

The starting point must be that, whether or not China has a plan for world economic domination by 2049 (the 100-year anniversary of the creation of the People’s Republic), that is a plausible, though not inevitable, outcome. Other things being equal, population is decisive in determining the size of an economy. The U.S. is the most powerful high-income country because it has the biggest population, by far. But the population of China is to the US’s, roughly what America’s is to Germany’s. Nobody could now imagine a world in which Germany’s economy is comparable in size to that of the US. Similarly, why should we imagine that the U.S. economy will remain indefinitely comparable in size to that of China?

There can only be one answer to this question. U.S. output per head will remain far higher than China’s, permanently. At market prices, China’s gross domestic product per head in 2018 was just 15 percent of U.S. levels. That is very close to Turkey’s (and ranks 72nd in the world). Imagine, however, that China achieves Spain’s output per head, relative to the US. Its economy would then be twice the size of that of the U.S., at market prices (and close to three times as big in terms of purchasing power).

Is it plausible that China will, over the next three decades, achieve a GDP per head relative to the U.S. comparable to that of Spain today? Of course it is. Does anybody doubt that the Chinese people are capable of this? But what is plausible is not inevitable. It is possible, instead, that Xi Jinping will be remembered as China’s Leonid Brezhnev.

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China exports far more to US allies than to the US

Exports as % of GDP



*European Union, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand


Sources: Refinitiv; FT calculations
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Brezhnev closed down all thoughts of economic and political reform in the Soviet Union from 1964 to his death in 1982. He emphasised communist orthodoxy and party discipline. The result proved a disaster for the USSR. His conservatism bore direct responsibility for the subsequent collapse. It is conceivable that Mr Xi's re-establishment of party discipline and the role of the state in economic life will have similar consequences for China. But what is conceivable is not inevitable. China also has a vigorous market economy and a studious bureaucracy. It may avoid this trap.

In sum, what Mr Pillsbury views with horror is not just plausible, but natural. What, short of war, could the U.S. do to stop it? The answer is: not much. Yes, it could halt its imports from China and try to halt all transfers of technology, too. Such actions would hit China's development, but they are unlikely to halt it. Only Chinese blunders, always possible, are likely to do that.

The US and its allies still have bigger economies than China and Russia


% of global gross domestic product at purchasing power parity



This is a cry not for defeatism, but for the realism Mr Pillsbury himself calls for. China is likely to become the world's greatest economic power because it is both big and competent. Yet even if the U.S. does not remain the world's largest economy over the decades ahead, it should retain three significant assets: a law-governed democracy; a free-market economy; and economically powerful allies. These are sources, respectively, of admiration, dynamism and strength. Unfortunately, the U.S. is trashing them all. President Donald Trump seems ignorant of what a liberal democracy is. The U.S. economy is slowly morphing into rentier capitalism. It has also become an unreliable and even outright hostile ally—ask the Germans.

The US and its allies still also do much more trade than China


Exports and imports of goods as a % of world total



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The US and its allies still dominate military spending

Military expenditure as a % of world total




Source: SIPRI
© FT

The last might be the biggest blunder of all. For military strength, the U.S. has in truth to rely mainly upon itself. But in economic policy or human rights, it does not. The US's allies bring enormous extra weight to the table (unlike Russia, China's only potent ally). Take trade: China's exports to close U.S. allies far exceed those to America alone. Many of those allies also share U.S. concerns over market access, poor protection of intellectual property and China's demand to be treated as a developing country. Yet the U.S. has thrown away the leverage its allies could have given it. If it had promoted a negotiation with China inside the World Trade Organization on these issues, in concert with its allies, it would have enjoyed both more leverage and the moral high ground.

China's population is bigger than those of the US and its allies

Working age population, 2018 (% of total)




*Albania, Canada and Turkey

Source: World Bank
© FT

China is a very important market for some US allies

Export of goods, by destination (as a % of GDP)



*European Union, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand

Sources: Refinitiv, FT research
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It is, of course, not enough for the U.S. to appreciate its resources. It also has to know what to do with them. It is not to make itself an enemy of the Chinese people's legitimate desire for a better life. Still less is it to dream of overthrowing China's political system. Such aims are neither reasonable nor achievable. It is to stand up for an open and dynamic world economy, based on market principles, to defend freedom of speech and to challenge abuses of human rights in China itself. But it is also to recognise that, if humanity is to achieve economic progress, maintain peace and preserve the global commons, a high degree of co-operation must also exist between the superpowers. In dealing with China, the U.S. and its allies need to confront, compete and co-operate across multiple domains. Today, this seems inconceivable. Instead, we are looking at a crumbling alliance and a fraught relationship between the U.S. and China. None of this augurs well for humanity's future. Remember: it could be so much better.

Europe's moment of truth with China

Noah Barkin | Politico | January 13, 2020

Introduction

For much of the past year, China has been preoccupied with its trade conflict with the United States. Now that it has clinched a “Phase One” deal with Washington, it is turning its attention to Europe. The problem? Europe hasn’t made up its mind about how to respond.

When Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, came to Brussels in December, he delivered two messages to Europe. The first was rather benign: “We are partners, not rivals,” he told his audience at the European Policy Centre think tank, calling on the EU and Beijing to draw up an “ambitious blueprint” for cooperation.

The second was more of a thinly veiled threat: Europe and China had to “get mutual perceptions right,” he declared. Failure to do so would risk “unnecessary disruptions” to the relationship. Wang didn’t mention pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, reports of human rights abuses in Xinjiang or security concerns surrounding telecoms giant Huawei. But his message was clear: If Europe wants smooth relations, it should stop criticizing China.

Europe, however, is still clarifying its stance toward China and may not be ready for the hard choices implied by Wang’s quid pro quo.

Back in March, when the European Commission issued a toughly worded paper that described China as a “systemic rival,” the EU seemed to be heading down a more confrontational path with Beijing. But in the intervening months, momentum has stalled. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron both traveled to China but focused primarily on business ties. Most European countries have delayed increasingly urgent decisions over whether Chinese telecoms equipment giant Huawei should be allowed to build their 5G mobile networks.

In 2020, Europe—whether it likes it or not—will be under intense pressure to finally pick a lane, with several high-profile events on the agenda including an EU-China summit and a meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and EU national leaders in Leipzig in September, under the German presidency of the EU.

Here are the factors that are most likely to shape Europe's relationship with Beijing:

Huawei Conundrum

As 2020 dawns, Europe's biggest countries—Germany, France and Britain—are still debating whether Huawei should be given a role in their 5G rollouts. Lately, the discussion has been most intense in Berlin, where Merkel has faced a revolt, led by her former environment minister, Norbert Röttgen, over her refusal to ban Huawei. Other parties, including not only her coalition partner, the Social Democrats, but also the Greens, the liberal Free Democrats and the far-right Alternative for Germany, are pushing back. It should become clear in the coming months whether Röttgen's rebellion has a chance of succeeding.

After repeated delays, Britain faces a similar decision, with Prime Minister Boris Johnson forced to weigh up the risks of Washington curtailing intelligence cooperation if he gives Huawei the green light, against the costs of a Chinese backlash if he does not.

The European Commission will unveil its 5G "toolbox" in mid-January, which will give national governments a menu of options for mitigating security risks linked to their next-generation mobile networks. After studiously avoiding decisions in 2019, the big European players will need to come down one way or the other in 2020. Their decisions will have a ripple effect for smaller countries.

US Trade Pressure

For the past year, amid the ups and downs of the U.S.-China trade conflict, European leaders have been worried about one thing: that Trump would strike a cosmetic deal with Beijing and then zero in on Europe.

Now, Europe's nightmare scenario could become a reality. In December, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer spoke openly about the "very unbalanced" trade relationship with Europe, signaling that this will be Washington's focus in 2020.

If Trump follows through on his threat of car tariffs, it could trigger a tit-for-tat downward spiral in the transatlantic relationship that pushes Europe toward a more conciliatory stance with China.

The Trump administration has also begun rolling out proposals for export controls on emerging technologies. U.S. officials have been reaching out to Europe and other "like-minded countries" to get their buy-in. But if Trump is waging a trade war with Europe, the appetite to go along with Washington's plans to curb technology exports to China will be limited.

EU-China Investments

The German chancellor has signaled that she wants to clinch a comprehensive investment agreement between the EU and China in time for her September summit in Leipzig. But EU officials describe the challenge of doing so as “impossible.” Sabine Weyand, the European Commission’s director general for trade, has said talks with the Chinese are moving “at a snail’s pace.”

This might change in the new year. If it doesn’t, the EU will be confronted with the question of how to respond to China’s intransigence. The new Commission is examining ways to curb unfair competition from state-owned enterprises and its new investment screening mechanism will be up and running in October.

These initiatives, designed to shield Europe from certain Chinese investments, could make progress with Beijing in other areas more difficult. “There is a big gap between what we say and what we do,” one senior EU official said. “That gap has been reduced but we are still not where we need to be.”

Human Rights

The wild cards in the Europe-China relationship are the ongoing protests in Hong Kong and the growing backlash against Beijing’s re-education camps in Xinjiang. Both will remain prominent in news headlines in 2020, weighing on ties, souring public opinion on China and limiting the room for European leaders to work closely with Beijing.

The EU’s new foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, seems unlikely to shy from criticizing China on human rights. Speaking in the European Parliament in Strasbourg in December, he promised to push member states to toughen their response to rights violations in Xinjiang, where an estimated 1 million Uighurs have been detained, and to fight for an EU equivalent of the U.S. Magnitsky Act, which would allow the EU to sanction individuals complicit in human rights abuses.

Pressure on European companies to curb their activities in Xinjiang is also likely to grow in 2020.

New Commission

Under former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU took a decidedly firmer stance against China, agreeing to a new investment screening mechanism and labeling China a “systemic rival.” His successor Ursula von der Leyen has promised a more “geopolitical”

Commission. As German defense minister, she was highly critical of China. In her first weeks in the job, she has stuck to a hard line on issues like 5G. But she, like Borrell, is new to the job and the tone she strikes on China will be closely scrutinized in 2020 for clues about a shift in policy so she is likely to tread carefully at first.

One of von der Leyen's key challenges will be to get the various commissioners and the European External Action Service working seamlessly together—alongside national governments—to confront new challenges from China at the nexus of technology and security. Whether she can do so will determine the strength of a common EU strategy toward Beijing.

U.S. Election

Talk to European officials these days and they will tell you, in resigned tones, that Trump's reelection is all but inevitable. With nearly a year to go until the vote, there is ample time for this to change. But if U.S. Democrats struggle to unite behind a strong candidate and shift the momentum as the November election approaches, European countries are likely to hedge against a second Trump term by softening their tone with China.

The last thing they want is open confrontation with Washington and Beijing at the same time. As one veteran U.S. diplomat put it: "I fear that Europe will retreat to a transactional view of the world, doing deals with Russia and China."

NATO is Struggling Under Trans-Atlantic Tensions

Jim Townsend & Andrea Kendall-Taylor | Foreign Policy | December 5, 2019

NATO leaders gathered in London this week for a brief summit marking the alliance's 70th anniversary. The trans-Atlantic community looked on with trepidation—not because there was an imminent military crisis to navigate or a major alliance decision to make, but because of U.S. President Donald Trump's propensity to derail meetings. This time around, however, Trump was not the only source of contention.

Ahead of the meeting, there were plenty of warning signs of impending discord. French President Emmanuel Macron said the alliance was suffering “brain death” and in recent months has pushed an increase in outreach to Russian President Vladimir Putin—a position certain to disconcert Central European and Baltic countries. And Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emboldened by the strengthening of his own relationship with Putin, said he wouldn't commit to NATO's plans in the Baltic States unless alliance members capitulate to his position on classifying Kurdish fighters in Syria as terrorists.

Unfortunately, these fears were borne out. Before the summit was even underway, Trump, temporarily playing the part of the NATO fan, chided Macron for his remarks disparaging the state of the alliance. Even as those assembled posed for a NATO family photo with Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace, tensions behind the scenes were running high: Trump called Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau “two-faced” after he was caught on a hot mic mocking the U.S. president, in conversation with Macron and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. After hijacking most of his press opportunities after bilateral meetings with allied leaders to opine on a wide range of topics, Trump canceled his final press conference to beat a hasty retreat back to Washington amid ongoing House impeachment hearings.

Why NATO felt it needed to have a final 70th anniversary hurrah in London in the midst of a heated U.S. presidential campaign, in which NATO has become a punching bag for Trump's base, is anyone's guess. But Trump behavior aside, Macron, Erdogan, and even Johnson, who faces a general election next week, seem willing to send their own messages of discord. Amid mounting trans-Atlantic tensions, the alliance's most important weapon—unity—has suffered. Ultimately, there was not enough substance to the leader's meeting to justify the public relations gamble at a time of discord.

That said, a summit must not always culminate in a dramatic announcement, and there was some value in reaffirming member states' commitment to collective defense; the leaders did address important issues that perhaps should not have risen to the summit level but were nonetheless significant. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced further increases in defense spending, stepped up efforts to respond to cyberthreats, and recognized

China as a challenge the alliance must address. Macron also got NATO to step up efforts to fight terrorism.

NATO also announced outer space as a new operational domain. While a NATO “space force” like the one Trump announced in the United States is not in the cards, the alliance has recognized that its dependence on space for communications and surveillance could be its Achilles’ heel—compromised by the possibility of a cyberattack, and by Chinese and Russian anti-satellite capabilities.

More controversially, after months of bruising debates, NATO members finally agreed that the United States would cut its contribution to NATO’s common fund while other members, especially Germany (but not France), will increase their contributions to make up the difference. This cheap win for Trump on burden-sharing means that European allies’ funds will go to needs like NATO’s electrical bill instead of being spent at home improving their own military capabilities—a steep price to pay for a smidgen of burden-sharing relief for the United States.

As a sop to Macron, the allies agreed to initiate a “forward-looking reflection process,” to “further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation.” Macron continues to ring the alarm bell that NATO is once again in crisis.

Although NATO has its problems, the frustration that Macron and others are channeling doesn’t stem from anything happening solely within the alliance. Militarily, NATO is on solid footing. It has taken a number of prudent steps in recent years to adapt to the challenges it faces, including a more assertive Russia. Instead, a growing list of problems emanate from the outside; these are the symptoms of a larger, more existential problem in the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Europe has seen the growth of a widely held perception, fostered by Trump, that the United States is disengaging from the continent and lacks commitment to NATO. Macron has sought to lead the charge to carve out strategic autonomy from Washington. His frustration appears to stem from the fact that no one is following his lead. European elites are still searching for a plan B should the United States disengage from Europe. But whether that plan involves a stronger European Union, as the Germans want, or something else, remains to be seen. Russia, which has amplified its influence operations in many European nations, has fanned the flames, seeking to cast doubt about U.S. leadership and the efficacy of Western institutions built over the past 70 years.

Although these problems aren’t about NATO alone, the poor state of trans-Atlantic relations has spilled into the alliance. If political disagreements lock up NATO decision-making, it will make little difference how ready and capable the alliance’s military forces are when allies

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can't agree to deploy them. Many of Russia's tactics in Europe, including cyberattacks and information operations, are designed to be ambiguous, complicate attribution, and delay decisions. That makes it urgent for allies to come to grips with political issues outside of NATO in order to restore unity.

Disrupting the International Order

Gen. John R. Allen | Special Report by the World Economic Forum | January 22, 2020

Introduction

Throughout modern history, established regional or international orders have been overturned when a shift in technology has enabled or amplified a change in the balance of military or economic power. That was true when new technologies and techniques of sail vaulted Portugal past the larger European powers to become the first Western nation to establish a major presence in the Indian Ocean; when steam and the invention of the loom and new financial techniques powered the English industrial revolution; and when new approaches to mass production catapulted the United States to the top of the world economy—and then to the forefront of the defense of the free world in World War II and during the Cold War.

The American-led arrangements that emerged have been the backbone of international order ever since, and the systems of alliances and multilateral institutions that have supported this order have been the bulwark of international stability. But as we near the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II and mark the 30th anniversary of the end of the Cold War, a combination of economic and technological shifts is once again driving geopolitical change.

Some of these changes arise from hugely positive developments: integrating into the global economy and undergirded by liberal institutions like the World Trade Organization, emerging markets have pulled more than a billion people out of poverty and forged a global middle class. During the same period, institutions like the United Nations, driven by the West but encompassing genuinely global collaboration, made sustained progress on reducing the ills of civil war, infectious disease and humanitarian crises. But for all the positives, there is no escaping the reality that the cumulative effect of changes fuelled by economic and technological developments over the past three decades are creating a moment of genuine danger in international affairs.

Technological change and the rebalancing of power

The technological advances and an economic rebalancing under way are causing the world to enter a new phase—one where the non-Western powers, as well as some non-state actors, see low-cost and relatively low-risk opportunities to weaken the United States and the Western alliance.

One area where this danger is pronounced is in East Asia. As China's growth has vaulted it into the top ranks of global economic power, it has progressively shed its strategy of "hide and bide" and begun to exert itself in political and strategic affairs, in its region and beyond.

The economic and export prowess of China is intrinsically challenging the dominance of the Western model in international affairs. Again, some of this is productive: China's surge into Africa in the 1990s, in search of food, mineral and energy resources to power its growth, helped to pull more than a dozen African nations into middle-income status. But with global economic reach comes global interests and the temptation to project global power; now China has moved into a new phase of expansion—into a global network of ports, technology plays and infrastructure assets that in some theatres seem purposefully designed to challenge the West.

Added to this are powerful changes in the technological sphere: not only the deeper and now pervasive integration of cyber networks into military technology but also the wide penetration of social networks—and above all qualitative leaps in the effectiveness and power of supercomputing, artificial intelligence and biotechnology. Any one of these technologies could amplify shifts in the balance of geopolitical power—especially amidst a lapse in U.S. global leadership and a weakened and disorganized multilateral order. The current U.S. administration has usefully focused on the China challenge; but it has chosen to react to these developments not by deepening its commitment to democratic values and securing or expanding its alliance structure, but by alienating its closest friends and weakening multilateral arrangements just when they are most susceptible to concerted pressures from authoritarian states and most needed for global stability.

The risks from technological and economic change are not limited to the realm of great power relations. In regional conflicts, technologies like the remote management of drone swarms, precision strike missiles, and enhanced cyber- and artificial intelligence-supported influence operations in the information sphere can lift the power of lesser adversaries, and even of non-state actors like the Islamic State—who have used the information domain to spread their influence and network across most civil wars in the Middle East, North Africa and into South-East Asia. The danger is made graver, though, by the escalation of great power tensions; for while civil and regional wars were often the subject of international cooperation during the last quarter century, we are now watching a return to the behaviour of the world's top military powers treating these conflicts as zones for proxy competition—with disastrous results in terms of human suffering, as we've experienced in Yemen, Syria and Venezuela.

Getting the assessment right

While new technologies are unlikely to radically change the military balance of the nuclear powers in a way that makes military aggression likely in the near term, these technologies are helping to create new geopolitical tensions. Leaders do not always make rational calculations, and it can be tempting to have a new technology or new capabilities at one's disposal. Otherwise cautious or risk-averse leaders can become risk-prone, or simply

reckless, if they believe they have a technological “silver bullet”. The fact that history is replete with cases where such leaders fail in war does not rule out new episodes of miscalculation.

Beyond the narrowly defined military sphere, new developments in telecoms and technology are amplifying, perhaps even accelerating, the drift away from cooperation and toward competition. Technology is increasingly a zone of this rivalry: if Chinese companies like Huawei build out the global 5G infrastructure, the West will lose the intelligence collection capabilities it currently enjoys. Furthermore, the West will have to contend with new concerns about information assurance whenever it shares information with partners and allies that rely on a Chinese telecom stack. On a larger scale, there is a growing possibility of a geopolitical digital divide as Russia seeks to follow China in the creation of a “sovereign internet”. Indeed, this very outcome may be accelerating as the Chinese authorities and the Trump administration undertake policies that decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies and technologies.

Tensions are likely to be most acute in the areas of surveillance, social manipulation and human rights. States that lack strong rule of law institutions are discovering the power of new technologies to increase the effectiveness of their social controls. This will intensify as the costs for mass real-time surveillance technologies continue to shift downward and big data analytics vastly increase the aperture through which the state can monitor its citizens. In the social domain, authoritarian states and other actors are seeking to turn the openness of the West into a weapon against it. Most of that manipulation is occurring within consumer apps and social networks that have proven difficult for democratic governments to regulate effectively. Digitally-controlled industries are also vulnerable—as Ukraine learned in 2015 and 2016 at the hands of, likely, a Russian predatory cyberattack on its power grid.

The return of great power competition

National governments often feel tempted in moments of change and uncertainty to launch sudden strikes—literal or otherwise—aimed at weakening their opponents. At a moment of flux in American policy and in the coherence of the West, that temptation may loom. Tensions are likely to be most acute in the areas of surveillance, social manipulation and human rights. Shaping a Multiconceptual World 17 particularly large. While direct military confrontation with the United States or with NATO remains a very high risk and high-cost option—and, thus, is unlikely to transpire—the great powers and some middle powers are trying hard to increase their ability to affect adversary perceptions at all levels, by sowing discord in national populations, disrupting the unit cohesion of soldiers through psychological operations, and pumping false information into intelligence fusion centres. All this weakens trust, erodes cooperation and increases the risk of outright conflict.

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No part of this challenge will be ameliorated by American unilateralism, British isolationism or Chinese expansionism—to say nothing of Russian revanchism. As unfashionable as it is to argue the case, the reality remains that the best guarantor of stability in the coming period is Western unity and a deepening, not weakening, of the alliance structure. Cooperation with other democracies would strengthen the West's hand: in the realm of data and technology, the West should strengthen ties with India, whose data sets and tech entrepreneurs will be valuable assets in the coming competition, as well as with Mexico, whose technology and infrastructure grids can either be the soft underbelly or the strategic reserve of the West assets in the coming competition, as well as with Mexico, whose technology and infrastructure grids can either be the soft underbelly or the strategic reserve of the West.

At this moment of geopolitical tension, it is unfashionable, too, to call for calm and for dialogue in U.S.-China relations—but these are essential ingredients if both want to defend common interests and avoid outright conflict. These two countries have the largest economies in the world, the two top militaries in the world and the two most dynamic technological sectors. They are destined to be strategic competitors but are not yet destined to wage a new Cold War. Some in the United States, espousing greater emphasis on individual national sovereignty and strengthened borders, would squander the extraordinary asset of the alliance structure on the argument that it increases American exposure to costs and dangers in Asia and Europe in the face of a rising China. The reality is that the United States' economy and its values are already fully exposed by the global nature of information and energy flows, supply chain trade and the spread of democracy. What is in question is whether the United States defends its values and interests alone or with a robust network of allies and partners. That said, many of America's traditional friends and closest allies find it increasingly difficult to comprehend the values for which America stands, which further undermines the integrity of existing multilateral organizations or the future of purpose-built coalitions or instruments.

The simultaneous rise of the Asian economies and the impacts of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are amplifying risk and creating intense levels of geopolitical uncertainty. But crisis is not foreordained; as it has done in the past, a combination of American values and leadership, Western coherence and multilateral cooperation can still help us navigate these trends.

The question now becomes: does the United States regain its role as the principal advocate for global stability through alliances and multilateralism, and does it extend that leadership to the technological domain? Or does the United States stay on its current path toward isolationism, and thus fail to prevent the growing risk of great power confrontation? Only time will tell, yet the answer to these important questions may very well decide the character, and perhaps even the fate, of the community of nations in the 21st century and beyond.

Germany has to be a Leader in Disruptive Times

Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger | Frankfurter Allgemeine | February 27, 2019

The end of the cold war, German unification, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the wider changes in Europe have set Germany on a new trajectory: from security consumer and full-time U.S. client to security provider, anchor nation and even hegemon. In security and military terms, the country has been transiting from a culture of restraint to a culture of responsibility.

Before and after the turn of the century, demands and expectations that Germany carry more of the burden of transatlantic and European security and prosperity were constantly increasing –to the point where a Polish foreign minister, in November of 2011, called Germany the indispensable nation of Europe. Imagine. While Germany has always been Europe's economic powerhouse, it was around that time that the increase in political clout became all too clear. When the European debt crisis gripped many European countries and the future of the Euro zone was on the line, Germany clearly moved to center stage. It fell upon Germany to save the Euro and avert disaster for the global economy, on terms and conditions that were too lenient in the eyes of the believers of fiscal and monetary orthodox and too harsh for the recipients of aid packages. As a consequence British political scientist William Paterson argued that Germany had become Europe's reluctant hegemon. I do not think this is a useful term, because it suggests a kind of behavior we usually associated in the past with the behavior and power of the United States. Its new influence, authority and power notwithstanding, Germany does not fit in this category. It is a rich country with considerable power, but its resources are limited and, unlike in France and the United Kingdom, a strategic culture is almost nonexistent.

Since a couple of years, however, things don't look so bright anymore, if not outright dark. Most recent political and geopolitical changes in and around Europe were not in favor of Germany. Quite the opposite. Some developments directly challenge its core interests, beliefs and principles. We have seen Russia's aggression in and against the Ukraine changing borders, undermining states, threatening neighbors, popping up dictatorial regimes. We witness the return of big power rivalries and conflicts. The power struggle in Venezuela, by the way, may be an example for this. The rise of China is no longer merely seen as an economic opportunity but as a serious, geopolitical and economic challenge. Global order is seen as dissolving, as the concept of common rules and institutions is shared less and less. When it comes to Russia, it fell primarily upon Germany and France, in this order, to organize a response. This response, sanctions, is asymmetrical, and until now has not changed Russia's behavior. But it has signaled to President Putin that his aggression at least comes with a price. "Peace is more fragile than we had hoped for at the end of the Cold War," Chancellor Angela Merkel said the other day.

Geopolitical changes have not played in Germany's hand

The liberal order has come under attack, not just from the outside, but also from the inside. Populism, nationalism, and protectionism have entered Western politics and impact upon the agenda of Western states. There is Donald Trump in the White House and Brexit around the corner laying open fundamental questions about the future of European integration. By the way: In Germany some on the hard right, in their anti-EU mindset, think Brexit is super. The great majority of Germans, however, views the departure of the United Kingdom as a sad, bad thing: bad for us, bad for the U.K., bad all of us. Unfortunately, there is more to worry about. European countries that were welcomed into NATO and the EU just a few years ago have turned out to be neighbors with a strong preference for illiberalism and nationalism. This has come as a big surprise to us, as Thomas Bagger, a foreign affairs adviser to German President Steinmeier, has noted. Maybe it is true: As we approach the 30th anniversary of the fall Berlin wall, the golden moment for Germany, politically and even economically, is over or about to be over. Domestically, the refugee and migration crisis has turned German politics upside down.

At the same time, the call for Germany to rise to the occasion, from Afghanistan to Africa, and sharpen its international profile has not fallen silent.

And it was echoed in the country. Five years ago, almost to the day a loud shot was fired in the debate about German responsibilities in Europe and in the world. Speaking at the Munich Security conference, a German trio including the president, the foreign minister and the defense minister asked for Germans to be ready to shoulder more responsibilities. "As a good partner the Federal Republic should act earlier, more decisively, and more vigorously, then-President Joachim Gauck said. He defended the use of military force and said the country's past should not be misused as an excuse for complacency, ignorance and isolationism. As if he was looking into a crystal ball, Gauck encouraged Germany and its partners to do more for their security since the United States was no longer able and/or willing to shoulder the bulk of the collective burden. When Trump arrived, the bill was presented, though, in blackmail fashion.

A turning point in transatlantic relations

There was another key moment. It came in late spring of 2017. Upon her return from two summits in Brussels and in Sicily, and after strange encounters with the still new American president, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made headlines when, in an address to a Bavarian beer tent crowd, she said this: The times in which we could fully rely on others are to a certain extent over." European would have to take their fate in to their own hands. Actually, Merkel had made the reference to a more mature European posture before; but her reaction to the twin meetings with the American president was read by many as a turning point in

transatlantic relations, particularly for Germany. It was even idolized as a kind of European Declaration of independence from the United States. Well, this is too much self-indulgence, just as the talk of strategic autonomy is overblown. But it points in a direction which for Europe has become necessary to embark upon. The era of transatlantic romanticism, nostalgia and imbalance in military burdens is definitely over. We have to do much for ourselves, for our security and our well-being.

The populist revolt which brought Donald Trump in the White House has affected Europe in general and Germany in particular in several ways: directly, institutionally, in terms of method and approach. Directly, as Trump, time and again, singled out Germany for its trade surplus with the U.S., its level of military spending, its migration policy, its energy relationship with Russia. On all these issues, Germany has an open flank and is vulnerable indeed. Trump attacked Europe institutionally by disparaging the EU and by calling America's commitment to NATO in question. In other words, he has hit the foundations of the security, political and geo-economical order in Europe upon which our prosperity and security are based. One might add that the policy on the ground has not proved fears of American disengagement from Europe right.

The third challenge is the Trump's dislike for multilateralism and international treaties. His is the approach of a nationalist who views the world as a zero-sum-game. As you know, multilateralism is Germany's gospel in international politics. But to be honest: Germany's record is not unblemished, too. Energy comes to mind. And while Trump shows disdain for allies, Congress is cherishing alliance relationships: It was the largest ever congressional delegation that participated at the most recent Munich security conference ten days ago.

Defense has been a bone of contention for many years. Trump definitely has a point. American calls to correct a fundamental imbalance have long fallen on deaf ears in many European countries—no more, including Germany. Since a couple of years the German defense budget is rising—against strong resistance from the left. By 2024, it will be at 1,5 percent of GDP as agreed by the coalition Parties in Berlin. In 2014 the defense budget was 32,5 billion Euros, the current one is 43,3 billion Euros which translates into 1,34 percent of GDP. In light of the dismal state of the German military, this increase is highly welcome, but it is still a long way from the NATO two percent goal. Even, though, the Christian Democratic part of the government is adamant to close the gap in future years, which is the right thing to do. But it remains doubtful that the country will get to that. The public now reluctantly agrees that the embarrassing deficiencies of the Bundeswehr need to be taken care of. But the dimension of what needs to be done over many years makes this almost a mission impossible. Maybe only a major international crisis or some other disaster may be able to turn it into politically sustained program.

The Big Switzerland syndrome still applies to many Germans

Indeed, there are more obstacles. The German government cannot be sure of public support for enhanced international engagement, particularly when it comes with a heavy price tag and carries major risks. The German public is definitely skeptical. Asked if they prefer involvement or restraint, in a poll sponsored by the Koerber Foundation a majority of Germans said they are in favor of restraint (53 percent) while a strong minority (43 percent) supported a more active involvement. So military deployments, to Africa for example or to other far-away regions, usually are received with scepticism. In a nutshell for many the Big-Switzerland-Syndrome still applies. Not many Germans are eager to adopt a strategic culture, but many cherish the pacifism that was part of the fabric of the old federal republic.

Another obstacle has to do with Europe's history and the reality of European politics. Not all Europeans cheer when they are confronted with German leadership. In some parts and political milieus history is still a potent political force. Germany learned this during the European debt crisis. Or put differently: Germany is not immune to the American experience: Damned if you do and damned if you don't. Leadership cannot dispense with smart diplomacy and coalition-building efforts.

And then, of course, dynamics of coalitions politics and swings in public mood may hold Germany back from assuming international responsibilities. In general terms, Big Switzerland is particularly popular on the hard right and on the hard left.

In his recent book, "World in Danger", the Chairman of the Munich security conference, former German top diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger, disagrees strongly with suggestions to stick firmly with the old concept of restraint. We do not have the luxury anymore to watch what is going on in the world from the stands, he argues. We cannot afford being passive. If we want to keep ourselves out of what happens in the world, then we will have a price to pay—sooner or later. Witness the consequences of the Syrian nightmare. Hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming to Europe and turning German, and European, politics upside down. Ischinger thinks Germany has no other choice than to assume greater responsibility for the security and prosperity of itself, Europe and the wider West. He even suggest we must be prepared to spend more in and for Europe. This is certainly a controversial proposition.

What lies ahead

Here, in broad brush, is what Germany has to do:

- Work to preserve the liberal international order which is under threat from several sides. When and where necessary, aim for reforms.
- In collaboration with like-minded partners hold up multilateralism.
- Invest time, energy and other resources in the coherence of the European Union, its viability, and ability to act.
- At the same time, recent backlashes notwithstanding, engage the United States as much as possible. Europe cannot make without them. It is a bitter fact that most Germans have less confidence in the U.S. of Donald Trump than in the Russia of Wladimir Putin. Do not appease the man in the Kremlin even, though, a sizable part of the German business community wants the government exactly to do that.
- Fulfill NATO obligations and act militarily when necessary to protect our collective security and defend our interests.

The military dimension of this list is likely the most controversial. But then one has to look at today's deployments: German armed forces are, still, among others in Afghanistan, in Iraqi Kurdistan, in Mali. Recalling the German debate about the constitutional limits of out of area missions 25 years ago, I marvel at the distance travelled and acknowledge the way we have come. Yes, we may do too little and sometimes do it too late. But still. One can pretty sure there is more to come.

A New Mental Barrier Is Dividing Europe

Ivan Krastev | Zeit Online | November 6, 2019

In Ferenc Karinthy's 1970 dystopian novel "Metropole," a talented Hungarian linguist at the Budapest airport goes to the wrong gate, gets on the wrong plane and lands in a city where no one can understand him, despite the impressive array of languages he speaks. It is my fear that Europe is starting to resemble the city where the misfortunate Hungarian landed.

Feeling misunderstood is the defining characteristic of any European government today. This state of confusion is particularly painful in Germany's relations with the European Union's eastern member states. The post-communist societies as a rule admire Germany, welcome German investments and prefer to emigrate to Germany. But at the same time, populist governments of the region get elected by constantly attacking Germany. In Poland, the national-conservative Law and Justice party just recently won an absolute majority in parliament. During the campaign, one of the party's talking points was its demand that Germany pay World War II reparations.

In Berlin, it is widely believed that "the end of love" between eastern and western Europe is primarily because of diverging views on migration. This is correct. But there is nevertheless a misunderstanding: Eastern Europeans aren't afraid of the kind of migration Germans usually fret about. The problem is not the concern that Germany wants to bring in huge numbers of refugees from the Middle East and Africa, despite incendiary rhetoric of populist leaders in Eastern Europe. Rather, it's the fear that increasing numbers of Eastern European youth will end up in Germany, that Germany is aggressively courting the region's young professionals and that Eastern Europe itself will become a desert.

It is the very attractiveness of Germany that fuels anti-German sentiment in Eastern Europe. In this sense, Germany bears a share of the responsibility for the upsurge of populism in the East. The Merkel government should be as worried about the social divide that has grown in Europe as it is about the East-West rift that runs through Germany itself. Berlin's responsibility for unification reaches far beyond Dresden. It has not lived up to it.

Post-communist societies have become major suppliers of labor for the aging West. Since 2007, 3.4 million Romanians, most of them younger than 40, have left their country and moved to the West. This fear of nation-killing depopulation is at the heart of the Eastern Europe's demographic panic. It is not the first time in history that large numbers of Eastern Europeans have left their countries in search of better life. But whereas a century ago, they were leaving young and demographically burgeoning societies, today they are leaving some of the fastest shrinking populations in the world. At current fertility rates, Eastern Europeans are breeding themselves out of existence. From 1989 to 2017, Latvia lost 27 percent of its

population, Lithuania 22.5 percent. Bulgaria is currently experiencing the largest percentage drop in population not attributable to war or famine for a country in the modern era.

The combination of an aging population, low birth rates and an unending stream of outmigration is making Central and Eastern Europe fertile ground for populist politics. A small nation, according to Milan Kundera, "is one whose very existence may be put in question at any moment; a small nation can disappear and it knows it."

In a Europe of open borders, the threat that Central and Eastern Europeans confront is similar to the one that East Germany faced before the Berlin Wall was built, namely that working-age citizens would leave their homelands to pursue lives in the West.

The central paradox facing the EU's eastern member states is that the opening of borders and the freedom to travel and work abroad, according to opinion polls, is what Eastern Europeans value most in the post-Cold War world, but it is also what they fear most. Ordinary Bulgarians or Hungarians are enthusiastic about the opportunity to travel and work abroad, but they are also scared by the prospect that many of their compatriots could decide to leave the country. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, 50 percent of Poles and 49 percent of Hungarians would support legislation making it "illegal for their own citizens to leave for long periods of time." Similar attitudes can be found in several other countries in Central Europe.

At present, most Eastern European governments deal with demographic panic by adopting nativist policies and fueling nationalist rhetoric. For them, ethno-nationalist rhetoric is a substitute for the Berlin Wall they are now unable to build. In this rhetoric, Western Europe has become the periphery of a Greater Africa and Greater Middle East while Hungary or Poland are the last remaining bastions of European identity and European traditions. Thirty years after the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, a new mental barrier is being erected.

Having said that, Eastern Europeans' fear of outmigration is not irrational. When a young Bulgarian or Pole leaves her country, she takes with her all the resources that the state has invested in her education and deprives her country of her talent and ambition. A decade ago, when the eastern part of the EU was suffering high levels of unemployment, outmigration was generally perceived as a positive economic factor by Eastern societies. Today, however, with most Central and Eastern European countries suffering from labor shortages, the sentiment has changed. The fact that young and educated Bulgarians go to Germany means among other things that German investments are unlikely to come to Bulgaria. It also means that those who have decided to stay in their own country often feel like losers. Magnifying the problem is the fact that the exodus of young and well-educated people has seriously, perhaps fatally, damaged the chances of liberal parties to do well in elections. Ten thousand doctors have left Romania in the last two years, to quote just one statistic. Many young activists have

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realized that the most radical way to change one's life is not by changing their country's corrupt government but by changing the country in which they live. Why pin your hopes on transforming Romania into Germany when you can simply move to Germany?

"Exit anxiety" is tearing Central and Eastern Europe apart. It is an issue that Germany must address. But how?

First, it is important to recognize the critical importance of demographic panic in Eastern European politics. Berlin's current focus on the rule of law in the region is correct, but it is not enough to counter the populist trend in the region. Therefore, the second response must be that of addressing people's fears, such as the scenario of towns and villages with no doctors. Imagination will be vital, such as allowing Eastern European medical professionals who now work in Germany to be able to move back and forth for some period of time so they can practice back in their home countries.

When struggling to find his way out of the city where he was lost, the Hungarian linguist from the novel "Metropole" realized that his failure to make sense of the local language was rooted in the fact that one word no longer meant today what it had meant yesterday. Yesterday in Eastern Europe, migration meant the fear of foreigners arriving. Today, though, it means the fear of our own leaving.

30 Years After Communism, Eastern Europe Divided on Democracy's Impact
Jon Henley | The Guardian | October 15, 2019

Thirty years on, few people in Europe's former eastern bloc regret the monumental political, social and economic change unleashed by the fall of communism—but at the same time few are satisfied with the way things are now, and many worry for the future.

A Pew Research Center survey of 17 countries, including 14 EU member states, found that while most people in central and eastern Europe generally embraced democracy and the market economy, support was far from uniformly strong. Up to 85 percent of people approved of the shift in Poland, eastern Germany and the Czech Republic, for example, but fewer than 55 percent did so in Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia. This broadly mirrored very different perceptions of how individual countries had progressed since the momentous events of 1989-91, when a wave of optimism swept Europe as walls and regimes fell, ushering in more open societies and markets, the survey's authors said.

Most Poles, Czechs and Lithuanians, and more than 40 percent of Hungarians and Slovaks, for example, said they felt most people in their countries were better off than 30 years ago; in Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, more than half felt things were worse. Asked how they felt their countries had advanced, central and eastern Europeans were most positive about education (65 percent), living standards (6 percent) and national pride (58 percent). They were less happy about law and order (44 percent) and family values (41 percent), and a majority (53 percent) said healthcare had got worse in the post-communist era.

But across all the former communist nations surveyed, people were “mostly pessimistic about the functioning of the political system, and about specific economic issues like jobs and inequality”, the survey's authors said.

There was widespread frustration with political elites, perceived as out of touch with average citizens, with 69 percent of people in the EU nations surveyed disagreeing with the statement that elected officials “care about what people like me think”, and a majority sharing the same view in Russia and Ukraine. Central and eastern European nations also harboured a widespread view that politicians, and to some extent businesspeople, had benefited personally and excessively from the fall of communism, while “ordinary people” had largely not. When it came to economic prospects for the future; however, former eastern bloc countries were more optimistic than the west: about 60 percent of Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians thought children in their country would be better off than their parents, against fewer than 25 percent in Greece, Spain, Italy, the U.K. and France.

Central and eastern European nations that joined the EU generally appreciated the institution and felt it had been good for their countries, the survey found, with the highest approval ratings—more than 80 percent—found in the former communist states of Poland and Lithuania. In two that did not join, Russia and Ukraine, the situation looked very different, the authors said. “They are less approving of the shifts to democracy and capitalism, less supportive of specific democratic principles, and less satisfied with their lives,” they said.

The survey, which also included the U.S. and was carried out among 18,979 people from May to August this year, found those who expressed a favourable opinion of the rightwing populist parties that have made significant advances across Europe in recent years were more likely to disapprove of the EU, feel Europe’s economic integration had been bad for their countries, and hold negative views of minority groups.

It also revealed a sharp east-west divide on attitudes to some social issues, with western Europeans expressing far more progressive views: 94 percent of Swedes and 89 percent of Spaniards said homosexuality should be accepted by society, for example, against 28 percent of Lithuanians and 14 percent of Ukrainians.

The survey found major differences remaining between east and west Germany, with east Germans less satisfied with their country’s overall direction and how democracy was working there than those in the west.

But life satisfaction in east Germany and in most central and east European countries has rocketed in the years since a comparable survey in 1991, when the former eastern bloc countries were grappling with the transition to democracy and a market economy. Then, for example, just 12 percent of Poles, asked to give their lives a rating out of 10, gave a 7, 8, 9 or 10. Today, the figure is 56 percent.

Europe, Old and New

Jarosław Kuisz & Karolina Wigura | Berlin Policy Journal | August 29, 2019

Introduction

What is happening to Central and Eastern Europe? Sometimes even well informed observers find it difficult to articulate in which political direction the countries east of the river Elbe are heading today. Their development for over two decades after 1989 seemed comprehensible. Although some managed it better and others fared worse, the quest of equivalence with Western Europe gave everyone one clear goal.

Today, it appears that Central and Eastern Europe has ceased to exist as a distinct political entity. Indeed, it is impossible to present a more diversified image. Hungary has been under Viktor Orbán's rule for several years, increasingly moving away from democracy toward a mild authoritarian regime. In 2014, on the 25th anniversary of the democratic revolution, The Economist hailed Poland as the greatest achievement of democratic transformation; now, to many observers it seems as if it decided to ignore its historic opportunity. However, there are also countries where liberal democracy is doing well. Although skeptical of the European Union, the Czech government has not violated the liberal legal order. Slovakia as well offers hope: just a few months ago, a progressive politician Zuzana Čaputová won the presidential election.

No other part of Europe, however, is depicted in such broad generalizations. Of course, the adverse news, which mainly concern Poland and Hungary, have darkened the whole picture. From the Western perspective, the image of these countries permeates the entire region, creating a belief that in Central and Eastern Europe, we are dealing now with an illiberal, undemocratic, and even authoritarian wave, which has destroyed the hard-won accomplishments of democratic transformation.

Such superficial assessments actually refer to specific governments, but they affect how societies as a whole are. The countries are being put on par with Vladimir Putin's Russia or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Turkey, or even compared to the fascist countries of the 1920s and 1930s. The victims of such reasoning are not only the defenders of liberal democracy in those countries where it is really under threat, but also other Central and Eastern European states, including those which have enjoyed stable political systems since they were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Some disgruntled critics in the West have even started to vociferously claim that the so-called eastern enlargement of the European Union was premature or even completely unnecessary.

The Myth of the West

The 30th anniversary of democratic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe offers a great opportunity to diagnose what is actually happening in this region. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, the 19th-century French political philosopher, revolutions do not erupt when societies are in their deepest crisis. On the contrary, they happen when circumstances improve. This statement appears to prove true for some countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Some of these states have never been in a better situation, economically and with a view to the quality of life. All of the post-communist countries that became EU members in the 2000s developed rapidly. For example, in 1990 the GDP per capita in Germany was \$20,173, in France \$22,490 and in the United Kingdom \$20,808. At that same time it was \$3,312 in Hungary, \$2,254 in Bulgaria, and \$1,626 in Poland. Twenty-eight years later, in 2018, the GDP in Germany was \$48,264, in France \$42,878, and in the U.K. \$42,558. In Hungary it has grown to \$15,924, in Bulgaria to \$9,267 and in Poland to \$15,431. That growth is impressive. Nevertheless, the West, or the EU, is most criticized in these countries right now.

Major political and social changes are not possible without a powerful collective vision of the future. That was the case with the democratic revolution in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s in Warsaw, Prague, and Sofia, only one myth shaped this vision: the myth of the West.

The French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss defined a myth as a partly unconscious narrative that manifests the thought structures of people in a particular society. The myth of the West that dominated the minds of the Central and Eastern Europeans after the fall of the Iron Curtain functioned similarly.

Lifestyle and Philosophy

When the American liberal writer Paul Berman travelled through the former Eastern bloc in the early 1990s, he noticed an interesting phenomenon. The capitals he visited appeared relatively different, but their inhabitants had one thing in common: a distinct, uncritical passion for everything that came from Western Europe and the United States. The subjects of this passion did not seem to have much in common.

From our biographical perspective, we can confirm that television series such as *Miami Vice* and the soap opera *Dynasty* captivated Polish audiences at that time. The viewers were less interested in the plot than in the lifestyle these shows portrayed. They would enthusiastically follow the interiors people in the West lived in, what kind of cars they drove, and what clothes they wore. In Poland in the 1990s, the movie theatres screened only American films for

months. At the same time, the sophisticated economic and political ideas imported from the West strongly influenced the local mentality, in particular Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, and Jeffrey Sachs' doctrine of radical privatization.

Perhaps for an outsider, the myth of the West might seem like a surprising combination of rather unrelated, often contradictory elements, archetypes and opinions, yet from the perspective of Sofia and Prague everything made sense. Like for Levi-Strauss, this myth not only warranted the interpretation of the present, but also promised a better, more prosperous, and even morally better future. For nearly three decades, it functioned as a drive toward modernization, mobilizing people to tighten their belts and work hard for a better tomorrow.

A Return to Historical Patterns

Over time, however, the myth of the West lost its strength. One of the most important reasons for this was intergenerational dynamics. Those who entered the democratic system as adults, and even their children, deeply believed in this myth. But for the third generation of citizens who have grown up in Central and Eastern Europe in the meantime, the promise of a better tomorrow as "catching up with the West" is no longer satisfactory. Since they did not experience the poverty of the 1980s and early 1990s, they no longer consider it relevant. The transformational success of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria is therefore relative. The most important thing for them is not the past but the present, and countries such as Germany and France are no longer unsurpassed role models, but ordinary neighbors.

There were also other reasons for the decline of the myth of the West. In particular, a more direct familiarity with the countries west of the Elbe revealed that our knowledge was riddled with generalization and misunderstandings. For example, after the Poles and the Czechs had just enthusiastically embraced European integration by voting to join the EU, the French and the Dutch went on to reject the first draft of a European Constitution. The uncritical pro-American attitude of the Poles, in turn, was "rewarded" with the establishment of a secret CIA outpost in the northern part of their country, where prisoners of U.S. President George W. Bush's "war on terror" were held and most likely tortured. On top of which, there were the financial, the refugee, and the leadership crises in the EU. The West began to be seen as just as ambivalent economically, politically, and—perhaps most importantly—morally as the East.

The fall of the myth of the West not only meant a demise of a powerful modernization drive in Central and Eastern Europe, but also the dissolution of these countries as a relatively cohesive region with a linear historical narrative, moving from communism, a centrally controlled economy and dependence on the Soviet Union to the Western model of liberal democracy, market economy, and structures such as the EU and NATO. From now on, each country follows its own path, marked by deeply rooted historical practices and current political structures.

Thus, Hungary turns to dictatorship, a pattern that the country had already shown in the past. In Poland, the development is less clear, but we can identify a revival of anti-Western resentment as well as tendencies toward anarchy and privatization of the state, which have been present since the 19th century. In contrast, Estonia leans in the directions of the Scandinavian countries..

The Age of Fear

Shortly before the parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015, the migration crisis became the number one topic in public debate. Jarosław Kaczyński, the chairman of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, spoke about “all sorts of parasites and protozoa” that Muslim refugees allegedly brought to Europe. The right-wing media followed, spreading the notion about “hordes of refugees” attacking Polish cities and raping Catholic women. The “dictatorship of Brussels” was omnipresent. Four years later, the Hungarian Fidesz party similarly conducted an anti-EU election against allegedly reluctant EU officials and the American billionaire George Soros who were supposed to be planning to replace current European populations with migrants from Islamic countries.

Of course, the instrumentalization of fear in politics, in particular toward migrants, is a global phenomenon today. And fear has always been an important element in European political discourse. Since the end of World War II, the fear of the horrors of the past has been a fundamental European emotion. For decades, its meaning has been expressed in the German phrase *Nie wieder!* (“Never again”), which was intended to warn against the repetition of totalitarian crimes of the 20th century. In Western Europe, this fear of the past led to a cultural policy that viewed all forms of nationalism with suspicion. Instead, institutions were strengthened, and the rule of law, constitutionalism, and separation of powers were cultivated. In 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe followed suit. They brought with them the experience of two totalitarian systems: the fear of the Nazis was complemented by the fear of the Communists.

The memories of World War II reached their peak in the 1990s. Later they gradually began to play a more symbolic and less concrete role. Here, too, the most important reason was—probably again—generational change.

An Advantage for Illiberals

German writer Bernhard Schlink pointed out that in just a few more years, not a single person who directly experienced the horrors of World War II will still be alive. Over the decades, many efforts have been made to preserve these memories in form of recordings, research projects, or large museums such as the House of European History in Brussels and the Museum of the

History of Polish Jews (POLIN) in Warsaw. And yet, as the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur once warned, the excess of memory leads to shallowness. In Poland, for example, it is in vogue to wear T-shirts with an anchor, the symbol of the Warsaw Uprising. Very few, however, are aware of the senselessness of a combat without weapons that lasted for weeks.

As the fear of the past faded in Europe, it left a large void that could not remain empty. It was quickly imbued with another kind of fear: fear of the future. This fear has many faces, extending from inequality to the disintegration of the EU. Recently, it has been symbolized by the face of a Syrian refugee, which the mass media have frequently associated with the image of an Islamic terrorist. The forces that are trying to protect Central and Eastern Europe from the spread of illiberal politics are largely helpless in the face of fear. The illiberals were not only the first to recognize its existence, but they also took the full advantage of this fear. Finding an answer to it will be one of the greatest challenges in Central and Eastern Europe.

Back to the Future?

German politicians regularly emphasize how important the relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are. Angela Merkel never ceases to seek opportunities for dialogue with Viktor Orbán. On the 75th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising this year, Foreign Minister Heiko Mass repeated the declarations of German remorse for the crimes committed in the 20th century. Ursula von der Leyen travelled to Warsaw shortly after her election as President of the European Commission.

And yet Western Europe finds it difficult to see eye to eye on the future of their Central and Eastern European neighbors. Intellectuals from France and other countries maintain for some time now that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are fundamentally different from the so-called “old EU-countries.” There are not only suggestions of building a “two-speed Europe,” but also of a return to a small EU with just a few original founding states.

The frameworks through which we try to understand contemporary Europe are still based on concepts and mentalities originating in the tragic first half of the 20th century. However, the fundamental acceleration of political and technological transformations affects the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as they affect Germany, France, or Italy. These processes demand careful scrutiny, diagnosis, and a quest for solutions rather than premature judgments. Likewise they require a mutual willingness among neighbors both in Central and Eastern Europe and in Western Europe to get to know each other better. This will take a lot of effort, but only a truly united Europe will be able to face the current challenges.

Green Deal, Greener World

Dmitris Valatsas | Financial Times | December 17, 2019

Last week, the European Commission issued its “Communication on the European Green Deal”—the European Union’s legislative roadmap to carbon neutrality by 2050. But in a world in which emerging markets keep increasing greenhouse gas emissions and the United States is pulling out of the Paris agreement on climate change, one may well ask: What’s the point? After all, the EU accounts for only 10 percent of global emissions—and any gains made there would be more than wiped out elsewhere. Can the EU’s call to climate action actually have an impact?

There is no doubt that the European Green Deal is ambitious: It aims to decarbonize the world’s second-largest economy within three decades. Moreover, the deal’s long but still visible horizon—slightly longer than one generation—means that this goal is technically achievable while still addressing activists’ concerns. Contrast this with the Green New Deal proposed by U.S. Democratic Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Democratic Sen. Ed Markey this year, which envisaged the complete decarbonization of the U.S. economy within 10 years. Anyone familiar with the history of energy transitions, including experts who are supportive of the plan, will attest that this is just not scientifically possible.

But the EU plan is, and proving the feasibility of decarbonization is the first way in which it can help spread climate action policymaking beyond Europe’s borders. The Green Deal is no longer the hazy aspiration of a few climate action enthusiasts; it is a detailed mainstream policy document affecting every sector in one of the richest, most sophisticated economies in the world. If the EU succeeds in its ambitions, it will be able to tell the world that prosperity is not incompatible with climate sustainability.

The past 30 years have already given observers a taste of that: From 1990 to 2018, the EU’s emissions were down 23 percent. Its GDP was up by 61 percent. Getting richer does not have to mean polluting more. By driving the economy toward carbon neutrality, EU climate policymaking can prove as much for others.

The second way in which the Green Deal could succeed is by lowering the costs of the energy transition for everyone. The aggressive pursuit of decarbonization across the EU will provide the funding support and the economies of scale for innovation in clean technologies. Recent history shows how impactful such investment can be: The final cost of solar photovoltaic installations has declined by over 70 percent since 2010. The decline was doubtless helped by the early, heavily subsidized installations in Europe, which in 2012 accounted for 70 percent of total solar installed capacity. Only seven years later, that is down to 30 percent, with the Asia-Pacific region (including China) now accounting for over half of installed capacity.

The European Green Deal could have similar technological spillovers, not just for renewable energy but also for complementary technologies such as energy storage. These will make it cheaper for other geographies, including emerging markets, to decarbonize.

Finally, to be successful, the EU will need to use its economic size and influence in trade and foreign policy if it is to drive climate action worldwide. To do so, it first needs to shed any illusions that climate action is going to be a cooperative process in which the world harmoniously decarbonizes. The failure of the Kyoto Protocol and the intended U.S. withdrawal from the Paris agreement amply demonstrate that decarbonization cannot rely on multilateralism alone. To succeed, the EU must embrace climate unilateralism.

Because of the size of its market, the EU has substantial clout to drive its climate agenda through trade. The Green Deal takes a carrot-and-stick approach. To begin with, it proposes that the bloc only agree to new comprehensive trade agreements with countries that are parties to and are effectively implementing the Paris agreement—most obviously excluding the United States if President Donald Trump is reelected next year. Given how popular the climate agenda is in Western Europe, it seems likely that the EU will commit to this rule.

But in driving its climate agenda, the EU is also taking a leaf out of Trump's playbook: It suggests a provision for a "carbon border adjustment mechanism"—in other words, a carbon tariff. Although that will likely be one of the most contentious aspects of the Green Deal, it is hard to imagine how else the EU could combat carbon leakage, where products that fall foul of environmental regulations if produced in the EU are simply imported from elsewhere, creating the same carbon emissions with none of the economic benefits.

The EU's Green Deal will come with substantial costs—which is why Poland, a member state, has yet to sign up to it. But by being the first major economy to take the plunge, Europe has decided to pay the high costs of early adoption for the uncertain promise that it will benefit others in the future. In foreign-policy terms, too, a unilateral approach will increase the risk of confrontation with traditional allies and trading partners that do not share its ambition on climate action.

In presenting her Green Deal last week, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described it as Europe's "man on the moon moment." It is an apt metaphor for the endeavor: The United States put a man on the moon on its own, paying the full cost for Neil Armstrong's giant leap for mankind. The EU is doing the same thing for sustainable living here on Earth. If it succeeds, the benefits will spread far beyond the borders of Europe.

Transatlantic Cooperation is the Key to European Energy Security Otto Ilveskero | Atlantic Community | October 22, 2019

Europe's economic, geopolitical, and climate objectives converge in the current debate over EU energy policy. This was most recently on display at the European Parliament hearing of the Energy Commissioner-designate Kadri Simson on 3 October, during which she repeatedly stated that President-elect Ursula von der Leyen's Commission aims to foster a successful energy transition that is in accordance with the common long-term climate objectives in a way that also ensures reliability of supply and affordability of prices. To guide the EU toward its climate ambitions within these parameters, the European Commission must take swift action to nurture stronger transatlantic cooperation on the energy sector.

Energy security can be understood as the affordability, availability, and reliability of energy. As things stand, the EU is responsible for approximately 12 percent of the global energy consumption, while producing around 5.5 percent of the global energy in return. This dependency on energy imports makes it particularly important for the EU to diversify its supply to counter overreliance on specific energy forms and suppliers, which would otherwise be damaging to all three components of energy security. This is particularly important in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which is looking to reduce its dependence on Russian-imported energy.

European energy security can also be improved by greater cross-border interconnectivity of transmission infrastructure between the Member States. Crucially, greater interconnectivity relying on a greater number of sources of supply would ensure a more resilient European energy field able to adapt to regional geopolitical and economic challenges affecting the sector. The EU currently maintains a 15 percent interconnectivity target by 2030, which is a component within the Energy Union legislative package based on energy security, competitiveness, and decarbonisation. The implementation of said union is listed as a key priority of the new European Commission.

On 3 October, Commissioner-designate Simson identified lack of investment as the "biggest obstacle" to the EU's energy sector objectives. For the United States to contribute toward closing this investment gap would be greatly beneficial to the mutual interests of the transatlantic partners.

There are obvious economic gains for the U.S. to be made from promoting further liberalisation and integration to boost competition in the European energy market, while assisting the EU with its interconnectivity targets. Such projects could be supported by using the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) to mobilise private investment, for example. Legislation on this new federal agency to financially support the US's foreign policy

priorities was signed on 5 October 2018. US engagement with the EU's energy security would also compliment the strategic priorities of the transatlantic partners vis-à-vis the regional ambitions of China, for instance. In addition to providing an alternative to China's Belt and Road and 16+1 initiatives through more transparent and reliable financing programmes, the EU and U.S. should coordinate screening rules on foreign investments on energy and infrastructure sector projects. Ideally, such common measures should form a part of a wider transatlantic plan on strategic investments.

Nowhere is the need for transatlantic energy and investment cooperation as pressing as in the CEE region. A region showcasing the imbalances present in the EU energy sector, the CEE Member States are particularly dependent on extremely carbon-intensive coal-based energy production as well as on gas supplies from the Russian state-owned Gazprom and would therefore benefit from increased gas supply and diversification of sources. Considering the current geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe, Member States such as Poland are already looking to the U.S. to provide reliable energy to reduce both their greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on Russia.

Deepening the ongoing transatlantic trade on liquefied natural gas (LNG) would thus be a natural starting point toward strengthening the transatlantic energy cooperation to foster both EU security of supply and energy transition. Natural gas emits around 50 percent less CO₂ than coal when producing the same amount of energy and the commercial availability of the technology makes it one of the most cost-effective alternatives to achieve considerable short-term emission reductions in the EU. The European Commission has also recognised this role of gas on LNG and bio-methane especially in its A Clean Planet for All (2018) strategic vision for 2050. Therefore, such cooperation would allow the EU to directly contribute to the decarbonisation targets embedded in its Energy Union legislation and climate objectives.

Moreover, further LNG terminal projects in Croatia, Lithuania, and Poland would allow the CEE region in particular to continue to diversify its sources of supply. In 2014, the then President of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė, even went as far as to say that the ability to import LNG would curb the “existential threat” of having to rely on Russian supply. In fact, Lithuania managed to lower their overall energy costs and negotiate a 20 percent price reduction with Gazprom for the following year after the new LNG infrastructure pressured the Russian energy supplier to compete in the market.

To make the overall cooperation more effective, however, investments must be made available beyond terminals and toward supporting interconnected infrastructure projects to avoid congestion in some Member States and lack of supply in others. Washington must also demonstrate that it has sufficient capacity to deliver the necessary quantities of LNG at a competitive price to further encourage this development. Such reliable access to gas supply

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would grant crucial support to both energy transition and security of the most carbon-intensive EU regions in particular—also in Member States without a coastline. There are numerous reasons for why the transatlantic ties between the EU and U.S. should be reinvigorated, and energy security offers one of the most compelling ones. Providing transparent and reliable alternatives to Chinese investment programmes and Russian energy supplies through greater transatlantic cooperation should thus feature strongly on the agenda at the next EU-U.S. Energy Council.

We're Staying Silent Out of Fear

Charles Lane | The Washington Post | October 15, 2018

Most ordinary people found it unbearable to live under communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The reasons varied: shortages of consumer goods, incessant propaganda, restrictions on travel.

Nothing was more psychologically exhausting than the constant pressure to watch every word one said, and to pretend to believe things one did not, for fear of negative repercussions. Dissidents called this “double morality” or “double consciousness.” It drove people crazy. Actually, it drove some to suicide. Only among trusted family and friends was it possible to speak one’s mind, yet even that was not guaranteed. Of all aspects of totalitarian life, citizens of the former Eastern Bloc say, this is the hardest to explain to those who grew up in the democratic West.

Until now, perhaps. A new study of political attitudes in the United States offers stunning evidence that most Americans censor themselves, except among people they regard as like-minded, on a bundle of sensitive topics: immigration and immigrants; race and racism; gay, lesbian and gender issues; and Islam and Muslims.

The report by More in Common, a new nonprofit dedicated to understanding and healing political polarization in the United States and Europe, is based on a nationwide survey of nearly 8,000 people conducted this past December and January. It found that between 51 and 66 percent of Americans agree there is “pressure to think a certain way about” each of the aforementioned topics, with immigration seen as the least sensitive and Islam the most. Meanwhile, 68 percent report that “it is acceptable for me to express what I think” about race, or Islam, only among “people who are like me.” On immigration, 73 percent feel that way; on gay, lesbian and gender issues, the figure is 70 percent.

Political freedom has never been absolute in the United States, to be sure. For much if not most of our history, ostracism or worse awaited advocates of racial equality, especially in the South. If anyone understands the oppressiveness of being forced to present a false front every day, it would be the American gay men and lesbians who grew up in the era of the closet.

Conversely, a certain measure of self-censorship is necessary to democracy; to the extent that people refrain from gratuitously broadcasting bigotry, it promotes trust and rational discourse. For all that, the More in Common report confronts us with a disturbing reality. We are a long way from the “double morality” of Eastern Europe, but we are, apparently, living among many millions of citizens who routinely lie or dissemble about their political opinions out of fear. And what do they fear? Not necessarily government repression, the report suggests, but

ridicule and harassment from their fellow citizens, which is often magnified by social media and can sometimes lead to trouble at school or work.

Large majorities of the public—80 percent or more—see both hate speech and political correctness as problems plaguing American politics. Defiance of the latter fueled Donald Trump's electoral rise. Outrage at the former fuels the anti-Trump resistance.

Under communism, members of the party had to watch their words and deeds as much or more than other citizens did.

In the United States today, right and left-wing tribes—Progressive Activists and Devoted Conservatives, as the *More in Common* report designates them—enforce “core beliefs” within their own ranks. A quarter to a third of Americans feel pressure to “think a certain way” about controversial issues even among people like themselves, according to the report. Among progressives, more men than women felt pressure to conform; among conservatives, more women than men did.

With these less-than-tolerant ideological factions dominating everything from town hall meetings to Twitter, the far larger percentage of Americans who do see nuances, and who do favor policy compromise, keep their heads down.

They now constitute what the report describes as an Exhausted Majority, consisting of about two-thirds of the electorate. And 65 percent of the Exhausted Majority agree with the statement “people I agree with politically need to be willing to listen to others and compromise.” Yet their views are not reflected in political discourse, they believe.

They're right: According to the report, the progressive and conservative ideologues who dominate Democratic and Republican party politics are 14 points more likely than the Exhausted Majority to believe that “people I agree with politically need to stick to their beliefs and fight.”

For the time being, the president of the United States is openly sowing fear and anger for political gain in the 2018 midterm elections, and his Democratic Party opponents seem increasingly tempted to respond in kind. Hope for more decent and, indeed, freer politics lies in the possibility that members of the Exhausted Majority will wake up and raise their voices.

Munich Museum Is Another Step in Acknowledging the City's Nazi Past
Melissa Eddy | The New York Times | May 1, 2015

The Nazis first displayed their overt hunger for power in lock-step parades through Munich's elegant Königsplatz. Today, against the backdrop of imposing neo-Classical buildings, the striking white form of the city's new Documentation Center for the History of National Socialism appears oddly misplaced. It is too simple, too clean.

That incongruity was the desired effect of the center, which opened its doors to the public on Friday, more than a decade after it was first approved. It is meant to force both residents and tourists in the Bavarian capital to stop and ask themselves: What is that building? And why is it here, in Munich?

Winfried Nerdinger, the museum's director, who has worked since 1988 to see the center realized, said that the structure and its contents were designed to provide sobering answers.

"This is a perpetrator site," Mr. Nerdinger said. "Those who carried out the crimes actually sat here, and the emphasis is on retracing how it could have come to this."

The permanent exhibition follows the rise of the Nazi Party chronologically over three floors. Using a mixture of images, text and an audio guide, the center examines how the Nazi movement grew out of the German Workers' Party, or D.A.P., founded in a Munich beer hall in 1919; was embraced by middle-class society; and grew into a force that spread throughout Germany and later Europe, leading to World War II and the Holocaust.

The exhibition starts on the fourth floor and works its way down, leading visitors through the role that Munich and its society played in creating fertile ground for the far right and the radical anti-Semitism preached by the Nazis.

The lower floors are dedicated to an examination of how postwar Munich handled its Nazi history and how anti-Semitism and racial discrimination remain relevant today, through news reports and a study of neo-Nazis in the city. During the opening ceremony on Thursday, several dozen neo-Nazis gathered at the edge of the security perimeter, decrying the center as misleading, unnecessary and a waste of public funds.

Mr. Nerdinger said his main goal was education: "to examine what lessons can be taken away from this site, and how are they relevant in the present day?" Although some in the German news media criticized the exhibition as little more than a well-presented, life-size history book, its message seemed to reach and resonate with the visitors who turned up on the May 1 Labor Day holiday for its opening.

Martin Mühlischlegel, who was among the first several hundred people to tour the center, said he had initially questioned whether yet another memorial to the Nazi era was necessary. “I first thought, ‘Not another one,’ but after going through it, I found it very informative, very well done, and I think it will be a positive addition to the city,” he said.

Germany, more than most countries, has dedicated itself to working through the questions of its past crimes. In Bavaria alone, the memorial sites include the Dachau concentration camp and documentation centers at the Nazis’ rally grounds in Nuremberg and at the Obersalzberg mountain retreat, with its view of the Alps, where Adolf Hitler hosted foreign guests and Munich intellectuals. All are meant to recall the past and warn of its implications for the future.

But as the country struggles to cope with an influx of some 200,000 migrants fleeing conflict and poverty last year alone, reminders of Nazi sentiments have emerged. Refugee shelters in Bavarian villages have been defaced with swastikas or set on fire. In Dresden, thousands of Germans have joined weekly demonstrations against Muslims and other immigrants.

While those demonstrations, organized by the anti-immigrant movement Pegida, drew support from across the country, nowhere were the counterprotests stronger than in Munich, where several hundred anti-immigrant demonstrators were drowned out by thousands who turned up to send a message of tolerance and diversity.

Yet Munich, more than any other place in Germany, has struggled to come to terms with its fall from what Thomas Mann described in 1926 as a society “once healthy and gay” to “a hotbed of reactionary sentiment and the seat of inflexibility and resistance to the will of the times.” After a thwarted communist revolution and a crippling economic depression, the far right found legitimacy among much of the upper middle class, which welcomed Hitler and his newly established party.

In 1930, the Nazis purchased an elegant villa just east of the Königsplatz, where they established their headquarters. Known as the Braunes Haus, or Brown House, the building was largely destroyed by bombing and cleared by the American Army after World War II. For decades, the site sat vacant, until the city decided to build the center there at a cost of more than \$31 million.

Tall, slatted windows on the upper floors provide views of the surrounding buildings, creating a connection between the exhibition housed within the center and the city without. From a vantage point on the third floor, visitors can gaze out at the former Führerbau—today home to the Munich University of Music and Theater—where Hitler signed the treaty decreeing that Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland in 1938, while screens show film footage of Nazi parades past the site.

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Schloss Elmau and Munich, Germany

Hilton Sullivan, a native New Yorker who has lived in Munich for 31 years, said he had been overwhelmed by the power of the images. Although he was aware that Munich played a special role in the growth of the Nazi Party, he said he had never really given it much thought until visiting the center.

"It is incredible how it took place and the whole development, to see how Hitler was able to win people over," Mr. Sullivan said. "He was magical in a morbid way."

For decades after the United States Army marched into Munich on April 30, 1945—70 years to the day before the center's opening ceremony—proudly brandishing the sign removed from the city limits declaring "Munich, Capital of the Movement," the city preferred to think of itself as a "global city with heart," largely ignoring the role it had played in giving birth to the Nazi movement.

In the 1980s, that began to change. The municipal authorities conducted a study of the city's role in Nazi-era history. At the same time, younger Germans were beginning to explore who had suffered under the Nazis. Towns and cities sought to identify Holocaust survivors and invite them back, to give victims a face and a name.

In 2001, Munich set out to build the Documentation Center, to confront its past by examining the question of how and why it happened, while reminding visitors that history remains relevant.

"The Nazi period will remain a thorn in Germany's side," said Andreas Wirsching, director of the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich. "We will continually be confronted with the question of how it could be that such a highly civilized country plunged into such an abyss of transgression, into a regime of injustice and murder. That is a lasting question of humanity that can be nightmarishly relevant."

No End in Sight to German Employment Boom

Ulf Sommer & Frank Specht | Handelsblatt | January 30, 2019

Introduction

Despite the slowing world economy, German companies remain in hiring mode, with the 30 blue-chip firms listed in the DAX index currently looking for a total of 20,000 workers in Germany—including 3,000 at Volkswagen alone.

Most of the 9,000 firms polled by the Ifo economic institute plan to keep on increasing their workforces.

The boom is confirmed by another survey of 1,500 firms by consultancy EY. It showed that 38 percent plan to increase their payrolls in Germany over the next six months. That's the highest percentage since the regular survey was launched in 2004. Only 3 percent of businesses plan to shed jobs.

More than half of Mittelstand firms currently regard the difficulty in finding enough skilled workers their biggest business risk. "The lack of skilled labor is a far greater concern to companies than the risk of a cyclical downturn," said Michael Marbler, a Mittelstand expert at EY.

"They know that a shortage of well-trained workers can be a fundamental and lasting threat to a company's innovative capacity, whereas experience shows that every economic downturn is followed by an upturn."

Vacancies reach a record high

The government-owned Institute for Employment Research (IAB) has counted more than 1.2 million vacancies in Germany. Finding the right staff is increasingly a struggle. It currently takes firms 113 days to fill a vacancy, 11 days more than a year ago, according to research by the employment agency. For every 100 vacancies registered, there are only 247 unemployed people, down from around 1,100 in 2009, when the country was in a recession caused by the financial crisis.

The agency said the number of professions suffering significant labor shortages had increased by 40 over the last year to 86. They include mechatronic engineers, vehicle technicians, construction workers, sanitary and air conditioning engineers, train drivers and software developers.

Carmakers looking for tech specialists

Among DAX companies, even the ones that are currently shedding jobs like Siemens and Deutsche Telekom are looking for skilled workers to help them manage the accelerating pace of technological change.

The shortage is particularly acute in the auto industry, even though almost half the listed companies in that sector has issued profit warnings. Daimler seeks 2,000 workers for locations including Stuttgart, Mannheim, Berlin, and Munich. The most sought-after workers are development engineers, system architects, battery-engine specialists, 3D graphics experts and self-driving technology experts.

Health engineering firm Fresenius has 1,600 vacancies for engineers, IT experts, care workers and doctors. Deutsche Telekom is looking for 800 people in Germany, mainly software and cloud experts.

Siemens, which came under fire in late 2017 after announcing 6,900 job cuts mainly in its power and gas division, is also hiring. It has 1,184 vacancies for software developers, engineers and electric engine specialists at sites across the country.

Wages growing moderately

This shortage of labor hasn't led to pay increases, however. Salaries for skilled workers have been rising at annual rates of just 2 to 3 percent for more than a decade, according to recruitment consultancy Kienbaum. Around 1,000 German firms polled by Kienbaum expect a slight acceleration in wage growth to 3.3 percent for 2019, slightly above 3.1 percent for the overall market.

"Wages have increasing more than in times of mass unemployment but given the strong development of the labor market, there's certainly room for improvement," said IAB labor expert Enzo Weber.

However, the WSI Institute of Economic and Social Research found that real incomes in professions listed as suffering from skills shortages increased by 6.5 percent between 2013 and 2017, higher than the general increase of just over 5 percent for skilled workers in all professions.

There are several reasons why rising demand for labor doesn't always mean commensurately higher wages. Firstly, productivity in Germany hasn't been growing as fast as employment, meaning that many firms can't afford massive pay hikes.

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Germany's collective bargaining system is a further factor. "Wage hikes are negotiated for sectors, not for individual professions," said Weber of the IAB. That means when giant metalworking union IG Metall pushes through new wage contracts, they apply to all workers in that industry—and not specifically to skilled jobs in demand. and not specifically to skilled jobs in demand.

Bitkom: Digitalization to wipe out millions of jobs in Germany
Deutsche Welle | February 2, 2018

Introduction

Digitalization is expected to claim some 3.4 million jobs in Germany within the next five years, according to a new study by the IT industry association Bitkom.

The study also predicts that—when it comes to German companies employing more than 20 people—every fourth firm will face the risk of disappearance due to digitalization.

With the labor market performing at near-record highs, Europe's strongest economy has about 44.5 million people who are classified as employed and residing in Germany as of December 2017.

Half of the jobs may grow obsolete

However, Bitkom warned that the good times might be coming to an end. In the article published by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on Friday, the organization's head Achim Berg cited the example of the telecommunications industry. The sector was among the first to be transformed by digitalization.

In the 1990s, according to Berg, some 200,000 people were employed in the field of communications technology. Today, only 20,000 remain.

"We have lost 90 percent of jobs in this sector in just 15 years," Berg told the newspaper, adding that employment at banks and insurance companies as well as chemical and pharmaceutical firms were digitalization's likely next targets.

For example, tax advisors might soon be replaced by algorithms, while 3D printers could create dental molds rather than them being made by human dental technicians. Within the next two decades, according to Bitkom, half of the current job profiles will become obsolete.

The techies who cried wolf?

The German IT association is far from the first group to sound the alarm over the threat that modern technologies pose to the labor market. In the past, development of new technologies also created new professions and jobs to manage the new kinds of machines. Also on Friday, the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) rejected the scenario described by Bitkom, calling it alarmist.

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Germany is not “running out of jobs,” DIHK chair Martin Wansleben said. Instead, the country faces a deficit of highly qualified employees. Wansleben stressed the importance of new business models and continuous education in order to keep up with the times.

Germany's Mechanical Engineering Industry Association (VDMA) responded in a similar fashion, saying that digitalization would be “a job-creating engine” for the country. According to the group, “more jobs will be created than lost by digitalization.”

Berlin ‘detached from reality’

In the Friday article, Berg called on German politicians to pay more attention to the challenges of digitalization. The current talks on forming the next grand coalition focus on issues such as pensions or doctors' salaries, but not on the economy of the future, according to Berg. Germany's largest political parties have so far pledged to revamp the nation's internet infrastructure by 2025. Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives have also called for expanding the existing Ministry of Transportation to create the Ministry of Transportation and Digitalization.

Berg said the discussion was “strangely detached from reality.” “At the World Economic Forum in Davos, pretty much every event discussed artificial intelligence,” he told the paper. “I have heard way too little about it in Berlin.”

ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG GMBH BIOGRAPHIES

Sandra Breka, Member of the Board of Management



Sandra Breka was appointed to the Board of Management of the Robert Bosch Stiftung in September 2017. Her portfolio includes the foundation's areas of support International Understanding and Cooperation, Active Citizenship , as well as the department Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy. She furthermore supervises the Events and Operations at the Berlin Office.

Since joining the Robert Bosch Stiftung in 2001, she has been responsible for a wide range of programs, the establishment of the Robert Bosch Academy, the liaison with public and private partners in Berlin as well as the foundation's Berlin Office, most recently as Senior Vice President since April 2013.

An expert in international relations as well as foreign and security policy, Sandra Breka previously served as Program Director at the Aspen Institute Berlin after an assignment with the American Council on Germany in New York. After studies in Germany, France and the United States, she obtained her M.A. at Columbia University in New York. She was a Yale World Fellow in 2008.

Sandra Breka is a Member of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) as well as the Board of Directors and the Executive Committee of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). She represents the foundation on the European Foundation Center (EFC) Governing Council, the Board of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) and the Executive Committee of the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung (SNV).

Henry Alt-Haaker, Senior Vice President, Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy



In his role as senior vice president Henry Alt-Haaker heads the “Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy” department since January 2020. It includes the Foundation’s programs addressing political decision makers, its think tank partnerships and the Robert Bosch Academy. As such, the department contributes to the Foundation’s activities in all its thematic areas. Henry joined the Foundation in August 2013 as program officer and later served as a senior project manager. Before joining the foundation, Henry Alt-Haaker headed the parliamentary office of German Minister of Justice Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger as chief clerk, served as a political officer at the Canadian Embassy in Berlin and worked for the international NGO Humanity in Action on human and minority

rights. His expertise includes migration and integration, German politics as well as European and transatlantic affairs. He is an alumnus of several German foundations, including the German National Academic Foundation. After having studied German literature and philosophy at Humboldt University in Berlin, Sorbonne University in Paris and Washington University in St. Louis, he obtained a Master in Public Policy at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.

Laura Strömpel, Project Manager, Strategic Partnerships and Robert Bosch Academy



Laura Strömpel has been project manager at the Berlin Representative Office of the Robert Bosch Stiftung since March 2015. In this capacity, she is working for the department Strategic Partnerships & Robert Bosch Academy. Her portfolio includes programs with German policymakers such as the program “Policymaking in the 21st Century” and various Congress-Bundestag formats. Before that, she has been working for the Robert Bosch Academy with a focus on internal processes and the Richard von Weizsäcker Forum. She studied cultural sciences and European studies at European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) and London. During her studies, she worked for the German Council on Foreign Relations and the World Cinema Fund.

THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES (GMF)

Dr. Karen Donfried, President



Dr. Karen Donfried is president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Before assuming her current role in April 2014, Donfried was the special assistant to the president and senior director for European affairs on the National Security Council at the White House. In that capacity, she was the president's principal advisor on Europe and led the interagency process on the development and implementation of the president's European policies. Prior to the White House, Donfried served as the national intelligence officer (NIO) for Europe on the National Intelligence Council, the intelligence community's center for strategic thinking. As NIO, she directed and drafted strategic analysis to advance senior policymakers' understanding of Europe. Donfried is a member of the Board of Trustees of Wesleyan University, her undergraduate alma mater. She serves as a senior fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Council on Germany. Donfried is a member of the Team of External Advisors to the President of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly. She was a member of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's Foreign Affairs Policy Board from 2015 to 2017. Donfried has a Ph.D. and MALD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a Magister from the University of Munich, Germany. She holds a bachelor's in government and German from Wesleyan University. She received the Cross of the Order of Merit from the German government in 2011, became an officer of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic in 2018 and an officer of the Order of the Crown of Belgium in 2010, and received a Superior Honor Award from the U.S. Department of State in 2005 for her contribution to revitalizing the transatlantic partnership.

Reta Jo Lewis, Senior Fellow and Director of Congressional Affairs



Reta Jo Lewis is a Senior Fellow and the Director of Congressional Affairs at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Lewis draws on her immense experience and GMF's resources and European networks to connect Congress and GMF. In January 2015, she joined GMF's Leadership Programs, where she focuses on leadership development, outreach, programming, and thought pieces on global engagement strategies to strengthen the next generation of transatlantic leaders. Previously, she served as the State Department's first-ever special representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs, under secretaries of state Hillary Clinton and John Kerry from 2010-13. Lewis led the office charged with building strategic peer-to-peer relationships between the U.S. Department of State, U.S. state and local officials, and their foreign counterparts. In her post, she served as the State Department's lead interlocutor in negotiating and executing the first historic agreements to solidify subnational cooperation and engagement efforts with BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries and with targeted countries in the European Union. She was the driving force behind the global engagement of American state and local government leaders' integration into and strategies behind sustainability and climate change to RIO+20, COP-16, COP-17, and COP-18.

Sudha David-Wilp, Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Deputy Director, Berlin Office



Sudha David-Wilp is a senior transatlantic fellow and deputy director of the Berlin office. She joined GMF's Berlin office in September 2011. She oversees GMF's Congress-Bundestag Forum, a joint program with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and engages with the media as an expert on German-U.S. relations, and covers transatlantic digital topics. Before moving to Berlin, she was the director of international programs at the U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress in Washington, DC for nearly eight years. At the Association, David-Wilp was responsible for congressional study groups and international programs for current members of Congress and senior congressional staff. She established a trilateral roundtable format for legislators and launched a speakers' program involving current and former lawmakers. She received her bachelor's from Johns Hopkins University, with a major in international relations and a minor in writing seminars. She received her master's in international relations from Columbia University.

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Maurice Velazco, Program Officer, Congressional Affairs, Washington, DC



Maurice Velazco is a program officer for GMF's Congressional Affairs program in Washington, DC. Prior to joining GMF, he served as legislative assistant to Congresswoman Val Demings, in which capacity he developed and advised on the foreign affairs portfolio. Velazco has worked alongside the House Democratic leadership, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the House Armed Services Committee in order to introduce legislation essential to national security and transatlantic relations. Velazco earned his J.D. from the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law where he specialized in international legal studies. Throughout his legal education, he had the privilege of studying under U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, as well as holding summer clerkships with the Supreme Court of Ghana and Supreme Court of Costa Rica. Upon graduating from law school, he accepted a three-month internship with the appellate chamber of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to further develop his international legal knowledge. In addition to holding a J.D., Velazco has an M.A. in security policy studies, with specializations in transnational security and homeland security, from The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs and a B.A. in history from Temple University.

Corinna Blutguth, Program Coordinator, Transatlantic Programming, Berlin



Corinna Blutguth is a program coordinator in the Berlin office. She coordinates and manages events on transatlantic security, European affairs and questions of digitalization. Before joining GMF, Blutguth worked as a program officer for a public-private-partnership of the German Federal Foreign Office, the Robert Bosch Foundation, and the German Council on Foreign Relations. She also gained experiences working for the Kolleg-Forschergruppe Transformative Power of Europe at Freie Universität Berlin. Blutguth studied European Studies in Magdeburg and Brno and holds a master of political science from University of Potsdam. Next to her native German, she speaks English and Spanish, as well as has basic knowledge of French and Czech.

Elisabeth Winter, Program Assistant, Transatlantic Programming, Berlin



Elisabeth Winter is a program assistant based in GMF's Berlin office where she contributes to Transatlantic Programming activities. Her research interests include geoeconomics and the nexus of trade and national security, global economic governance, and U.S. foreign policy toward China and the European Union. She is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies, a joint program by Free University Berlin, the Hertie School of Governance, and the WZB Berlin Social Science Centre. Prior to joining GMF, she was a transatlantic research fellow at the Chancellor Helmut-Schmidt Foundation and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg. She held visiting research positions at Princeton University, Georgetown University, and the Bertelsmann Foundation in Washington, DC. Elisabeth holds a B.A. in international socioeconomics from the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg and an M.A. in North American studies (political science and economics) from the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at Free University Berlin.

Catharine Carstens, Program Assistant, Congressional Affairs, Washington, DC



Catharine Carstens is a program assistant with GMF's Congressional Affairs Program in Washington, DC where she assists with outreach, event planning, and operational support for GMF's congressional relations. Prior to coming to GMF, she interned for the European University Institute in Fiesole, Italy, where she assisted with administrative operations and conducted research on European education policies. She earned her B.A. in International Relations from Purdue University in 2018. At Purdue, she worked as a research assistant, focusing on social movements in the former USSR and interactions between civil society and the state in Russia. She earned her M.A. in European Union Public Policy from James Madison University's campus in Florence, Italy in 2019.

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The Robert Bosch Stiftung

The Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH is one of Europe's largest foundations associated with a private company. In its charitable work, it addresses social issues at an early stage and develops exemplary solutions. For this purpose, it plans and implements its own projects. Additionally, it supports third-party initiatives that have similar goals.

The Robert Bosch Stiftung is active in the areas of health, science and research, education, active citizenship, international understanding and cooperation.

The Robert Bosch Stiftung is committed to upholding the values and example of its founder Robert Bosch and continuing his philanthropic work. With more than 50 years' experience, the Foundation has extensive knowledge, the qualifications for developing solutions, and a comprehensive network of partners, experts, and practitioners.

The Robert Bosch Stiftung is owner of the Robert Bosch Hospital in Stuttgart and the associated research institutes, the Dr. Margarete Fischer-Bosch-Institute for Clinical Pharmacology, the Robert Bosch Tumor Center, and the Institute for the History of Medicine. The Robert Bosch Stiftung is founding partner of the UWC Robert Bosch College in Freiburg, the German School Academy in Berlin, and the International Alumni Center in Berlin. The Foundation holds an approximately 92 percent stake in Robert Bosch GmbH and finances its operations from the dividends it receives from this holding. Since it was established in 1964, the Robert Bosch Stiftung has invested around 1.8 billion euros in charitable work.

On the web: www.bosch-stiftung.de

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan.

GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship.

In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, nonprofit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

On the web: www.gmfus.org

Congress-Bundestag Forum

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Schloss Elmau and Munich, Germany